"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [و‎‎١‎٧‎٥] (٦٣١/٣٨٣)

iTb rs Bpemmeid ; m tke Property of Hi e Beiiaamic Majesty's Govermneat]
EASTERN DEPARTMENT. [March 28.]
SECRET SERIES. S ection 3,
[12282] No. J,
Sir Edward Greij to Sir F. Bertie.
(No. 114.)
Foreign Office, March 28, 1911.
1 SAW M. Cam hon with Sir Arthur Nicolson to-day.
M. Cambon informed us that the French Government wished to secure certain
railway concessions in the north of Asia Minor, which were being applied for by a
Russo-French group. They wished to complete the system of Syrian railways ; and, as
for a part of its length the Hedjaz Railway competed with one of the French railways,
they wished this length of the Hedjaz Railway to be conceded to the French, Further,
there was the Danube-Adriatic Railway project, in which they were interested.
1 said that I assumed that, if they were satisfied on these points, they would then
be prepared to give their consent to the 4 per cent, increase of the Turkish customs
dues, and to consider that an agreement had been come to about the Bagdad Railway
generally.
M. Cambon assented, but said that the consent of the French to the increase would
be dependent upon an accord having been come to with us.
I told him that our situation was a corresponding one. We wished to have a
satisfactory arrangement about the Bagdad-Gulf section of the Bagdad Railway that
would secure for us two things. The first thing was that British trade should be sure
of perfectly fair treatment on the whole of the Bagdad Railway system. We could
secure this if we had control of the Bagdad-Gulf section, for the arrangement of through-
rates would then be a matter in which we should have oar say. The second thing we
wished to make sure was that the strategic position in the Persian Gulf should not be
altered to our disadvantage. We did not wish to press that the Bagdad Railway
should be continued to the Persian Gulf, but we wished to secure that, if it did reach
the Gulf, it should do so at a place and under conditions such that the present strategic
position would not be prejudiced. I should discuss these two points with the India
Office, which was specially interested in the strategic conditions, and with the Board of
Trade, which was interested in the commercial conditions. I should then make a
counter-proposal in reply to the Turkish proposals, which would certainly nob do as they
stood. But, as the Germans could upset any arrangement which was come to with the
Turks, I thought we should probably tell the Germans frankly what were the things
which Ave wished to secure, and find out whether they were willing to agree to conditions
by which they could be secured. If we found that an agreement could be reached, I
should tell M. Cambon what the agreement was to be ; and T should say to the Turks
that we would not conclude it and give our assent to the customs increase until the
French Government also were satisfied on the conditions which he had indicated to me.
M. Cambon entirely accepted this statement of our position.
1 am, &c.
E. GREY.
[1932 ee— 3]