"ثورة مسقط، في الفترة من أبريل ١٩١٧ إلى يناير ١٩١٨، واستُأنفت في الفترة من أبريل ١٩٢٠ إلى أكتوبر ١٩٢٠" [و‎‎٢‎٤‎٢] (٥٥٨/٤٩٦)

XXX s
r
^3?
absent
(4) foreign ^nterferenoe. This appeared in the eyes of 1
the fanatical and ignorant Omaxiis to be directed
against their most cherished rights such as the
importation of arms and slaTes, In these the Sultan ^
acquiesced without consulting his subjects accepting
large sums of money for his acquiescence, not one
penny of which money the Omanis ever saw.
At the same time our policy in Zanzibar
lost nothing in the telling.
Several of the reasons why the Sultans were
unable to cope with the rebellion are contained in
these. But to them may be added three more, ^he loss
of Zanzibar and its revenues, the loss of sea power
owing to the introduction of steam, and finally and
most important of all the effects of British
influence.
When considering our policy in Muscat and
Oman this last point must never be lost sight of.
A brief perusal of the treaties and engagements
with the rulers of muscat will show that our
influence has been entirely self interested, has
paid no regard to the peculiar political and social
conditions of the country and its rulers, and by
bribing effete Sultans to enforce unpalatable
measures which benefitted none but ourselves, and
permitting them to misrule without protest has done
more to alienate the interior and to prevent the
Sultans from re-establishing their authority than
all the rest put together. In other words it has
been support wrongly applied, in money and not in
essentials, interference in external affairs which
must have seriously reacted upon internal peace
and no palliative except money which was thrown
into the sea or worse by those into whose hands we