سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [و‎‎٢‎٤] (٣١٢/٤٨)

The information whicli our Special Correspon
dent at Simla gives ns, in the telegram wliich we
publish this ^ morning, shows that the Indian
Government is taking the only action "which is
now possible to it. However much we blame the
policy which Lord Lytton has pursued since bis
accession to the Viceroyalty, and which has
brought about the grave situation in which he
now finds himself, we fully recoirnise the impossi
bility of acquiescence in the affront which has
been administered by the Ameer of Afghanistan.
The recall of the mission was inevitable; and
military action must follow the rebuff which our
diplomacy has met with. The garrison of
i Quettah is to be reinforced; and a body of Euro
pean and native troops will immediately appear
at Thull, at the entrance of the Ehoorum Valley.
Early in November a reserve force of six thousand
men will assemble at Sukkur. Our Correspon
dent expresses the opinion that the effect of this
demonstration will be to show the Ameee that he
is helpless, while measures will be taken to con
ciliate the frontier tribes who are ill-affected to
him. A St. Petersburg telegram denies that
any understanding exists betweea Eussia
and Afghanistan. The statement, so far
as it goes, is satisfactory, though it
needs further explanation to reconcile it with
notorious facts. If the intentions and action of
Eussia have been misunderstood, it is well that
the misapprehension should be rectified. If they
have been rightly appreciated, we may hope that
the announcement conveys the purpose of recon
sidering and reversing them. We trust that, if
this be so, our Government will also reconsider its
intentions. Instead of challenging the hostility
and distrust of the Ameeb , and so throwing him
into the arms of Russia, its business should be to
court his goodwill and to guarantee his indepen
dence conditionally upon his practising the duties
■ of friendly neighbourhood. If a different course is
adopted we shall simply advance from one folly
and imprudence to another. Nothing, so it be
adventurous and rash, is impossible to
Lord Beaconseield . His policy of fireworks may
amuse the country ; but there is in it the certainty
of increased public burdens, and the probability
of confusion and disaster. The taxpayer had
better look after himself. Even the demagogic
principle of exemptions, which the present Go
vernment has largely and unscrupulously tiged,
and which it will no doubt extend, will scarcely
make an eightpenny or shilling income-tax
i acceptable to the country.
What is the purpose for which this and even more
serious burdens and difficulties are to be encoun
tered ? If we are to catch the drift of the policy
upon which the Ministry have persistently refused
to take the nation into their confidence, we must
connect what we know of their action at Con
stantinople with what we know of their action in
Afghanistan. It was semi-officialiy stated the
other day that the designs of the Government in
Afghanistan were part of a great scheme of policy
for the better security of our Indian possessions.
The scattered hints which have pierced the studied
veil of secrecy concerning Government negoti
ations with the Ameee . and the Sultan have
gradually thrown something like clear light upon
the general scheme, and even enabled us to guess
at the period of its inception. Although the Anglo-
Turkish Convention was revealed to the world
as a theatrical'surprise, the Government may get the
credit of not having devised it on the spur of the
moment. The proposals to the Afghan ruler which
Sir Neville Chambeelain has not been allowed to
make to him are declared, with apparent authority,
to be the same which were carried last year by Sir
Lewis Pellt . Towards the close of the Session
of 1877 the Government were questioned in the
House of Commons concerning Sir Lewis Pelly's
mission, but absolutely declined to declare its
purport. Lord Geoege Hamilton would only
say that the Cabinet had resolved to deal with our
Indian frontier relations 4$ simultaneously, as in-
" divisible parts of a single Imperial ques-
" tion, mainly dependent for its solution
" on the foreign policy of her Majesty's
" Government." This Pythian utterance was
I unintelligible at the time, and in answer to the
1 pressure of the Opposition leaders the Govern
ment would vouchsafe no explanation ; but, re
peated now in a semi-official communication when
some projecting angles of the great scheme have
appeared in sight, the oracle is not so difficult to
understand. Turkey and Afghanistan were to be
dealt with on the same principle. In return for
the advantage of an English defensive alliance
against Eussia they were to give us certain privi
leges, not yet defined or not yet published,
in directing their administration. They were
also to permit na to occupy certain posts to
facilitate our efforts in defendiner and suner-
? intending them. How SfflERB Alt treated ouf
i first overtures towards this arrangement was kept
| secret at the time, but has lately been disclosed.
! He rejected Sir Lewis Pelly's proposals. Ha
j did not desire the English alliance on the terms
offered. He plainly intimated besides that he re-
| garded even our occupation of Quettah as a direct
■ menace to his independence. This rebuff might
have been a warning to Lord Beaconsiteld ' a
Cabinet not to persevere with their grand schema
of a Mohammedan Confederacy, Their negotia
tions with Sheee Ali were secret, and they
might have returned without dishonour
to the policy for defending India which
had commended itself to their predecessors,
and had obtained the sanction of Conservative aa
well as Liberal statesmen. But they were bent
upon dazzling "the groundlings" with their
showy, new-fangled Imperialism. The warning
of tSir Lewis Pelly's failure fell upon heedlesa
I ears. They have sent Sir Neville Chambeelain
on the same errand, and he has met with a most
ignominious and insulting rebuff. The other branch
of their scheme is the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
How far that will be successful remains to be
seen, but the hints which the Sultan is said to
have dropped about " semi-independent Indian
"Princes" seem to show that his jealousy has
been awakened by precisely the same considerations
as those which impelled the Ambee to reject
our overtures, and to repel those who bring
them.
j So far from combining Turkey and Afghanistan
: with us in the defence of India, Lord Beacons-
field's policy has only succeeded in touch
ing the jealous susceptibilities of these Powers.
That other agencies would be ready to work
upon this jealousy to the utmost was an
eventuality which her Majesty's Ministers
ought to have foreseen before departing
from the firm and cautious policy which has
hitherto prevailed in the administration of India,
and which best befits a strong nation. Why
j should we have gone out of our way to solicit the
| assistance of Turkey and Afghanistan in the
i defence of possessions which we have proved our
competence to defend out of our own re
sources ? If wo did, it was the extreme
of folly to euppose that our proposals would
be eagerly accepted when they were coupled with a
condition that the Powers addressed should
remit some part of their sovereignty. The em-
, phatic and frequent repetition of an assertion that
what we proposed would leave their independence
untouched was not likely to further negotiations.
It would be a wonderful triumph of diplomatio
skill to persuade a Sovereign that he had
lost not a particle of his prerogative when he
| allowed a stranger to occupy part of his terri
tories, and pledged himself to listen to
advice in the treatment of his subjects.
The attempt to enlist religious fanaticism on
i our side might have been more hopeful if we had
not been ourselves a Christian Power. Our
treatment of the Mohammedans in India offers a
favourable contrast to the Eussian treatment of
Mohammedans in Central Asia; but is a Mussul
man Prince who believes his sovereignty to be
menaced likely to draw the right conclusion from
such a comparison ? We do not proselytise by
i fire and sword, and we grant an equal toleration
i to all creeds within our dominions; but neither
the Sultan nor the Ameee is thereby induced to
give us a treaty right of superintending their admi
nistration. The Sultan , indeed, has nominally
conceded this right, but he has not yet shown any
alacrity in promoting its practical exercise., Tha
Convention has given our Ambassador at Con
stantinople a special locus standi among the rival
Pachas and other intriguers for the Sultan' s
confidence, but it has not improved his position or
added to the weight of his counsels as the repre-
1 TOM pejIJunuioopijij sjr.w sn{
| eratjs ot^ tu noi;T}0d v. pe[y gtrtinf^neii (peAtaa |
-isd oq (|ta\ at tj^uota is Apron) pa', oq? I
| no •Smpuad koc ais uotft^ed sn$ o; eApcpa stfmpeaxMMj !
j •aoapjiqo jo j£po}sno eq} aAt!q A'mtt eqs pais
'a^nixreut -bq jo uornqoasip v .ioj s.vtud jatrotjtjed ©qj;
[ •s®nu^ Btiou-BA. pi pnrqsnq joq Aq po^rarcboj setia^
"T Tl P< 1 jo enoi^TiSiqpi smtunoo osp norfned iqj •Xqtnua
"PI J 0 eoaanbasaoo ' nr raiq vacjj gfmv SttiAfi
rraq;j bu.m. ©qs ;isq; pun 'epuoux '.toq fO uorpc-qojtd ©q^
pnvj ocooq aoq fu/Bsq o) pejroduioo uosq "saoisuooo. atojiip
T he information which our Special Correspon
dent at Simla gives us, in the telegram which we
publish this morning, shows that the Indian
Government is taking the only action which is
now possible to it. However much we blame the
policy which Lord L yttojt has pursued since his
accession to the Viceroyalty, and which has
brought about the g:rave situation in which he
now finds himself, we fully recognise the impossi
bility of acquiescence in the affront which has
been administered by the Ameer of A fghanistan.
The recall of the mission was inevitable; and
military action must follow the rebuff which our
diplomacy has met with. The ffarrison of
Quettah is to be reinforced; and a body of Euro
pean and native troops will immediately appear
at Thull, at the entrance of the Khoorum Valley.
Early in N ovember a reserve force of six thousand
men will assemble at Sukkur. Our Correspon
dent expresses the opinion that the effect of this
demonstration will be to show the A meer that he
is helpless, while measures will be taken to con
ciliate the frontier tribes who are ill-affected to
him. A St. Petersburg telegram denies that
any understanding exists betweea Eussia
and Afghanistan. The statement, go far
as it goes, is satisfactory, though it
needs further explanation to reconcile it with
notorious facts. If the intentions and action of
Eussia have been misunderstood, it is well that
the misapprehension should be rectified. If they
have been rightly appreciated, we may hope that
the announcement conveys the purpose of recon
sidering and reversing them. We trust that, if
this be so, our Government will also reconsider its
intentions. Instead of challenging the hostility
and distrust of the A meeb , and so throwing him
into the arms of Russia, its business should be to
court his goodwill and to guarantee his indepen
dence conditionally upon his practising the duties
of friendly neighbourhood. If a different course is
adopted we shall simply advance from one folly
and imprudence to another. Nothing, so it be
adventurous and rash, is impossible to
Lord B eaconseield . His policy of fireworks may
amuse the country ; but there is in it the certainty
of increased public burdens, and the probability
of confusion and disaster. The taxpayer had ;
better look after himself. Even the demagogic 1
principle of exemptions, which the present Go
vernment has largely and unscrupulously used,
and which it will no doubt extend, will scarcely
make an eightpenny or shilling income-tax
acceptable to the country.
What is the purpose for which this and even more
serious burdens and difficulties are to be encoun
tered ? If we are to catch the drift of the policy
upon which the Ministry have persistently refused
to take the nation into their confidence, we must
connect what we know of their action at Con
stantinople with what we know of their action in
Afghanistan. It was semi-officialiy stated the
other day that the designs of the Government in
Afghanistan were part of a great scheme of policy
for the better security of our Indian possessions.
The scattered hints which have pierced the studied
veil of secrecy concerning Government negoti
ations with the A meer and the S ultan have
gradually thrown something like clear light upon
the general scheme, and even enabled us to guess
at the period of its inception. Although the Anglo-
Turkish Convention was revealed to the world
as a theatricalsurprise, the Government may get the
credit of not having devised it on the spur of the
moment. The proposals to the Afghan ruler which
Sir N eville C hamberlain has not been allowed to
make to him are declared, with apparent authority,
to be the same which were carried last year by Sir
L ewis P ellt . Towards the close of the Session
of 1877 the Government were questioned in the
House of Commons concerning Sir L ewis P elly's
mission, but absolutely declined to declare its
purport. Lord G eorge H amilton would only
say that the Cabinet had resolved to deal with our
Indian frontier relations " simultaneously, as in-
" divisible parts of a single Imperial ques-
" tion, mainly dependent for its solution
14 on the foreign policy of her M ajesty's
" Government." This Pythian utterance was '
unintelligible at the time, and in answer to the
pmssura of the Opposition leaders the Govern
ment would vouchsafe no explanation ; but, re- j
peated now in a semi-official communication when |
some projecting angles of the great scheme have
appeared in sight, the oracle is not so difficult to
understand. Turkey and Afghanistan were to be
dealt with on the same principle. In return for |
the advantage of an English defensive alliance
against Eussia they were to give us certain privi
leges, not yet defined or not yet published,
in directing their administration. They were
also to permit ua to occupy certain posts to
facilitate our efforts in defendinsr and euner-
■ intending them. How SffERB A lt treated ouf
j first overtures towards this arrangement was kept
| secret at the time, but has lately been disclosed.
I He rejected Sir L ewis P elly's proposals. He
{ did not desire the English alliance on the terms
! offered. He plainly intimated besides that he re-
| garded even our occupation of Quettah as a direct
1 menace to his independence. This rebuff might
have been a warning to Lord B eaconseielb's
Cabinet not to persevere with their grand schema
of a Mohammedan Confederacy, Their negotia
tions with S heee A li were secret, and they
might have returned without dishonour
to the policy for defending India which
had commended itself to their predecessors,
and had obtained the sanction of Conservative as
well as Liberal statesmen. But they were bent
upon dazzling "the groundlings" with their
showy, new-fangled Imperialism. The warning
of iSir L ewis P elly's failure fell upon heedless
I ears. They have sent Sir N eville C hamberlain
j on the same errand, and he has met with a most
ignominious and iwsultmg rebuff. The other branch
of their scheme is the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
How far that will be successful remains to be
seen, but the hints which the S ultan is said to
have dropped about " semi-independent Indian
"Princes" seem to show that his jealousy has
been awakened by precisely the same considerations
as those which impelled the A mber to reject
our overtures, and to repel those who bring
them.
So far from combining Turkey and Afghanistan
with us in the defence of India, Lord B eacons-
field's policy has only succeeded in touch
ing the jealous susceptibilities of these Powers.
That other agencies would be ready to work
upon this jealousy to the utmost was an
eventuality which her M ajesty's Ministers
ought to have foreseen before departing
from the firm and cautious policy which haa
hitherto prevailed in the administration of India,
and which best befits a strong nation. Why
j should we have gone out of our way to solicit the
assistance of Turkey and Afghanistan in the
defence of possessions which we have proved our
competence to defend out of our own re
sources ? If we did, it was the extreme
of folly to euppose that our proposals would
be eagerly accepted when they were coupled with a
condition that the Powers addressed should
remit some part of their sovereignty. The em
phatic and frequent repetition of an assertion that
what we proposed would leave their independence
untouched was not likely to further negotiations.
It would be a wonderful triumph of diplomatio
skill to persuade a Sovereign that he had
lost not a particle of his prerogative when he
allowed a stranger to occupy part of his terri
tories, and pledged himself to listen to
advice in the treatment of his subjects.
The attempt to enlist religious fanaticism on
our side might have been more hopeful if we had
not been ourselves a Christian Power. Out
treatment of the Mohammedans in India offers a
favourable contrast to the Eussian treatment of
Mohammedans in Central Asia; but is a Mussul
man Prince who believes his sovereignty io be
menaced likely to draw the right conclusion from
such a comparison ? We do not proselytise by
fire and sword, and we grant an equal toleration
to all creeds within our dominions; but neither
the S ultan nor the A meer is thereby induced to
giveus a treaty right of superintending their admi
nistration. The S ultan , indeed, has nominally
conceded this right, but he has not yet shown any
alacrity in promoting its practical exercise. Tha
Convention has given our Ambassador at Con
stantinople a special locus standi among the rival
Pachas and other intriguers for the S ultan' s
confidenoe, but it has not improved his position or
added to the weight of his counsels as the repre
sentative of a Great Power. It has given a stimulus
i to counter-intrigue, and furnished Eussian agents
and hostile countries with a new weapon.
Human nature, and especially the nature oi
' Eastern despots, must be radically chaacred befora
the grand Imperial policy can have a chance oi
success. There will be no reason to regret it*
failure, either for the honour or for the interests
of England, unless our theatrical managers, rathei
than revert to the old lines of statesmanship in
providing for the defence of India, should try, aa
seems only too likely, to cover their diplomatic
defeat by plunging the country into war. We
trust that they will recall the Ameer of A fghan
istan to his senses. It is not less necessary that-
j they should recover their own.