"تقرير عسكري عن جنوب غرب بلاد فارس، المجلد I. گرمسیر بختياري" [و‎‎١‎٧] (١٦٨/٣٨)

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ments, except fuel. As regards the latter, there are usually large
stacks available at Ahwaz, Band-i-Qlr, and Shallli, as the Shu~
shan burns only wood.*
From Ahwdz to Shushtar .—Transhipping cargo by the tramway
at Ahwaz, the same procedure could be observed as far as Shalili,
but it should be remembered that the Shushan can only carry
about 80 tons of cargo. At Band-i-Qir, it would be convenient
to use the ship as a ferry-boat, in order to enable troops to make
use of the shorter and more fertile Mian-Ab route.
Shushtar, Ahwaz and Bamuz once seized, the task of collecting
food, fodder, transport, etc., would be commeuced under favourable
circumstances, as these towns are the centres of commercial activity
in the district.
Muhammareh to Rdmuz .—In dry weather, a force unencumbered
with much baggage could reach Ramuz from Fallahieh in 6 days,
but the first two stages are partly by boat on the Marid canal,
and partly over marshy ground intersected by canals, and would
not always be practicable. A route could probably be found
from a point some miles up the east bank of the Karun, which
would be free from these obstacles.
It must be borne in mind, however, that this region may be the
objective of a force coming elsewhere than from the North. The
Perso-Turkish frontier, an ill-defined line running nearly parallel to
the Karun from near Muhammareh was mapped, but not demarcat
ed by a Commission in 1865, and may still give rise to disputes.
The construction of the Baghdad railway, and especially its pro
jected extension to a point near Basrah, would give Turkey an
enormous strategical advantage by enabling her rapidly to concen
trate troops on the frontier. Muhammareh and Ahwaz, and in
a smaller degree Shushtar, all lie open to aggression from the west;.
and with consolidation of Turkey’s influence in Mesopotamia,
which is likely to follow the construction of the railway, and of
canals, aggression directed against Persian territory in these parts is
not beyond the bounds of possibility. It must be remembered also
that along the frontier there is no lack of inflammable material in
the shape of semi-independent ’Arab tribes whose internecine disputes
may be made the excuse for a forward movement.
Our arrangements with the Shaikh of Muhammareh, and our
interests in the Persian Gulf would not permit us to consent to
an occupation of Persian territory by the Turks, and com
* Arrangements are being made to burn crude oil in 1910—a great advantage
from every point of view : the crude oil will be brought down from Maidan Minaftun
by the pipe-line to Ahwaz. In this ease the wood supplies referred to will not be
available.