"دليل الخليج. مجلد I. القسم التاريخي. الأجزاء Iأ و Iب. ج.ج. لوريمر ١٩١٥" [‎٦‎٨‎٧] (١٧٨٢/٨٣٠)

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687
troops this unreliable ally changed sides and helped to complete the
Saiyid's discomfiture.
In 183^, on the occurrence of another rising against Saiyid Sard's
authority during his second absence in East Africa, Shaikh Snltan-bin-
Saqar availed himself of the opportunity to seize, by surprise or treachery,
Dihah and the Shamailiyah ports of Khor Fakkan and Ghallah, which A i 8fcrict
were thus lost to the •'Oman Sultanate. But for the timely arrival of
two Masqat frigates, with reinforcements and stores, it is probable that
the town of Shinas a\so would have fallen into his hands.
Annexation
by the
Shavjah
Shaikh of the
Shamailiyah
Connection of the Wahhabi power with Pirate Coast affairs,
1820-35,
The prestige o£ the Wahhabi Amir was for a time destroyed by
the successful operations of the Egyptian and British forces against him
and his dependents; but, with the withdrawal of the Egyptians from Najd
and of the British from Qishm, his influence in 'Oman began to revive.
Though in 1821 Sultan-bin-Saqar had already abjured Wahhabi tenets,
and though his authority was even then preponderant over that oi flusain-
bin-'Ali of Earns, the official representative of the Wahhabi interest on the
Pirate Coast, it was nevertheless the case that in 1823 a large proportion
of the people were still Wahhabi in sympathy; but of the secular
power of the Wahhabi Amir there was no longer a trace to be found
in the country.
In 1824 the Wahhabi state began to raise its head once more in
Central Arabia ; and Shaikh Sultan-bin-Saqar and his chief dependent.
Shaikh Rashid -bin-Hamaid of 'Ajman, lost no time in creating interest
for themselves with its ruler. The negotiations were conducted quite
openly on the part of the Shaikh of Sharjah, who pretended that they
were necessary for his safety.
In November 1825, in an interview with the British Resident,
Shaikh Sultan-bin-Saqar professed great fear of the growing power o
the Wahhabis and enquired whether he might rely on British aic in
endeavouring to defend his independence against them ; he also asked what
course he should follow if the Wahhabis were to make war on the Saiyid
of Masqat and demand the assistance of Sharjah. No reply was appar
ently given to the question about British support, the Bombay Govern
ment thinking it more prudent not to publish their intention of avoid mg
a collision with Wahhabis over merely territorial matters ; but t e ai
Temporary
discredit
of the
Wahhabis,
1821-23.
Revival of
Wahhabi
influence,
1824.
Corre
spondence
between the
Shaikh of
Shavjah and
the British
authorities
relative to
the Wahhabi
danger, 1825.