"ملف 10/3 VI الامتياز النفطي بقطر" [ظ‎‎٧‎٩] (٤٨١/١٧٠)

34
P. 3082/13.
Vic. to S. of
S., 2.8.13,
P. 3083/13.
S. of S. to
Vic., 6.8.13,
P. 3157/13.
P. 3234/13.
(c) agreed that the eastern boundary of the Turkish Sanjak of Nejd should
be represented by a line, shown in blue on a map appended to the
Convention, running due south from the head of the Gulf opposite
Zaknuniyeh Island, which formed part of the said Sanjak, to the
20th parallel of latitude in the Rub'al Khali.
Ihn Saud and Qatar; Apprehensions of the Trucial Sheikhs, July 1913.
166. On 1st August the Government of India reported the death on 17th July
of the* Sheikh of Qatar, and stated that the Political Agent, Bahrein, had
informed the Resident that while at Katif Ibn Saud had addressed the Sheikh
of Qatar and demanded the expulsion of the Turkish garrison from A1 Bidaa.
" Residency Agent, Trucial Coast, reports that Sheikhs of Debai and Abu
Dhabi, who are of the same tribe, have had a conference, and latter, who
since the Wahabi evacuation has achieved a paramount position in Baraimi
and neighbourhood, is convinced that Ibn Saud will now turn his activities
in that direction. In this fear the two Sheikhs have decided to mobilise their
Bedouins in the Sabakhat el Matti (vide page 1200, Persian Gulf Gazetteer)
and take the initiative against Ibn Saud. There having been nothing
unfriendly in our reply to Ibn Saud, I [Sir P. Cox] should not imagine that
he would think it worth while to hostilize us by such action, but of course
the state of Oman generally at present offers him a very favourable oppor
tunity, if he be so disposed. I am warning Sheikhs of the improbability of
such a development, and deterring them from provoking hostilities, but I
should be glad to give them, if possible, something reassuring as to the
attitude of the British Government towards a possible enterprise of this kind
on the part of Ibn Saud."
British Guarantees to Qatar, 1913.
167. The Resident was instructed in reply that the new Sheikh of Qatar
" and, if necessary, Ibn Saud, should be informed that H.M. Government would
allow no outside interference in the peninsula. Latter should clearly understand
that if he attempts it, he will be forcibly resisted. Former may be told that he
has nothing to fear from Turks."
H.M. Government and Ihn Saud as a Potential Danger in the
Trucial Area, 1913.
168. On 7th August the Political Resident telegraphed to the Government
inter alia that—
" At any rate for a long time to come the Porte can exercise no control
whatever over Ibn Saud and that meanwhile he is in a position to give a
varying deal of inconvenience alike in regard to Oman, the Trucial Coast
and Katr, which inconvenience an innocuous modus vivendi, arranged n
necessary with the knowledge of the Porte, would obviate. It is not a
question of any desire to interfere in the politics of Central Arabia. Ibn
Saud is now at the coast, and for us it is a question of a new menace to our
interests in the Gulf sphere which we need either to sterilise or protects
ourselves against."
Views of Government of India, August 1913.
169. The Viceroy on 10th August in a telegram commenting on the general
situation, and urging a modification in the policy hitherto adopted by H.M.
Government, said that—
" It is clear from his [Ibn Sand's] relations with the Sheikh of Katr and
the recent reports as to the apprehensions of the Trucial Chiefs that It®
Saud is becoming a more and more prominent factor in the politics of titf
Persian Gulf littoral, and has thus brought himself within the sphere o
our interests and influence. As lon^ as Ibn Saud confined himself to ^
Hasa he could be ignored with impunity. Such a policy, however, cannot m
our-opinion safely be pursued now that there is a possibility of his in^
ference in El Katr, with the Trucial Chiefs, and possibly in Oman, whei^
the rebellion may give him an opportunity for encroachment on Musca
territory. .... Unless we come to some mutual and amicable under