"دليل الخليج. مجلد I. القسم التاريخي. الأجزاء Iأ و Iب. ج.ج. لوريمر ١٩١٥" [‎١‎٠‎٣‎١] (١٧٨٢/١١٨٦)

1031
was, in both cases, that His Majesty's Government had no desire to
disturb the stains quo at Kuwait; and, on the 9th o£ September, the
controversy between the British Government and the Porte regarding
Kuwait was closed, to all appearance, by a mutual engagement to respect
the status quo.
While the discussions just described were proceeding in Europe
Ibn-Rashid was not inactive. At the end of September 1901 his partisans
raided a camp of the Rashaidah not far from Jahrah j and, though
eventually driven off, they succeeded in carrying away a considerable
booty and killed several men of a Kuwait force which was sent against
them. The Bedouin inhabitants of the whole country-side then flocked
into the neighbourhood of Kuwait town for protection, and a huge
camp was formed, containing thousands of Bedouins with their flocks
and herds, which extended along the coast as far as Ras-al-Ardh ; but, a
second raid by Ibn-Rashid^s men in the neighbourhood of Jabal 'Amudah
and Ras Misha'ab having proved less successful than the first, the invaders
retired towards Central Arabia, and the enormous gathering of refugees
at Kuwait melted away as suddenly as it had formed. Ibn-Rashid
lingered for some time longer at Hafar, and his protracted stay there, taken
in conjunction with the proceedings of the Turks, caused Shaikh Mubarak
much uneasiness. During this disturbed period several British gunboats
were held in readiness at or near Kuwait; the naval authorities were
empowered by the Government of India to use force to repel an attack
by Ibn-Rashid ; and a scheme for the defence of the town was arranged
by the Senior Naval Officer. The experience gained and the observations
made on this occasion showed that Kuwait was not defensible against
a land attack by naval means alone. Shaikh Mubarak, in return for
the good offices exercised on his behalf, was required to promise
compliance with such British advice as might be given him, and he did so.
At the middle of November 1901, Ibn-Rashid having in the
meantime moved down from Hafar to Safwan, a place on the frontier
between Turkish 3 Iraq and Kuwait, the Naqib of Basrah visited Kuwait
with a telegram from the Sultan of Turkey. In this telegram the V\ ali
of Basrah was directed to send the Naqib to interview Shaikh Mubarak
and warn him that his course of action was rash and impious, and that
he should seek safety by returning to his religious duty and
propitiating the Sultan. According to one account. Shaikh Mubarak in
reply made commonplace professions of loyalty to the Porte and
complained of the doings of Ibn-Rashid and Yusuf of Dorah ; but the
Naqib seems to have reported to his own Government that the Shaikh
repudiated the suzerainty of the Sultan and that he had referred the
Panic at
Kuwait 02
the approwh
of Ibn-
Rasbid,
September—
October
1901. .
Crisis at
Kuwait diie
to attempts
bj' Turkey to
upset the
status quo,
November'
December
1901.
ii
: > i 1