سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [ظ‎‎٢‎٠] (٣١٢/٤١)

case to protect him against armed aggression on the
part of Russia. He must not be suffered to render
our duty in this respect more difficult than it need
be. We stand bound by an unspoken guarantee to
defend Afghanistan. No engagement on our part
could add to the weight of this. We have the right,
therefore, to insist that the ruler of Afghanistan
■hall perform his share of the joint work, or shall
at least do nothing to hinder us from performing
ours. Our interests, if he will believe us, are the
same. We could desire nothing better than that
Afghanistan should be interposed between us and
Russia as an independent neutral State, jealous of
its territorial integrity, and prepared to defend it
against all comers. But when Afghanistan ceases
to be neutral, and ceases in any real sense to be in
dependent, the conditions of the case are changed.
We are driven to be aggressive, whether we wish it
or not. The Ameer of Cabul must make his choice
between England as his enemy and as his friend.
He cannot continue to be independent in name
while he is becoming in reality a tool of Russia,
which she may use for her own purposes. It is this
which wa are no*" minded to prevent, and we ah all
not shrink from employing whatever means we may
find necessary for so doing.
There has, then, we may conclude, been no
real change in our policy towards Afghan
istan. Change there has been, but it is
not from us that it has come. How far we
shall be driven to proceed with it must equally be
a matter not within our own choice. Whatever
1 we may do will be limited by the requirements of
the case, but we shall not suffer it to fall short of
them. The Ameer of C abul can be in no doubt
as to the terms on which we insist. It is still pos
sible that he will submit to them, and that he will
receive our Mission as a first proof of his compliance.
If he does not do this willingly, we shall have no
1 choice left us but to employ the necessary force.
; It would need no t great effort on our part.
! It would soon be clear that we had the means of
making ourselves obeyed, and that our past
moderation must have been caused by something
very different from a dread of the A meer's power.
We have been content hitherto to treat the
A meek as an equal. It will be his own fault if
our behaviour is now changed. When our friendly
advances are repelled, it becomes our business to
take care that at least our orders are respected.
We have received the following telegrams through
Renter's Agency
RUdrflA AND AFGHANISTAN.
st. fetehsbukg, sept. 24. |
With re ference to the telegram published yestertiay by a
London moraiog paper assuming that au understanding
exiiited between j^ussiu and Afgtianwfcan, it is declared in
the best informed quaners that this supposition is purely
imaginary, audi: is turther stated on the same authority
that no grounds are known to justify such imputations and
conjectures.
AFGllA NI ST AN.
Continuing our notice of the military geography
of Afghanistan yesterday, it will bo of interest to
touch briefly on the means of communication be
tween Cabul and British India, and glance at the
jr mode of operations in our last campaign with that
country. J he map shows that a lofty chain of
mountains, the summits of which rise in some cases
If to 18,000ft., intervene between our Indian domi-
^ nions and the Ameer's territory, and the chain is
no mere screen behind which an army can secretly
E collect and through which it can suddenly dash on
an unsuspecting foe, but is a broad tract of
« mountainous land, inhospitable to the last degree,
C and inhabited by barbarous tribes, ownirg no
IT master, and constantly at feud with each other.
C It is pierced by numerous passes, the best
I known of which are the Khyber and the
K' Bolan, through which our forces in the late Af-
K ghau war advanced on Cabul ; but there are no
t lewer than 17 well-defined roads,practicable for the
I movements of lightly equipped columns, and cer-
i tainly four up which guns could be taken. These
B are annually traversed by caravans of Afghan mer-
I chants, who bring the produce of Central Asia into
i Hindostan and take thence linglish wares in ex-
I change. The great drawback to their being
I utilized in the event of war being forced
I upon us is the fact that our own means
■■;ot communication within our border are of
I i the worst description, so that the difficulties a
pj force would encounter before it could reach, the
■ eastern end of the Kuram or the Gumal passei
ITS would be almost as great as those to be met with
15 in the mountains themselves. It is therefore only
8; necessary to t'jko into consideration the Khyber
and the Bolan. The former is within 170 miles of
^ Jhelura, the present terminus of the Punjab
j* railway system, with which it is connected
^ .by the (jrand Trunk road, probably one of
tne very best military highways in the world.
Grouped round the railway terminus, or between it
and the Khyber, are the military cantonments of
Jhelum, Seaikote, Tallvgaon, Kawul Pindi, Now-
sftera, Abbottabad, Hoti-Mardan, C-tmpbellporo,
Pheshawur, and Kohat. At those places are sta- S
tioned four batteries of horse, six batteries of field, |
and two of mountain Artillery, two regiments of
British and eight of JN'ative Cavalry, six batta- I
lions of British and lb of JSative Infantry— I
a force in itself sufficient to form a very
admirable nunleus of an expeditionary army,
when it is remambered that the Army of the Indus >
in 1838 consisted of but two regiments of British, |
with four of native Cavalry,,thlve troops of Horso I
I and tour catteries of iield Artillery, lour Line and |
13 Native Infantry battalions, ihen, however, the |
; troops advanced by the Bolau, and encountered no
opposition worthy of the name until they were
j fairly clear of the mountains. There were many
I reasons for the adoption of the southernmost
| route in those days which would be of no
] weight now, and it is most probable that should ;
j hostilities be determined on two columns would be .
i organized, the Bengal Army furnisldug the one tl.at
I would march thiough the Khyber and operate
1 towards Cabul and the northern districts of Afghan
istan, the Bombay Army giving that for the Bolan,
Candahar, and the southern tracts of the Ameer's •
dominions.
Unfortunately, in speaking of an Afghan war, and
more especially of the Khyber Pass, popular
1 oninion appears to cling to the remembrance of the
j misfortunes that overtook the ill-iatsd expedition
of 1839, and more especially the disastrous retreat
through the Koord Kabul Pass from Cabul to Jela- j
labad ; but it should ever be remembered that a |
miserable want of agreement between the military
and political chiefs of that force was the primary k
cause of the disaster, while the arms possessed by the ^
Queen's troops in those daya\old flint-lock Brown '
Bess) were far inferior to the long jazails of
the Afghans. Now, with rifled canon and breech
loaders we are far more completely equipped,
| while the experiences of the Abyssinian and
I Ashantee expeditions certainly prompt the hope
j that the military and political chieftainship will be
| vested in one man. That the Khyber Pass presents
j slightdifficultytoa well-handled force is evident from
I the fact that in 1839 Colonel Wade forced it at the
i head of an irregular contingent, penetrating from
j Peshawur to Jelalabad, with a loss of but 180 men.
! in 1842 General Pollock forced it by shelling the i
heights from the ravines below, while two columns j
of 12 companies each on either flank pushed the
enemy from ridge to ridge. His casualties
were 128. On his return march he lost
but 56 men. The Khybor Pass may be
said, generally speaking, to commence at Jam-
rood, 10 miles west of Peshawur, and to ex
tend as far as Dhaka, a distance of about 33 miles.
The actual entrance to the defile, however, is at
Kadam, a place three miles west of Jamrood,
which is a small village, surrounded by a mud
wall. There still exist the ruins of an old
Sikh fort built in 1837, after the defeat of the
I Afghan army on the adjacent plains, by the
i Khalsa Army under Hurree Singh. Within
j 1,000 yards of Kadam the gorge narrows to 150
, yards, with steep precipitous cliffs on either hand,
i Between this and the Afghan frontier fort of Ali
1 Musjid, distant about ten miles, the mountains on
| either hand are about 3,500ft. in height, slaty,
1 bare, and to all appearance inaccessible ; the width
of the pass varies from 290 to 40 feet. For a dis
tance of 2^ miles beyond Ali Musjid the pass retains
: its difficult character. It then enters the L^la Beg
Valley, about six miles in length, with an average
; jj breadth of a mile and a half. The western end of
1 the valley, however, finds the road entering a still
narrower defile, there being scarcely room for two
camels to pass each other. The Lundi Khana Pass
is distant from this point about a mile and a half,
* the ascent over it is narrow, rugged, steep, and
& generally tho most difficult part of the road ; guns
could not be drawn here except by men, and then
only after the improvement of the track.
The descent, however, is along a well-made
road, and is not so difficult. On the west side of the
pass the mountains gradually open out, and lose
much of their inaccessible nature. Dhaka is distant
i about eight miles, and here the defile ends. Diffi-
I cult as the Khyber is to force, it is evident that
what Wade and Pollock did 40 years ago can, if ne-
cessary, be done again. Moreover, our knowledge of
I these mountain ranges has much improved of late
g years, and several roads are well known which com
pletely turn Ali Musjid,the most formidable obstacle
P between Peshawur and Jelalabad. Among these are
the Tatara Road, which enters the hills about nine
Z. miles north of Jamrood and joins the main route
^ at Dhaka ; the Kadapa Road and one through the
H Bara Valley both avoid Ali Musjid, are practic-
H able for lightly-equipped columns, and doubtless
would be made use of were we compelled to force
■ the Khyber.
It must be borne in mind that the tribes residing
^ in the pass and its immediate vicinity, though
nominally owing allegiance to the Ameer of
Afghanistan, yet are powerful enough to demand
and to obtain sabsidies from him in return for the
privilege they grant in permitting the highway to
be made use of. In the time of the Durani Kings