"أوراق تتعلق بتجارة الرقيق على الساحل الشرقي لأفريقيا والنظام المتبع لكبحها" [ظ‎‎٥‎٦] (٧٢/٥٢)

52
2. As directly bearing on this point, I would refer the Right Honourable the
Governor in Council to the views expressed by Sir W. M. Coghlan in the Proceedings of
the Zanzibar Commission, in ray humble opinion the soundest that have ever been written
on all questions relating to Oman. On pages 69 and 70 he states" Colonel Rigby, in
his account of the preparation made by Seyd Majid to resist the expected invasion, repre
sents the means at the disposal of the latter as ample to destroy any force brought against
him, dwelling especially on the enthusiasm of the people in his cause. Subsequently,
however, and long after the expedition of Seyd Thoweynee had returned to Muscat, his
report of the state of affairs at Zanzibar led Government to conclude that the position of
Seyd Majid was not secure,* and later still, on the occasion of the outbreak, when the
Al-Harth Arabs rose in support of Seyd Bargash, all the force which Seyd Majid could
bring against them was ineffectual, and the rising was not suppressed until assistance from
three British men-of-war had been sent to co-operate with them, when, as it is averred, the
Arabs yielded because they would not fight against the British.f Subsequent inquiry
confirms me, rather than otherwise, in the obvious drift ot the foregoing quotation. The
elaborate account given by His Highness Seyd MajidJ of the insurrection at Zanzibar in
October 1859, divested of its vain colouring, shows that he was hard pressed by the
insurgents, and Colonel Rigby, in attempting to reconcile a former statement of his, that
the faction opposed to Majid was utterly contemptible with the position which that faction
had secured on the occasion referred to, renders it highly probable that, without the
opportune assistance of the British, the struggle would have been prolonged and the final
result at least doubtful. §
38. On the other hand, it is by no means certain that the success ot the insurgents
would have placed Zanzibar in the hands of Seyd Thoweynee. Colonel Rigby is of
opinion that the Al-Harth were actuated by private aims, and availed themselves of Seyd
Thoweynee's antagoni&m to Seyd Majid, not for his sake, but for their own, anxious, if
possible, to get rid of the whole family ot the late Imam. H
3. I do not pretend to any knowledge of Zanzibar, or of the state of the parties
there, but I would beg Government to remember that it is an open town; that danger
threatened Seyd Majid, on the occasion above referred to, from the Al-Harth tribe, of
whom Saleh-bin-Ali, the man who plotted and so successfully carried out the late revolu
tion here, is an inHuential chief; that this man himself took an important part in those
events, and had to leave Zanzibar on that account; and that it is by no means impossible
that the religious sentiment which has lately been so conspicuous here will be carried
across the ocean, and play a part equally remarkable amongst the Arabs on the continent
of
4. I feel convinced that it is from no spirit of mere braggadocio that such a scheme is
now openly talked of in Muscat, but that the idea has taken root in the minds of the
Chiefs, and is popular with their followers. It can, moreover, I fancy, be easily w r orked
out by' those with whom it emanated, as a few emissaries sent to Zanzibar in the name of
the Imam are likely to be all that is required. The priests would probably be easily
gained over, and there, as here, the Chiefs and people would follow.
5. It is therefore from no idea of exciting alaam, or of exaggerating the power and
objects of the late movement, that I have penned this Report, but to put Government on
their guard against a contingency by no means remote, and with a hope that they will
warn Seyd Majid that any infringement of international rights, as in the case of Seyd
Hillal, who has been identified with this movement from the first, in the cases of any
persons who have been concerned in bringing about the late revolution, will most probably
be visited on his head, if not by expulsion, at least by an attempt on the part {sic) to
subvert his authority.
* Resolution of the Honourable Board, November 16, 1859.
f Muscat Report, paragraph 24.
X Appendix L.
§ Appendix B, reply to Query 15.
ij Appendix B, reply to Query 14.