مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎٥‎٤] (٥٤٠/١٠٩)

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45. The fears about the Yemen which Ibn Saud communicated to the
Foreign Office at the end of last year (pargaraph 33 of 1936) were again spoken
of during Mr. Eendel’s visit. The Yemen, the King said, was in a ferment. The
whole country was against the heir apparent, Ahmad, and the Foreign Minister,
a Turk named Raghib, who was in Italian pay. When the Imam’s sons had been
in Mecca for the pilgrimage, one of them, Saif-ul-Islam Husain, had asked Ibn
Sand’s advice about the situation : if there was a revolt in the Yemen what
would be the attitude of (1) Ibn Saud, and (2) the Italians ? The malcontents,
the Prince said, had asked for the removal of Raghib, but he was protected by
Ahmad. They had sent the Imam a written protest, but without effect. If they
were free they would revolt and sweep away both Raghib and Ahmad, and the
Imam, too, if he opposed this popular movement. To this enquiry from Saiyid
Husain, Ibn Saud had replied, he said, that he himself proposed to observe
complete neutrality and non-intervention in Yemeni affairs. He had withdrawn
once when he might have occupied the Yemen, and he did not propose to reverse
that policy. If there should be trouble in the Yemen the most he could do would
be to consult other Arab countries if asked by both sides to try to make peace,
and to see what could be done to give effect to the request.
46. The record of what was said about Italy and the Yemen in the course
of the Rendel conversations will be found in paragraphs 78, 79, 80 and 89.
47. Ibn Saud informed His Majesty’s Minister in December that after the
conclusion of the Italo-Yemen Treaty a few months before he had written to the
Imam asking whether there was anything behind the treaty. The Imam had
assured him that there was not, and Ihn Saud accepted this statement, knowing
the Imam to be a wide-awake man; but he would not answer for the Imam’s
sons, nor for the Yemeni officials.
48. The Iraq Government acted upon their intention (paragraph 31 of 1936)
to write to the King of the Yemen on the subje'ct of his adhesion to the Iraqi-
Saudi Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance. In his reply the King evinced
the friendliest sentiments and his entire approval of the general purpose of the
treaty, but expressed reluctance to adhere to it because of the manner in which
its provisions were conditioned by the Covenant of the League of Nations and
other international instruments. He considered that it was unnecessary for his
foreign policy to have a wider aim than peace and friendship with the rest of
the Arab world, and for this reason he thought it inexpedient to become entangled
in the complications of League politics. He therefore proposed that Iraq and the
Yemen should conclude a new treaty on the lines of the Iraqi-Saudi Arabia Treaty
of April 1936, but without any reference to Iraq’s other treaties or to the League
of Nations. If this were done, he would be willing to use his influence to persuade
Ibn Saud to sign the treaty, too.
49. The Iraq Government then decided to send a mission to the Yemen to
try to overcome the King’s objections. His Majesty’s Government uttered a
warning lest the Iraq Government should accept any proposed Yemeni reserva
tions without close scrutiny. The Yemen, they said, was in the same position as
Saudi Arabia with regard to the League of Nations and the Anglo-Iraq Alliance,
and references appropriate for the Saudi Arabian Government should be
appropriate for the Government of the Yemen. The delegation called at Jedda
on the way to the Yemen and visited Ibn Saud at Mecca. They had instructions
from their Government to invite the Imam to adhere to the treaty either without
reservations or with suitable reservations excluding the Yemen from the applica
tion of the Covenant of the League of Nations and any other international
instrument referred to in the treaty which the King might dislike. Ihn Saud
sent a grumble to His Majesty’s Minister, saying that he was bound by article 17
of the Covenant and by the Kellogg Pact, and thought it hard that Iraq should
be moie generous to the Yemen than to him—though he had forborne to say so
to the Iraq mission. This is, of course, inaccurate. It is Iraq that is bound by
the Co\enant and by the Kellogg Pact, and Saudi Arabia is only affected in that
she cannot expect Iraq to take any action under the treaty that is contrary to the
latter’s obligations under those two international instruments The Foreign Office
examined carefully the reservations which the Iraq mission was to put before
the Imam and found them not unsatisfactory, but pointed out that if Ibn Saud
accepted any reservations sub silentio he would be taken to have agreed to them.