ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣، الجزء ٤ "الخليج الفارسي: السياسة تجاه ابن سعود (بعثة النقيب شكسبير)" [ظ‎‎٦‎٥] (٤٢٦/١٢٨)

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8 . I did my best to remove the apprehensions indicated above, but finding 1
that nothing short of a treaty with clauses categorically stating the obliga
tions on both sides would satisfy him, and in order to crystalize what was in
his mind, I suggested that matters would be expedited if I were enabled to
forward a preliminary draft containing what he was prepared to accept and
what he desired. To this he agreed, and I have the honour to enclose herewith
an Arabic copy* and a rough translation
• Not enclosed. of ^ draft «c Bin g au d ” thoroughly
understands that this draft is merely an attempt to produce something more
or less definite on which to work and that it will probably undergo con
siderable alteration, some conditions being removed and others substituted.
However His Majesty’s Government may desire to vary the conditions it
should be borne in mind that “ Bin Saud ” has no intention of abandoning his
neutral position with freedom to make his own arrangements with the Turks
(and he is confident that he can secure from them, so to speak, a very good
“second best”) until he holds a signed and sealed treaty with the British
Government, nor will he move a step further towards making matters
either easier for us or more difficult for the Turks so far as the present war
is concerned, until he obtains in that treaty some^ very solid guarantee
of his position with Great Britain practically as his Suzerain. Granted
this, he can be relied upon to use all his resources and immense influence
in Arabia on our side, not only in the present war but afterwards and to con
tinue after its conclusion to have no dealings with any other Foreign Power
| without first communicating with us. He begs for the earliest possible decision,
for already his neutral position embarrasses him considerably with the Turks,
and failing a very early comprehensive agreement with us he must in self-de
fence and to avoid reprisals give some practical proof of his intentions to side
with the Turks. There is no threat implied in this, for a bitter hatred of the
Tu rks is almost an obsession with Abdul Aziz, but he recognises that failing
British protection he must make peace with his enemy and at once prove
. himself a friend—for him there is no half-way house.
9. I venture to submit that “ Bin Saud” in effect asks for little more
than what has already been conveyed in the Acting Resident’s assurances, if
these were meant to apply to the future and were not limited to the present
crisis, and if they are interpreted liberally and generously. In exchange “ Bin
Saud ” offers to make himself a British vassal for good. The addition to our
responsibilities does not appear heavy:—
(a) The Turkish menaces from the west and north of Nejd, though
very real to Bin Saud, need give us no anxiety—we have no
reason to suppose they will be more successful in the future than
they have been within the last two or three decades, while
guaranteed from attack by sea “ Bin Saud ” will be in a far
better position to meet them than was possible hitherto; should
they become threatening, strong diplomatic representations
would probably suffice to prevent any attempt on a scale with
which “ Bin Saud ” could not cope himself.
(&) We should probably be called upon to act as arbiters somewhat
more frequently than hitherto between the Arab Shaikhs along
the coast and “ Bin Saud ” a duty largely to the advantage of our
own interests.
On the other hand, the advantages seem to be considerable :—
(a) Complete control of the Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf.
(&) Similar complete control of the Arms Traffic.
(c) The practical exclusion of Foreign Powers and influence in Central
Arabia.
(d) The security induced by British Suzerainty and “ Bin Saud’s”
strong control of the Bedouin tribes will give a great impetus
to trade through the Persian Gulf ports, probably diverting a
share of what now passes through the Bed Sea ports.