ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣، الجزء ٤ "الخليج الفارسي: السياسة تجاه ابن سعود (بعثة النقيب شكسبير)" [ظ‎‎٦‎٤] (٤٢٦/١٢٦)

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I four Ulema at Buraidah in what may he described as honourable confinement.
These four men are of the Wahabi sect, residents of Baghdad or Kerbela and
were sent by the Turkish authorities to preach a “ Jihad. ,, It will be evident
from the above that the general .situation politically throughout “ Bin Sand’s ”
territories is as favourable to Great Britain as can be desired.
3. Campaign against “ Ibn Rashid.” —Before proceeding to deal with " Bin
Sand’s ” relations with the British Government it will he well to clear the
ground by explaining his present relations with his neighbours. “ Bin Sand ”
in common with all other Arab Chiefs received repeated requests from the
Sublime Porte to proclaim a “ Jihad ” against the British. The part assigned
to him was the protection and defence of Basrah and Baghdad from any
British advance in Lower Mesopotamia. “ Ibn Rashid ” was to have joined
forces with the Rowala (Anaizah), Howeitat, Bani Sakhr, Sherarat and other
western tribes near the Hedjaz Railway and moved on the Sinai Peninsula
and Egypt, while the Sharif of Mecca, the Imam Yahyah and the Sayyid Idrisi
were to have secured the Red Sea littoral and defended the Holy Places and
other towns and ports in Yemen and Hedjaz. The plan miscarried for the
same reasons that the attempt to provoke a “ Jihad ” has failed—the Ottoman
Government failed to take into account the irritation its policy for the past
five years has produced in Arabia, failed to foresee that combined action
between the tribes would be impossible without some more or less lasting
. composition of their feuds, enmities and jealousies and failed to realize that
religious enthusiasm could not be invoked on the flimsy pretexts it advanced.
The result has been that the Chiefs consulted each other before moving and
apparently came to the conclusion that it would be more profitable to await
events than to take up the Turkish cause. “ Bin Saud,” the Sharif of Mecca
and the Shaikhs of the great Anaizah tribe in Northern Arabia decided to hold
together and remain in constant, communication. “ Bin Saud ” and tc Ibn
Rashid” had been on had terms since the summer and the former, having
decided to open hostilities as soon as the season permitted, apprised the Anaizah
Shaikhs in the north of his intentions and obtained a promise of their support
against “ Ihn Rashid.”
4. At the same time he informed the Turkish Government that being at
feud with “Ibn Rashid” it was impossible for him to move north for the
protection of Mesopotamia, leaving Nejd open to attack, unless and until “Ibn
Rashid” moved on Egypt. Having thus found a legitimate excuse for
taking no action likely to conflict with British intentions in Irak, “ Bin Saud ”
set about his preparations fora campaign against “Ibn Rashid” for the
double purpose of keeping him from any advance Egyptwards and carrying
out his original plan to crush him. “Ibn Rashid” is now of very small
account, there are frequent dissensions between his tribes and he has not the
power to control them, while some of them have actually transferred their
allegiance to “ Bin Saud.” “ Bin Saud ” has collected at this camp some 3,000
to 4,000 of his townsmen, has the whole of the Umtair and Ajman Bedouin
tribes within call and has issued orders for another 4,000 townsmen to join his
standards within the next few days. His preparations are on a scale he has not
attempted since 1911(?) when the Sharif of Mecca at Turkish instigation made
his incursion into Washam. He will move within the week and hopes to find
and crush “ Ihn Rashid ” before the end of January, unless the latter has
moved westwards, in which case new plans will have to he made.
5. Relations with British Government. —It is unnecessary to recall what
passed between British officials and “ Bin Saud ” up to the meeting he had
with Lieutenant-Colonel Grey near Koweit at the end of April 1914. “ Bin
Saud ” assures me that the three months’ time which was arranged for at the
meeting at Ojair in December 1913 having been exceeded by a month and
having received frequent letters from Shaikh Sir Mubarak-as-Subah urging him
to come north to meet the Turkish officials, holding out strong hope of a satis
factory solution with them, he proceeded to Koweit, feeling sure (as he had
kept the Political Agent, Bahrain, fully informed as to his movements) that
he would be able to consult the Political Agent, Koweit, before closing with
the Turks. On reaching Subaihiya he was astonished to receive from Shaikh
Sir Muharak-as-Subah a letter advising him to refuse to treat with the Turks
and intimating that he himself would not be present at the negotiations as he
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