"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [و‎‎٧‎٢] (٢٤٨/١٤٣)

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both in India and in Mesopotamia. We have examined a
mass of correspondence which has been submitted to us
to ascertain why this question of river hospital steamers
was not taken up earlier, and we have made definite
inquiry from the Army Department as to when it was
first raised. We have ascertained that the question of
river transport for the sick was first considered in
February, 1915, when a private organisation in Bengal
offered to provide an ambulance steamer or barge for the
use of the force in Mesopotamia. This offer was accepted,
but the flat selected and equipped for the purpose was
unfortunately lost at sea while en route from Calcutta.
It was then suggested that motor launches should be
used for the speedy evacuation of the sick and wounded,
but for reasons which commend themselves to us as sound,
the Military Authorities in Mesopotamia did not accept
this offer. Motor launches are necessary, but they are
not suitable means of evacuating large numbers of wounded
from great distances, and can only be used profitably for
taking patients for a short distance from one hospital to
another, or to a hospital steamer. This correspondence
is, however, of some importance, as it indicates that the
attention of the authorities in India was drawn to this
question of river hospital transport very early in the
campaign. It is, in the circumstances, somewhat surpris
ing that systematic efforts were not then made to put
matters upon a proper footing.
56. The first indication which we have been able to
discover of any definite steps to remedy this state of
affairs, was in December, 1 1915, when a telegram was
addressed to the Secretary of State stating the necessity
for a number of regular hospital steamers. The figures
before us indicate that previous to the date upon which
this telegram was sent, more than 11,000 patients had been
evacuated down the various rivers of Mesopotamia to
Basra, and we feel, if the facts have been placed fully before
us, that steps should have been taken earlier to remedy
the want. As a result of the telegram to the Secretary
of State, the Director, Royal Indian Marine, was in
January, 1916, asked to provide four paddle steamers and
8 barges, each steamer with its two barges being suffici
ently large to accommodate 500 patients. These were,
however, not provided, and in lieu thereof, and in spite
of the recommendations of the local officers, three stern
wheel steamers which cannot tow barges down the Tigris,
and four small composite barges which are for various
reasons unsuitable, have been supplied.
57. While, however, we consider that the authorities
in India are in great measure responsible for this defect
in the organization, we think that the conduct of the
medical and military authorities in Mesopotamia is also
open to criticism, and we do not believe that they realised
the serious danger that they were incurring by the failure
to provide more suitable means of evacuating the sick
and wounded by water ; at least if they did realise this,
we cannot find that, up to December, 1915, they had
made any requisition on the Indian authorities for properly
equipped river hospital steamers. In the early part of
1915, Surgeon-General Hathaway, then Deputy Director,
Medical Services, Mesopotamia, had six or eight mahailas
fitted out for hospital work ; these were towed by tugs
which accompanied the troops, and he stated that they
met his requirements well. We cannot agree with the
Surgeon-General that vessels of this kind ever were, or
could have been suitable means of transporting sick
and wounded on long journeys, particularly during the
hot season. They may, no doubt, have been very
useful as a makeshift, but we do not think that a few
country boats could have been adequate for the evacua
tion of the sick and wounded of a force of 30,000
men operating in three different directions, that is,
up the Euphrates, Tigris and Karun. It is right
to say, however, that in June, 1915, Surgeon-General
Hathaway applied to the authorities in India for four
tugs for the purpose of towing these ‘mahailas, and that
this demand was refused on the plea that such vessels
were not available. Shortly after this, Surgeon-General
Hathaway apparently recognised that some more suitable
arrangements were necessary, for we find that in August
he asked the Inspector-General of Communications that
a river steamer, capable of accommodating 150 patients,
should be placed at the disposal of the medical services—a
demand which was summarily rejected. The provision
of such a steamer would no doubt have been useful for
the evacuation of sick and wounded from Ahwaz and other
minor garrisons, and also for the transport of medical
units and stores ; but it would obviously not have met the
requirements of the situation in the operations on the
Tigris in the winter of 1915-16, when the casualties ran
to thousands. We consider that this demand, coupled
with the one previously referred to, illustrates the failure
of the head of the medical administration in Mesopotamia
to appreciate the real needs of the situation, for what was
wanted was not one small hospital steamer, but a number
of vessels, properly equipped with necessary personnel and
appliances, capable of accommodating 2,000 or 3,0CO
patients. It is, nevertheless, a matter for some regret
that the refusal of the Inspector-General of Communica
tions to concede this very moderate demand, and the reply
of the authorities in India to the request for tugs, were
so readily accepted as final. We believe that an officer of
greater force of character would have pressed his demands
for separate transport for the medical services much more
strongly. The only other documentary evidence of any
demand in 1915, for hospital steamers, is a telegram of
December 7th. in which the Deputy Director, Medical
Services, Mesopotamia, informs the authorities in Ind.a
that receijt experience (he refers to the evacuation of the
wounded after Ctesiphon) had confirmed his opinion that
well equipped river hospital steamers were absolutely
necessary for the sick and wounded.
58. We also doubt whether the military authorities in
Mesopotamia treated the medical services with much
consideration in this matter, or whether they sufficiently
realised the need of such steamers. We recognise that
their difficulties in the matter of river transport were
very great, and that they found it hard to meet the many
urgent demands made upon them ; but we think that
there were occasions on which the medical requirements
might have received more favourable treatment. Further,
once the need for hospital river steamers was brought to
the notice of the military authorities, we think that they
ought to have informed the authorities in India of the
position of affairs and of the imperative need for such
vessels. We are indeed forced to the conclusion that the
necessity for an adequate provision of this kind of transport
was overlooked both in India and in Mesopotamia, until
the sufferings of the wounded after Ctesiphon made it
apparent that some systematic steps must be taken to
remedy the deficiency. The delay in providing this
form of transport is the more to be regretted because
it is now difficult, indeed almost impossible, to get river
hospital steamers towed across the Arabian Sea to Basra.
The Director, Royal Indian Marine, has informed us that
if he had had proper notice he could, in seven months,
have had the requisite number of vessels built and equipped
in this country, according to specification. Assuming this
to be correct, if the necessary instructions had been given
early in 1915, these vessels could have been built in the
summer months and taken across the Arabian Sea to
Basra in the most favourable season of the year.
59. In view of the fact that it will probably be impossible
to send river hospital steamers from India during the
present monsoon, some local arrangements ought, in our
opinion, to be made for the evacuation of the wounded.
We suggest that, as soon as military requirements admit
of this course, two of the large steamers now in use on
the Tigris and four commodious barges should be regu
larly fitted out and equipped for hospital work. We are
informed that one steamer so fitted out could, with two
barges, accommodate 500 patients, and if the vessel were
properly equipped with electric fans and lights, and with
ice machines or large ice chests, we think that it would
probably be more convenient for hospital work in Mesopo
tamia than some of the hospital steamers which have been
sent for that purpose.
60. For the evacuation of less serious cases, and as a
temporary arrangement pending the equipment of these
steamers, we consider that selected steamers and barges,
out of those now available in Mesopotamia, should be
used for hospital purposes and that systematic efforts
should be made to improve the accortimodation on these
vessels. The awnings should be renewed and made
water-tight, or, if this is not possible, replaced by some
more adequate covering. Cots should be provided for
all patients—folding beds of the “X or American:
“ gold medal ” pattern, or some similar kind, would answer
very well for this purpose. Proper arrangements should
be made for the supply of pure drinking water, and a.