"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [ظ‎‎٥‎٣] (٢٤٨/١٠٦)

104 PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.
D, Atmosphere of Economy up to Date of War and Effect upon Military
Preparations in India.
main it is the fact that both he and the Commander-in-Chief in their management of the
expedition entirely depended upon theL official information from that country. The
well-being and adequate maintenance of the expedition were therefore dependent on' the
requisitions and demands made on Simla by the General Officer Commanding and his
subordinates in Mesopotamia. It is therefore worth noting the environment, in which
for years previously military officials had worked and lived, and which represented the
fixed policy of the India Office and Government up to the date of the sudden outbreak
of war.
35. It is a primary duty of every well-regulated Government to enforce effective
economy. In other words, to prevent waste and }^et ensure efficiency. Simple as is the
phraseology of this formula, it is in practice most difficult to enforce, and economists,
when in office, not unfrequently find themselves in defence of their principles obliged
to subordinate efficiency to economy by adopting the simple process of cutting down
aggregates of expenditure, or at any rate, of refusing an increase of existing outlay, no
matter what may be the urgency of the fresh demand.
A policy of strict economy had been insisted on alike by the India Office and by
Simla for many years, and even as late as March, 1914, in a despatch to the Government of
India, the Secretary of State pointed out that the majority of the Army in India Committee
(a committee appointed to overhaul Indian military expenditure), had recommended
“ that the normal standard of net military expenditure should be retained at 19.5 millions
sterling, and that to the extent that reductions can be made in the figure by the economies
we have suggested, but not otherwise, our proposed measures for the improvement of
the Army should be taken in hand." The Secretary of State concluded his despatch
by placing an arbitrary limit on military expenditure as regards fresh demands in the
following words :—
I am anxious to receive from you a general assurance on similar lines as to the limits within which
military expenditure in the immediate future will be confined, and until you are in a position to give it I should
find it difficult to deal with any separate proposals that you might submit for carrying out measures involving
expense that have been recommended for adoption by the Committee.
36. Sir Douglas Haig, when Chief of the Staff, did put forward a memorandum in 1911
suggesting that the Indian Military establishments might have to furnish an expeditionary
force, armed and equipped to meet a European Army. In this paper he contemplated
; the possibility of a war with Turkey either alone or supported by Germany; but it was
| stated in evidence before us that this memorandum did not receive the approval of the
Viceroy, Lord Hardinge. It is a matter of common knowledge that after the Agadir
incident in 1911 there was such a possibility of war with Germany as to call for military
preparation and the consideration of plans of action. We know that such plans—and, to
some extent, preparation—were made in connection both with the Navy and Army at
home. But in India, until late in 1913 or early in 1914, no steps whatever seem to have been
taken to consider what help could be given in such contingencies by the Indian Army.
Still less were preparations made so to equip the Indian Army as to put it upon equal
conditions with modern European troops. The responsibility for this omission must rest
primarily with the Cabinet. Although the Indian Government is, to some extent, inde
pendent of the Cabinet, yet the Cabinet, through the Secretary of State for India, can
exercise control and authority over its actions, but the whole influence of the Home
Government was thrown in the direction of restriction rather than expansion of military
preparation in India.
So far as Mesopotamia was concerned, the consequences were unfortunate—there was
a lack of plans, and a lack of preparations.
Sir O’Moore Creagh was Commander-in-Chief for 4j years ending April, 1914. In
his evidence before us he stated that he was constantly calling attention to the deficiencies
of the Indian Army as regards modern equipment, especially in connection with machine
guns, heavy howitzers, signalling apparatus, wireless and air equipment, transport and
medical complements, and to the inadequate grants made for practice ammunition and the
insufficient sums voted for manceuvres. Sir O’Moore Creagh informed us that his repre
sentations had no result and were practically ignored and to such an extent was he generally
over-ridden by the Finance Department and the Viceroy that he determined to resign
office some six months before the usual tenure of his appointment terminated. But his