"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [و‎‎٢‎٠] (٢٤٨/٣٩)

PART VIII.—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC. 37
* See Part I., para. 23, and Part XL, D.
1 . Every General who appeared before us agreed that the Mesopotamian Expedition
was badly equipped. Sir Beauchamp Duff informed us that the Indian Army, which fur
nished the expedition, was organised only for semi-savage fighting, was not well found for
an overseas expedition, to a large extent used second rate equipment, and was “ backward
in every particular.” He thought, however, that the equipment was adequate for an Indian
Frontier campaign, but even in this very modified commendation he is not supported by
Sir Percy Lake, for many years Chief of the General Staff in India, who declared that the
Indian Army was badly equipped even for frontier warfare. Both General Nixon and his
Chief of the Staff, General Kemball, maintained that the expedition was ill-equipped.
Other witnesses, such as General Aylmer and General Younghusband, agreed in
this view, the latter indeed asserting that the expedition was badly equipped in every
essential, especially transport, ambulance and commissariat.
2 . We have elsewhere* expressed our opinion that the unpreparedness of the Indian
Army for its task in Mesopotamia was primarily due to a long standing policy of economy
and restriction of military preparation to the needs of frontier warfare. For this policy
and its results on the outbreak of war in 1914, the Home and Indian Governments were, of
course, responsible, and not Sir Beauchamp Duff and the General Staff at Simla. But the
unpreparedness for overseas warfare was well-known to the Indian Military Authorities, and
when they undertook the management of an expedition which was to fight egainst Turkey
supported by Germany, they ought immediately to have striven energetically to bring
the equipment of the expedition up to the standard of modern warfare. We shall deal
in the next two Parts of our report with their omissions in this respect as regards transport
and medical provision and we regret to find similar omissions in nearly every other branch
of military provision, with the exception of the commissariat, though even here the standard
was low, and the distribution of food uneven. Serious defects in military equipment,
resulting in unnecessary suffering and casualties among the troops, were allowed to persist
month after month during the first fourteen months of the campaign, when the Indian
Government were responsible for its management.
3. It is true that India was not herself in a position to supply some of the lacking
material, such, for example, as heavy guns ; and it is also fair to recognise that before the
Mesopotamian Expedition was despatched, India had already sent to Europe much of
her finest artillery. But when the responsibility of the Mesopotamian Expedition was
assumed by India, the Indian Military Authorities do not appear, for at least a year, to
have appraised, anticipated or represented to England the needs of the expedition in this
very important particular. From the evidence of Major-General Sir Stanley von Donop,
late Master-General of the Ordnance in England, it would appear that it was not till Decem
ber, 1915, after the reverse of Ctesiphon and more than twelve months after the expedition
had landed at Basra, that any request for heavy guns for Mesopotamia was received by
him, and it was not till May 26th, 1916, more than two months after the Chief of the General
Staff at Whitehall had asked what were the requirements of Mesopotamia in guns, that the
full artillery requirements in Mesopotamia were at last communicated by India to the
War Office.
4. During these months the troops in Mesopotamia had, without adequate preparation
by heavy artillery, to attack across the open and, at the cost of heavy casualties, strongly
fortified trenches, and General Nixon in his evidence stated that his artillery was not only
deficient in number, but out of date in quality. Major Bastow, who was General Towns-
hend’s Aide-de-Camp, stated that the advance against Ctesiphon was undertaken with only
eighteen field guns, and six horse artillery guns ; and Sir Fenton Aylmer informed us that
the lack of proper artillery contributed to the failure of the operations for the relief of Kut.
We may note that the chief shortage felt was in howitzers.
5 . But if it was outside the productive power of India to make good portions of the
defective equipment such as aeroplanes, artillery, high explosive shells, machine-guns,
etc., there were various other articles which India could have arranged to supply, but the
supply of which was not seriously attempted until 1916. The list of deficient equipment
disclosed by witnesses is long and multifarious, and we will only mention some of the chief
items.