"تقرير عن صور. بقلم الرائد ج. ب. ميرفي، المساعد الهندي، الإدارة السياسية الهندية، الوكيل السياسي، مسقط" [ظ‎‎٩‎٢] (٢٠/١٨)

108. The value of Sur from the point of view of prestige appears to have
been realised by Colonel Felly, who wrote in 1869 that if Saiyid Azzan bin
Khais were successful in his expedition in Jaalan, he would be likely to
strengthen his authority so considerably as to be able to keep a firmer grasp
on Muscat territory than any other aspirant to power could.
109. It was also realised by the French, who confined all their efforts
to undermine the Sultan’s authority to that place.
110. The extension of the influence of the Amirs of Jaalan lias also
•caused some uneasiness to Sheikh Isa bin Saleh and the Imam’s Government.
The Council fear that the Imam’s Government may interfere and obtain
mastery over Sur, in which case most of the trade from the interior would
be deviated to Sur, and the revenues and trade of Muscat would become
negligible . 0
111. In 189f) the British Government extended to Saiyid Faisal the
guarantee given to his father that they would not allow attacks to be made
upon Muscat and Matrah, whatever differences the Sultan might have with
his tribes.
In actual practice this guarantee was extended to ail the ports of the
Batineh coast, and to Kuryat, at which British subjects were residing, and
in 1890 an offer was made by the British Government and finally accepted
by the Sultan, of naval assistance for the recovery of Dhofar.
112. If assistance is now to be afforded, the question arises as to what form
such assistance shall take, and I venture to* put forward the following
remarks on the question.
113. It seems hardly likely that at the stage which has now been
reached, Mahomed bin Naser would be deviated from his purpose by moral
pressure alone. His attitude will probably be that of the Jenebeh in 1865 :
“ We have been threatened before. Nothing has happened. We are quite
sure nothing will happen now.”
114. It was suggested last year that economic pressure could be brought
on the inhabitants of Sur by preventing their dhows from trading in British
ports. This was the policy attempted by Napoleon against England. It
failed then. 1 doubt whether it would succeed in the present instance.
115. Naval action has been taken at Sur before, as has been noted in the
Historical Summary of the Jenebeh. The presence, of a man-of-war would
appear to have a good moral effect at the time, but its influence seems to
depart as soon as it has steamed out of sight and the incident forgotten as
rapidly as the promises made to former Sultans on their visits there. Beyond
levying a few fines and possibly destroying a certain amount of property,
the result obtained is meagre. It tends to make British merchants at Sur
more unpopular than ever with their customers and forces them eventually
to seek their means of livelihood elsewhere.!
H 6 . If the administration of Sur is to be brought to that state of
efficiency which its importance as a trade emporium demands, if the slave
trade and arms traffic are to be stopped, and if effective protection is to be
afforded to British subjects trading in Sur instead of allowing them to be
* tn 1891-2 caravan roads from Slmrkiyali to Muscat were closet! by Gliafin tribes, ant!
trade was deviated from that part of the province to Sur, thereby causing a gloomy prospect
for Muscat trade. (Administration Report, 1891-2.)
t In bis letter Xo. 97b 8., dated 28th December 1922, to the address of the Foreign
Secretary to tin* Government of India, commenting on the elTect of shell fire on Oman tribes,
Colonel Trevor writes :—
“ It will be seen that the operations dragged on from the 18th October until the 2nd
November. This was most unexpected as ihe Muscat Government confidently hoped that
the Yal Saad would submit as soon as one of H.M. Ships appeared upon the scene. The
Political Agent and I both consider there were good grounds for such a hope, as the last time
when the Yal Saad were rebellious the mere threat of bombardment by the then Wazir made
them submit and pay their tine at once. I have noticed, however, recently on the Trucial
Coast that bombardments are not regarded with so much dread as formerly, and that whereas
formerly the threat of a bombardment, or at most the tiring of one or two rounds, was sufficient
to make a Sheikh submit, nowadays it has become necessary to carry out a fairlv heavy
bombardment to achieve the same result. I can only regard this as one of the unexpected *
results of the war.”