"ملف 61/6 مجلد 4 (D 34) ابن سعود وحركة الإخوان" [و‎‎٣‎٤] (٥٦٥/٦٧)

11
Annexure VII to Enclosure III.
Memorandum No. 15-C., dated the 2nd August 1920.
From—Khan S ihib Saiyid Siddiq Hasan , Indian Assistant, Bahrein (on deputation
to Riyadh).
To—The Political Agent, Bahrein.
I received your letter of 27th July 1920, last night at 8 p.m . and Bin Saud
has also received your letter embodying Government's approval of his proposal
to send a mission to Mecca at once.
I beg to thank you for conveying the reply, which, fortunately, is quite in time.
I, accompanied by Farhan Beg, went to Bin Saud immediately on reading your
letter and found Bin Saud pleased with your reply accepting his proposal.
He said I was fortunate to go to Haj, and that although much time had been
lost in receiving the Government's approval, yet he felt very much relieved and
obliged to Government, to Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson, and yourself, for this favour
able answer to his late proposal.
He then spoke about the general condition of the way the difficulty of travel
ling in this hot season and the general unfriendly attitude of the King of H3jaz to
wards himself and the people of Nejd. He said that the party would be quite safe
up to Ashairah on the border of Nejd, but that farther than that we sould have to
rely on God and the Sharif. He remarked laughingly that we doubtless valued
our lives sufficiently to care about the matter and ask Government to persuade the
Sharif to proivde escort from Ashairah to Mecca.
I would therefore, request that if you agree with Bin Saud in thinking that an
escort is necessary to take us further, you will kindly refer to the Civil Commis
sioner, Baghdad, telegraphically, and have necessary arrangements made in this
behalf.
Bin Saud has fixed Thursday, the 19th Dhil-Qaadah (5th August 1920), for the
departure of the Nejd mission to Mecca. Further particulars, as to who will be in
charge, number of men. etc., will be reported as soon as fixed, in any case before
I leave Riyadh. We will have to travel very fast to reach in time for the Haj.
It is gratifying to note that Bin Saud told me definitely that he will send the
most conciliatory and respectful letters, with us, to King Husain and Sharif
Abdullah, and will also send some suitable presents, probably two thoroughbred
mares.
Even in this interview, although he was in very good spirits and jovial mood.
Bin Saud made a few remarks of the nature already reported at length. He said
he was doing all this for Government's sake, and only to please His Majesty's
Government. He did not see much use in doing this, but he clung to the hope that
the Sharif would perhaps see the futility of continuing the quarrel. It was a pity
the Government did not fully appreciate him, or realize his position. He was not
only belittled, but tied hand and foot and let to lie down. By their present policy
Government caused a loss to themselves, to him, and to Arabs. Syria and Iraq
were up struggling to oust the English, he on the contrary, only allowed more and
more rope to Arabs. They will soon become uncontrollable when Government
will see too late that not only sheathe British Government), but Bin Saud is a
great loser. Independent strength and power of Syria and Iraq would only mean
proportionate weakness of him, Bin Saud. If let alone he could control them
to the advantage of the British Government, but if she does it herself, so much the
better.' #
p ^5.—Although he would not say in plain words, it is clear from these remarks
as well as those alteady reported that Bin Sand's mind is exercised by the idea of
bidding for the headship of Arab Rulers, and more specially of being constituted
or appointed something like a Rais or President of the newly born Arab States
of Syria and Mesopotamia. He has not ^ttered the word Palestine a§ yet, as far
as I can remember, in his half a dozen long coversations of this kind with me.
He himself says that it is impossible for him to rule over the Arabs of Meso
potamia, Syria, Hejaz, etc., as he cannot derate their religious or social customs or
habits for one moment ; nor can he possibly convert them all to his own creed unless.
is