سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [و‎‎٨‎٢] (٣١٢/١٦٧)

Comaaencing with _ the northernmost tribe—the
Jadoous. who inhabit the southern slopes of the
Mahabun—we find that their fighting force is
estiiftated at 5,000 men. Their relations with us
have been one long series of petty raids on their part
of strict blockade on ours. In 1863, a brigade,
under the late bir A. Wilde, inarched into their
country, when they submitted, only to break out
afresh on the withdrawal of the troops. Next to
the Jadoons are the Bonairwals, who were, perhaps
th At* V6S * 0t om ' foes in the Umbeyla Expedition'
of 1863, when over 900 casualties testified to the
arduous nature of the fighting. With them may
be classed the Swatis, against whom we ssnt a force
tinder Colonel Bradshaw in 1849. These two clans
may be estimated at a strength of 26,000 men.
Against the Eanizaes we were compelled to send
two expeditions under Sir Colin Campbell in 1852.
They may be computed at 3,000 fighting men. The
conduct of the Utmankhail, who number close on
10,000, has been such that we have been forced to
•undertake three small campaigns against them—in
1849, under Colonel Bradford ; in 1852, under Sir
Colin Campbell ; in 1866. under General Dunsford.
■South of these again we find the Momunds, a
powerful tribe, who have ever been on unfriendly
terms with us. They can muster 20,000 men. In
1850 and 1852 Sir Colin Campbell was compelled to
chastise them ; two years later Sir Sydney Cotton
was engaged with a section, and in 1864 Colonel A
Macdonnell, of the Rifle Brigade, had a smart en
counter with them on the Shubkudder plain. All
these lie to the north of the Khyber Pass, in the
hills immediately skirting our border ; but west of
them again are equally^ powerful, equally fanatical
races, such as the Bajaories, the Shinwarris, and
others. Between the Khyber and the Khoorum
Passes lie the Afridis, perhaps the most powerful
clan on the frontier. They number about 25,000
fighting men. Against them we have been com
pelled to operate many times, notably in 1850,
under Sir Colin Campbell ; in 1853, under Colonel
Boileau ; in 1855, under Colonel Craigie ; in 1877,
. under _ Generals Keyes and Ross. Against the
tribes in the Miranzae district Colonel Coke in
1851, Sir Neville Chamberlain in 1855, and
General Keyes in 1869, were compelled to act.
They muster about 5,000 men. The Turis, really
subjects of the Ameer, can put about an equal
number into the field. Sir Neville Chamberlain
led a'force against them in 1856. Further south
come the Orakzaes, who number from 15,000 to
20,000 men, f.nd against whom we have conducted
operations in 1855, 1868, and 1869 under Chamber- j
Iain,Jones,andKeyes,BetweentheKoorum and the ;
,Goomul Passes lie the Dawaris,wkom General Keyes
coerced in 1872. and the Vaziris, a large tribe, who
occupy a very extended tract of country. In 1852
Nicholson, in 1859 and 1860 Sir Neville Chamber- |
lain, and in 1869 Keyes entered their ter- N
ritory at the head of punitory expeditions, f
On both sides of the Goomul the Mah-
jjood Vaziris dwell. They have ever given us
trouble ; while south of these the Bozdars, the
Kasranis, and Sheoranis have all felt the force of
our arms. Further south again are the Khetrans,
Kosahs, Lagharis, Gurchanis, Maris, and Boogties,
' with whom we have been on fairly good terms,
iheir amenability to bribes being, perhaps, the chief I
reason for their good conduct. As we have before said,
"behind ail these tribes lie others equally powerful,
but, as their lands are not contiguous with ours,our
relationship has been more amicable. The conduct :
of the Ghulzaes towards our troops in the last war,
of the Jajis to Lumsden's Mission, and of the
various Khyberi tribes to Pollock's force, certainly I'
do not warrant the hope that a peaceful promenade
will be permitted through any pass in Pathan terri
tory. The above sketch amply proves that, however ^
advisabla it may be for political and other reasons to
advance into Cabul at once, it would be an act of
folly to move a mile into the hills until we are fully v
prepared to deal with the tribes who separate us
, from Afghanistan, should they venture to oppose
our passage ; and not only must we bo prepared to
"i push our way through their defiles, but we must
have a suflicient force at hand to keep open free
| communications by at least two roads into Cabul.
This will necessitate the employment of fully 5,000 ||
over and above the number required for the actual S
Afghanistan operations, and will force upon us the
I erection of suitable defensive posts, both in the V
Koorum and the Khyber Passes. The Afghan race "
is notoriously faithless to its public engagements. ^
On every occasion that we have had to deal with
them have we found this to be the case. Not only
in the last war was our disaster considerably | i|
, augmented by the British leaders putting faith in a
1 Pathan's word, but in every expedition we have "
: undertaken along our border the victorious force, M
after having humbled the enemy and compelled him
to submit to terms, has invariably been attacked
on evacuating the country by the very men who have
been forced to concede our demands. The
various writers on Afghanistan have dwelt on this
faithlessness in no measured terms. EJphinstone,
Bellew, Masson, Ferrier, all were struck by this
characteristic. There are men unknown in Eng
land, but whose names are as household words on 1
our Punjab border, whose knowledge of the
Afghan character is far superior to that possessed
by any writer on the subject, with the ex-
ception, perhaps, of Bellew. M" I
bome of these ac
company the force. We may rest assured they -j
will not be deluded by any specious promises on f
the part of the Afghans, whether they be indepen-
lib; dent tribes or the Ameer's subjects. The lessons
- taught by Burnes, Elphinstone, and Macnaghten
; will not be lost on Chamberlain or Roberts.
. Ov/ing to their extreme jealousy and suspicion,
. it is highly improbable that more than one or
B 1 wou ^d coalesce against us, but it is
1 ■ j i e ^ er ) however much we may sub
sidize them, the passage through the various passes
1 opposed by the Pathan mountaineers. I
: Until, therefore, the Indian Government is in a
position to mass a force on the frontier of sutlicient
strength to overcome any resistance that !
may be^offered by these clans, it would be most
injudicious to make a forward movement ; and that
some time must elapse before such an army
can ^ be collected is obvious to any one ac
quainted with the present state of the roads
in the Punjab. It is true that the railway
stretches from Calcutta and Bombay up to Jhelum
170 miles distant from Peshawur, but the recent
heavy floods have washed away a section of i ?
the line in the vicinity of Phillour ; several I •
bridges have gone, and communication is most
uncertain. Then, again, between Jhelum and
Peshawur are many small streams and two rivers.
Most of these are unbridged; all afford hin
drances to the rapid mobilization of troops on
the border. From Rawul Pindee to Kohat the
road is a mere track, after rain well-nigh impass
able for troops. Further south, again, the roads
in the Dera Ghazee Khan district are of the poorest
description. That station was almost entirely
destroyed by an overflow of the Indus last month. !
Floods of an unexampled nature then occurred ; !
at the present moment we learn that the whole of ■
Upper Scinde is under water, and that the march
of a force vid Rajanpore to Dadur is
out of the question. The direct road
through Boogtee Derah to Quetta is a mere
mountain path, unfitted for the passage of wheeled
artillery, yet it must be used ; the garrison of that
advanced post is scarcely 1,200 strong, and i
| is in a _ most exposed and dangerous situa
tion. With a couple of field batteries, a full
regiment of cavalry, and another battalion of
Infantry—British, if possible—Major Sandeman
should be able to hold Quetta until the soring. ;
There is little doubt that General Biddulph will ! ?:
push up these reinforcements rapidly.
A general opinion prevails that no movement
will be made by the Khyber Pass,but that the force
in the Peshawur Yalley will be used merely to
threaten the Ameer, while the real attack will be
made by Quetta on Candahar, and by the
Koorum route. This may be so, though from
the published reports of Lumiden's mission it
would appear that the physical difficulties of the i';.
Koorum were far greater than those by the -
Khyber. The Paiwar Khotul is at present quite
impracticable for guns, and the pass over the ■
Shootur Gurdan, or " Camel's Neck," further on S
is upwards of 13,000 feet above sea level. So in
tense was the cold experienced, even in the month !
of April, that Lumsden's small escort, only +
19 sabres strong, lost one night two horses frozen
to death on that ridge. A campaign before winter
sets in means an occupation of the salient points
in the mountain ranges throughout the depth of the
I cold season.
!No living General has had a wider experience of
hill warfare than Sir Neville Chamberlain ; he is
now at Simla, conferring with the Viceroy, and
his knowledge of the Afghan character is
as profound as his acquaintance with the
topography both of the Cis and Trans-Sulimani
districts. _ Sir Neville, though personally brave to
a fault, is as a commander imbued with great
caution. It is, therefore, possible that, beyond
reinforcing Quetta and massing the various
columns of the expeditionary force at Peshawur,
Thall, Dera Ghazee Khan, and Sukkur, no ac
tive operations will be undertaken until the
spring. The magnitude of our preparations will i
show the people of India as well as the Ameer our
actual intentions, and that we are far from
being inclined to sit down under the insult re
ceived. Notwithstanding the many arguments in [■
favour of a prompt punishment, it seems that delay
in this case is not only advisable, but absolutely
necessary.