الملف E/8 I ابن سعود [ظ‎‎١‎٩‎٣] (٦٠٦/٤٠٩)

So much for Bin Baud's own attitude which I am convinced will not alter until he W
despaired of obtaining the countinuance or good oflices of His Majesty's Government in In;,
efforts for an arrangement with the lurks.
One reason, and that the most cogent for Bin Saud's determined attitWe j is that he f,ek
himself strong enough to oppose the Turks especially if he can keep the other great Arab Shaikhs
firm in their resolution not to permit any further aggression or encroachment in Arabia by the
Turks During the past year there has arisen a loose kind of confederation or alliance betweo,.
the following Chiefs-Bin Sand, Imam Yahyah Saiyid Mahomed al-ldrisi, Bin Sha'alan and the
Sharif of Mecca, with only Ibn Eashid, the Shammar Chief, left outsjde the coalition, Tho
basis of the alliance is that the allied Chiefs should endeavour to settle their differences by agree-
ment or arbitration as war between them only weakens all parties as against the common enemy
(viz the Turks), that in the event of any aggression by the Porte upon any one of these ShaiVhn
all should combine for resistance and mutual h 'lp. Ibn Eaahid has been left out of the con
federation because the present ruler is a boy who cannot be trusted, who is hand in glove with
the Turks and has no real authority over his own tribesmen. Whether the Turkish Govern
ment is aware of this combination or not I do not know, but I presume that it is for it has
been at great pains to strengthen Ibn Rashid with arms and treasure within the last six months.
Before 1 left Kuwait on on the 3rd February I had heard rumours of large consignments of
arms being despatched to Hail for Ibn Rashid from Damascus ; at Riadh Bin Sand told me
that he had certain information to the same effect and that they must be intended by the
Turkish Government for use against himself; in the north-central desert the news was
confirmed ; and finally I was informed in the vicinity of the Hedjaz Railway by Chiefs in a
position to know, that some 30,000 rifles (all magazine arms of Mauser or Mannlicher pattern)
with bayonets had been railed from Damascus to the station Tebuk) on the Hedjaz
line for Teimah, that hundreds of boxes (accurate numbers were not obtainabh) of ammunition
accompanied the arms together with three breech-loading mountain guns (each said to be
accompanied, I think, with some 500 shrapnel shell apiece) and thai the consignment filled
three large Railway waggons ; further that three Europeans (probably European Turks) had
taken a motor-car by the same route to Hail at about the same time (I think in January)
who might be artillerymen for the mountain guns. In the nortnern desert it was common
report that these arms were intended for Ibn Rashid and that he would probably make a move
against Bin Saud within the year, perhaps in the autumn.
Bin Saud may have received accurate information later of the quantities and description
of arms and of tha plans conceited between Ibn Raslud and the Turks, and it is some such
knowledge, I think, which prcbably accounted for his uncompromising and somewhat truculent
attitude at Kuwait towards the Turkish deputation sent to interview him. It is action of this
(UJ) k . ind in the faCe o{ correspondence of the descrip-
yAA). ^ reporte(i * the p olitical Agent at Ku , vait m
April which causes Bin Saud to view any Tmkish proposal with the greatest suspicion.
From all that I heard throughout Central Arabia I feel convinced that the old methods of
Turkish intrigue, of setting up one Arab Shaikh against another, will no longer have the success
of past times in maintaining even that shadowy semblance of Turkish sovereignty over them
which has hitherto passed unquestioned ; throughout the country I was struck by the contempt
with which the Arabs all regarded the Turkish Government, its troops and its civil officials.
In attempting to show of what little account in Arabia Turkish authority really iSj I am only
endeavouring to explain that present Turkish methods invite further disasters. ^
I am aware that His Majesty's Government are committed to a policy of supporting and
maintaining a strong Turkey in Asia and if such a desirable result can be brought about in
Arabia so much the better. Unfortunately the Turkish Government appears to have no concep
tion of its own weakness in Arabia, nor of the power and strength of the Arab Chiefs, nor does it
appear to realize what are the probable consequences likely to ensue should forcible miasures
have to be resorted to in the end. The reports from Kuwait describing the course of the; negotia
tions with Bin Saud I think^ sufficiently bear out the above view. The nearest parallel to the
i urkish difficulties with Bin baud which I can draw is our own case in Somaliland, only exaggerated
ten times worse. Knowing something of the country, its difficulties in transport, supplies and
the like, I would hesitate to suggest that less than two divisions, completely equipped for a long
desert war, would be able to re-establish and maintain effectively the former Turkish, occupation
of the Hasa province. The Turkish occupation before May 1913 was not effective in any sense,
aad only existed because Bin Saud was more occupied elsewhere. He could have carried out his
coup of May 1913 at any time in the last five years.
So far as my limited knowledge goes the Turkish Government does not appear fco be in
a position at present to undertake any expeditions in Arabia, nor indeed for many years to come.
mus a so e remembered that any future campaign against one Shaikh is exceedingly likely
to raise the whole of Arabia against the Turks. It may be argued that the Arab tribes have not
the necessary cohesion to maintain for any length of time a united front against the Porte.