ملف رقم ٢٦٢٦ لسنة ١٩٠٥ "بلاد فارس: - الملحق العسكري في مشهد" [ظ‎‎١‎٢] (٥٣٢/٢٩)

him all the political and military intelligence, secret as well as easily accessible, winch
we require f am strongly of opinion that it would be wise to adhere to the plan of
retaining the Consulate General at Meshed as the head-quarters for our becret
Intelligence Department in Central Asia. There are many reasons which lead me to
this conclusion:—
1. At Meshed, under the apathetic and_ not unfriendly rule of Persia it is
possible to carry on Secret Service operations with a security which could not exist at
any place within Russian territory. 1 . ., ,
2. Both as a large centre of population and as a holy city, constantly swarming
with Mahommedan pilsrims from all the countries bordering on India, including
Afghanistan and Russian Central Asia, it affords facilities for obtaining Secret Agents
without attracting any special attention, and through them establishing relations with
informants in those countries, and thus spreading, as Captain Smyth is gradually
doing, a network of intelligence officers all over the region from which we desire to
obtain news. n t ^ o 0 .
3. The Persians, with all their faults, make on the whole better Secret Service
agents than the Afghans or the natives ot India. The latter aie much moic closely
watched by the Russians, They are, more especially the Afghans, less wily, and more
apt to betray their real character. Their correspondence to us addressed to other
Persians living on or near the Khorassan frontier, or in Meshed itself, is less likely
to he opened than if they were either Afghan or Rritish subjects, and Captain Smyth
informs me that none of the numerous agents employed by him at various centres in
Trans-Caspia and Turkestan have, up to the present, been detected by the Russians.
The weak point in their intelligence, apart from the w r ant oi absolute accuracy,
which is common to all Orientals, is their technical ignorance as to military matters,
their inability, for example, to distinguish between the uniforms of different
regiments, different kinds of artillery, &c., hut Major Sykes and Captain Smyth
believe that this can be, to a great extent, remedied by sending one or two of the
abler among them (which can easily be done without exciting observation) to India,
where they could get the training necessary to enable them to report in a thoroughly
trustworthy fashion upon such matters.
If the system at which Captain Smyth has been working for nearly two years
with results which may, I think, be regarded as successful, is allowed to develop, I
venture to hope that we may before long be in possession, through this Consulate-
General, of early and full intelligence on every event of political or military interest
occurring in Trans-Caspia, Bokhara, Perghana, and Turkestan. Until, therefore, as I
ventured to observe, we are able to obtain such intelligence direct through a regular
political officer stationed in Russian Central Asia, it would, I think, he a great mistake
to relax our efforts in this direction at Meshed. I would even he inclined to continue
to maintain our Intelligence Department here for some little time after the appoint
ment of such an officer. It is certain that a British Consul at Tashkend would, during
the earlier days of his appointment, be subject to continuous espionage, that no native
other than a British Indian having explicable business with his Consulate, could
visit him without danger of arrest or deportation, and that nothing would afford the
Russian officials in Central Asia more satisfaction than to catch him out employing
spies, and thus have a pretext for demanding his removal. It would therefore he
necessary for him at first to walk most warily, to confine, himself to reporting those
military tacts which he could ascertain in a perfectly above board fashion, and to
cultivating cordial personal relations with the officers, both civil and military, with
whom he would have to deal. Gradually as these got more used to his presence, he
would doubtless he regarded with greater friendship and less suspicion and mi° > ht
before very long, if a man of tact, he able to mix as freely with all classes, as is "the
case with our Consular officers at Moscow’, Warsaw^, and other centres of European
Russia. When this happened it might he possible to suppress, or greatlv reduce; the
activity of the Intelligence Branch here at Meshed. Under present circumstances,
I should myself wish to see it strengthened by the appointment of a subaltern officer
as an assistant under-study, and locum tenens to Captain Smvth. This w’ould be just as
cheap in the long run as bringing, when the Military Attache goes on leave, another
officer all the way irom India to replace him, and would be much less likelv to
disorganize the rather delicate work he had to do. It would also relieve the Political
jN ative Attache of a good deal ot translating and other work which he has now to
TlJnh Captam br W th ’ and ^ich takes him away from his own special duties.
The above considerations would naturally apply with even greater force if the result
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