ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [ظ‎‎٤‎٧] (٣٣٠/٩٩)

No. 1.
If, as seems not unlikely, the Trans-Persian railway in its entirety should prove financially
uninviting, it cannot be overlooked that the scheme is not necessarily one indivisible whole, and
d prendre on a laisser as such. Portions of the line, principally perhaps, within the Russian
sphere but not improbably in the neutral sphere as well will be carried out eventually, whether
or not there is British participation. If attention be confined for the moment to the Russian
sphere : here is an extensive region where British commerce is considerable now and might in
the future be increased, but where, under the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention,
British subjects are debarred from railway enterprise, except by consent of the Russian
Government.
It may possibly be objected that the line from Yezd to Tehran is not a natural artery of
British trade: but the Trans-Persian project, so far as the Russian sphere is concerned, is not
confined to the main line, it comprises branches from Tehran to Khanikin, and from Ispahan to
the main line. It is of great importance that the large British trade which enters Persia vi^
Bagdad should receive equality of treatment on any line which may be built from Khanikin to
Tehran.
The Board of Trade have represented, in regal'd to other railways, that it well-nigh impossible
to insure against inequality of treatment unless there is an adequate representation of British
interests on the board of management. The Russian Government in regard to this railway
propose British participation, and the percentage of British representation on the Board is a point
in regard to which His Majesty’s Government have made full reservations.
The most effective way of precluding manipulalion of rates would perhaps be (a) an
agreement with Russia to this effect combined with (h) the establishment of an international
“Rates and Traffic Committee” whose function would be to arrange and enforce a table of
rates, and there could be machinery for appealing to an impartial expert if decisions were not
unanimous.
No. 2.
It is urged that British and Indian trade depends on railways running inland from the
sea board, and “ that if we have these we may be able to compete in north-west and north
Persia with Russian goods imported via Astara, or German goods imported via Khanikin.” Such
competition in north and north-west Persia does not appear very promising if our railways from
the Gulf stop short, as they must do, on reaching the Russian sphere, and if, by declining to
participate by in the Trans-Persian project, we reject any share in the management of, or control
over the freight charges upon, the lines in the Russian sphere : camels and caravans are not
likely to prove efficient means of transport where the trade rival has a railway at his service.
No. 3.
Again, it has been urged - that a Trans-Persian Railway, “ with its long run through the
wilderness from Karachi, will not enable us to compete in north and north-west Persia. The
journey through the wilderness does not, it must be conceded, seem likely to contribute to this
result: what may, however, contribute to successful competition is the possibility that Indian
and Bntish goods can be sent by sea to Bunder Abbas, and thence be conveyed, without break
of bulk, to the very heart of the Russian sphere. Should there be a branch from the Trans-
I eisian line to Bushiie (though there may be objections to this on other grounds) there would be
a choice of ports for the disembarkation of goods destined for through transport to north-west
and north Persia.
No. 4.
Ihree further points of alleged financial disadvantage in
have recently been submitted for examination :—
the Trans-Persian Railway scheme
(a.) The feared loss to British shipping by diverting the mail subsidy from a British Company to
one winch will be international. r s
(b.) If Bunder Abbas becoines a great port it will grow at the expense of Bombay and Karachi.
(c.) 1 he sections of the railway between Karachi and Bunder Abbas would involve a dead loss to
of India VenUeS,> ^ ^ Baluchistan) must necessarily be built by the Government
(a.) 1 he mail subsidy argument is familiar from the Bagdad Railway controversy; it is
plausible, but it is doubtful if it will bear closer examination. So Jong as the sea route remains the
quickest the mails will continue to be conveyed by sea. When the Bagdad route is completed
and if, as is probable it is more expeditious, the public will mark Indian correspondencevH
Vienna, and the Post Office, as m the case of the Siberian Railway, will adapt itself to the
common-sense of the public. I he question at issue will not be, then, whether the mail subsidy
should be paid to a British Company or an international railway: it will be, should it be paid to
a brerman Railway Company or to an international one partly British ?