"جزء ٤. رقم ٢٤١٠ لسنة ١٩٠٣. بلاد فارس:- الوضع المالي. القروض." [ظ‎‎٢‎٩‎٨] (١٠٢٦/٦٠١)

only could in any case be realised by impounding
the telegraph revenues, and deprecating such action
as likely to disturb existing relations between his
own and the Persian Telegraph Departments.
43. Mention may here be made of a complaint
by the Russian Government in the spring of 1908
that the Imperial Bank of Persia had sequestered
the customs revenues of Kermanshah (in the Russian
sphere) as a guarantee for sums due to the Bank from
the Persian Government ; it was pointed out that
those revenues were part of the security for Russian
loans. The Foreign Office ascertained that the action
of the Bank had been based on a verbal arrange
ment with the Persian Customs Administration, and,
the Russian representations being held to be well-
founded, a plan was proposed for transferring the
lien acquired by the Bank from the customs
receipts of Kermanshah to those of Bushire. A
note with this object was addressed to the Persian
Government on the 4th November 1908, and, in the
end, the Persian Government undertook to pay
from the receipts of the Bushire customs, as interest
on the Bank’s debts, the sum of 30,000 tomans a
month (72,000L a year) with effect from the 21 st
March 1909 (the beginning of the Persian financial
year). The Bank’s debts, it may be remarked,
amounted in all at this time to 52G,000L (leaving
out of account the Anglo-Indian loan), or about
310,000L in excess of the amount authorised by
their concession. Nearly half the debt was on
account of their advance of 200,000L in 1901 (see
paragraph 6 ), secured on the customs of Fars and
the Persian Gulf.
Transfer of lien of the Imperial
Bank of Persia on the Kermanshah
Customs Receipts to those of Bushire.
Sir A. Nicolson’s Telegram No. 72, 16th
April 1908.
(P. 67.)
Pol. 3090/08.
Sir G. Barclay’s Despatch, No. 293,
5th November 1908.
(P. 138.)
Pol. 4195/08.
Sir G. Barclay's Despatch No. 326,
30th December 1908.
(P 81-)
Pol. 2819/09.
Sir G. Barclay’s Despatch No. 5, 18th
January 1909.
(P. 149.)
Pol. 2851/09.
Sir G. Barclay’s Despatch No. 32, 23rd
February 1909.
(P. 215.)
Pol. 3149/09.
44. Subsequent!} 7 , on the falling off of the
Bushire customs receipts, the receipts of the
Mohamerah customs were also assigned, with the
concurrence of the India Office, to the service of
the Bank’s own loans. Sir G. Barclay had explained
that the receipts at Ahwaz, Lingah, and Bunder
Abbas should amply suffice for the service of the
Anglo-Indian loan.
45. In giving their assent to the arrangement
described in the preceding paragraph, the Treasury
raised the question whether the Persian Govern
ment should not be pressed for a further payment
in respect of the Anglo-Indian loan. The Foreign
Office considered that such action would be useless
in the financial condition of Persia, but that “ the
question must be considered when Persian finances
“ are set in order, or if a further loan to the
“ Persian Government is eventually guaranteed or
<£ made.”
46. The extent of the Persian Government’s
indebtedness at this time had been disclosed in the
report of M. Bizot, their French Financial Adviser,
dated the 15th March 1909, of which the main
Additional lien of Bank on Mo
hamerah Customs.
Letter of India Office to Foreign Office,
15th September 1909.
(P. 379.)
Pol. 3946/09.
Question of pressing the Persian
Government for payment in respect of
Anglo-Indian loan.
Letter of Foreign Office to Treasury
16th September 1909.
(P. 381.)
Pol. 4056/09.
Extent of indebtedness of Persian
Government as disclosed in M. Bizot’s
Report.