مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎١‎٧‎٩] (٥٤٠/٣٥٩)

the feeling against the former was demonstrated by a mass of documents published
in the Mecca Umm-al-Qura of the 5th August, the first number to appear after
the defeat of the rebels. Among those who had clamoured for drastic action were
the King’s eldest son, the Ulema of Nejd and the Ikhwan. Ihe King was too
politic to let himself be embroiled with His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom. Having disposed of Ibn Rifada, he dispersed the bulk of the Ikhwajp^
promising, it was said, to inform them of the result of his diplomatic action by
middle of October. His first step in a new diplomatic campaign against the Amir
was to send a “ personal and private ” memorandum to Sir Andrew Ryan on the
5th August for transmission to His Majesty’s Government. He restated
vigorously his grievances against Abdullah. He suggested explicitly that the only
cure was the removal of the Amir. Admitting that this was a matter for His
Majesty’s Government to decide, he propounded as an alternative that they should
guarantee “the neutrality of Transjordan and its non-interference of our
affairs.” He would trust such a guarantee, but added that “in that case the
Sharif Abdullah should cease from all his activities and foregatherings, both
hidden and open.”
23. Although His Majesty’s Government were unwilling to engage in any
formal investigation of the origins of the Ibn Rifada affair and the other activities
connected with it, Sir Andrew Ryan was asked at this juncture to prepare a
review of the available evidence for use on his return to England on leave early
in September. He produced a voluminous memorandum which tended to the
general conclusion that there was a widespread conspiracy with ramifications in
South-Eastern Arabia, Eritrea, Egypt and elsewhere, and that it had the closest
connexion with Amman. He considered that three personages in the Amir’s
entourage were deeply implicated, namely, the Amir Shakir, Hamid Pasha-al-
Wadi and one Abdurrauf-as-Sabban. He discovered no evidence against the Amir
Abdullah himself, unless it were a presumption that he must have been a party to
proceedings in which so many people about him were involved.
24. By the time Sir Andrew Ryan reached London one more hopeful factor
had come into the situation. General Wauchope had obtained from the
Amir Abdullah on the 1st September an expression of readiness to recognise
Ibn Saud, if required, a course to which the Amir had previously been bitterly
opposed. The promise was unconditional, although the Amir expressed some not
unreasonable desiderata, one of which was that His Majesty’s Government should
arrange for a treaty of friendship between him and Ibn Saud. King Feisal of
Iraq would appear to have played some part in producing this result, although
an earlier suggestion that he should act as honest broker, on a request from
Ibn Saud and with the blessing of His Majesty’s Government, had fallen
through. The main credit belongs to General Wauchope, whose action paved the
way for a communication addressed to the Saudi Government by Mr. Hope Gill
on behalf of His Majesty’s Government on the 6th October. It intimated that
the Amir Abdullah was prepared to recognise Ibn Saud as King of Saudi Arabia
subject to similar recognition of his own position. It suggested that mutual
recognition should be the first step, to be followed by immediate negotiations for
a treaty between the two rulers. It expressed the readiness of His Majesty’s
Government to take part in the negotiations, and, if a treaty were concluded, to
use their best endeavours to secure the loyal execution of its terms. Reference
was made to the wish which Ibn Saud had repeatedly expressed during the first
stages of the Ibn Rifada affair and earlier for a settlement similar to that arrived
at with Iraq in 1931.
25. Ibn Saud replied in a memorandum forwarded to Mr. Hope Gill on the
13th October. He agreed to mutual recognition and to treaty negotiations “on
the lines of the treaty with Iraq, subject to the condition that the British Govern
ment shall guarantee it and shall be responsible for the execution of the terms of
that treaty in Transjordan in the event of the Amir violating any of his
obligations.” On receipt of this memorandum, His Majesty’s Government in
the United Kingdom prepared a draft reply showing precisely what they had in
view. It was proposed to suggest a procedure for mutual recognition and to
define the position of His Majesty’s Government vis-a-vis of the Amir, in such
terms as to make it plain that they w T ould consider themselves responsible for
ensuring the fulfilment of any international obligations contracted by him and