"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [و‎‎٥‎٤] (٢٤٨/١٠٧)

PART XL—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF 105
JUDGMENT AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.
r*'
(C 48—176)
0
^ V
-Jr
D. Atmosphere of Economy up to Date of War and Effect upon Military
Preparations in India.
reasons for resigning were not explained either to the Viceroy or to the Secretary of
nor can he entirely escape from criticism for not having taken more definite action ...,
earlier stage of his tenure of office, if he was certain that the efficiency of the Army, for which
he was responsible, was being impaired by the rigid economy which in all directions was
enforced upon military expenditure in India.
37 Under a policy so rigorously defined, it is not unnatural that military and medical
officers thought that they were best discharging their duty to the Government by keeping
down demands, bv carrying on as best they could without incurring fresh expenditure,
and by discouraging their subordinates from pressing new ideas or ideals which,
though undoubtedly beneficial to the service for which they are responsible, would
entail, at any rate at the outset, additional expenditure.
38. The Vincent-Bingley Commission report upon this tendency in language which
seems to us so accurately to represent the views of many of the witnesses who appeared
before us that we quote it in its entirety :—
The observations of a senior officer who has given evidence to the Commission may be quoted with
advantage in this connection, as they crystallise the views of many others.
This officer writes as follows in an annexure to his evidence : “ In my opinion the Indian system is more
to blame for the breakdown of the Mesopotamia medical arrangements than anything else—a system which
allows officers to think, whether rightly or wrongly
“ (a) That there is more merit to be obtained by keeping quiet and not worrying the higher authorities
than by asking for what is necessary ;
“ (6) That keeping down expenditure is more meritorious than efficiency ;
“ (c) That nothing new is likely to be sanctioned unless a corresponding saving in something else can
be shown ; and
“ (d) That even in small matters anything asked for will be cut down by half. ... A system of
this nature will possibly be good and economical in peace time, but is bound to break down in war.”
There is, in our opinion, much force in this criticism, and though we do not accept this statement in its
entirety, we are inclined to ascribe much of the delay in applying for, and the reluctance to insist on, the
provision of separate river hospital steamers, proper ambulance land transport, electric fans, ice machines,
and other essential requirements to this cause.
39. Assuming that such a feeling generally existed in the Indian Army, it would
affect not merely the medical officers and arrangements but also the combatant office s
and the whole equipment and organisation of the Indian Army. The Mesopotam a
Expedition, in the first instance, was equipped as if for frontier warfare against undisc -
plined tribes armed only with rifles. Its wants rapidly grew ; but there is little, if anything,
in the mass of communications between the India Office, the Indian Government and tin
General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia to show that the authorities either in London
or Simla recognised the immense differences between the conditions of an Indian frontier,
and a Mesopotamian campaign.
40. Some of our witnesses expressed the opinion that the supreme Government of India
did not seem adequately to realise the immensity of the issues raised by the war, and that
their response to the necessities of the situation was not as whole-hearted and sufficient
as it might have been. We fully recognise the internal difficulties and embarrassments
which the Indian Government had to face, when the enemy to be encountered was, in his
intrigues and conspiracies, as ubiquitous and unscrupulous as the German Government
has shown itself to be, and we can well understand that in the earlier stages of the war
the Indian Authorities had to devote much of their attention and a considerable propor
tion of their military establishments to counteract such machinations.
But as the dimensions of the war grew, and the character of its issues became more
and more apparent, the Indian Government do not appear to us to have fully risen to the
situation. It would almost seem that they acted on the assumption that the war would
not be one ot long duration, for they adhered to the routine method of normal times,
father than to the impressment of new ideas and the mobilisation of fresh resources.
The standard of effort was regulated more by past experience of previous war than by
the magnitude of the emergency. The unprecedented exertions of Great Britain and her
self-governing Oversea Dominions did not seem to stimulate the Indian Government to
similar efforts. The attitude and disposition of the Indian Government are shown in the
nature of the argument used by them in rejecting military railway expenditure in Meso
potamia, viz., that it might ultimately fall on Indian revenues as being possibly outside the
Imperial guarantee of indemnity for extraordinary disbursements. Neither as regards
compulsory service for Europeans, nor in the organisation of industrial resources for
purposes of war, nor in general finance was sufficient ala^ity shown during the first yea?;
and a half of the war.