"دليل الخليج. مجلد I. القسم التاريخي. الأجزاء Iأ و Iب. ج.ج. لوريمر ١٩١٥" [‎٦‎١‎٣] (١٧٨٢/٧٥٦)

Vs ^
613
assembled for safety in a sheltered situation near the Telegraph Office;
a iid on the other side Khuda Nabi Bakhsh, alarmed at the prospeet of
injury to British interests, severed his connection with 'Abdul ^Aziz. At
length, on the 7th of August, the besiegers withdrew baffled. The total
cost of the operations to the Sultan of 'Oman was about lis. 8,000 ; and
the losses sustained by his Arab and Baluchi subjects were considerable.
The attack on Gwadar was not commenced by 'Abdul 'Aziz until,
in reply to a request by him that British subjects might be
removed beyond reach of danger, he had been informed that he would he
held personally responsible for all injuries that might befall British
persons or property through bis acts of aggression. As at Chahbar in
1872, the protection of a British gunboat was not immediately avail
able, and H.M.S. " Rifleman " did not reach the scene until two or three
days after 'Abdul 'Aziz had commenced his operations; nevertheless, out
of 139 British shops protected by official notices, only 5 were tampered
with by 'Abdul 'Aziz's partisans ; and, though the traders entitled
to British protection estimated their losses at Rs. 48,658, Captain
Mockler placed tliem at a very much lower figure. It was ruled by ^ the
Government of India that to recover compensation from Saiyid Turki
would be unfair, and from Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz impossible; consequently
no official estimate of the damage done was ever drawn up.
But the Government of India, while they recognised the impractica
bility of obtaining reparation from 'Abdul 'Aziz, were now resolved, to
put an end to his disorderly proceedings, as well as to those of baiyid
Salim, who, a few days after the incidents above described, announced
his intention of making a fresh attack on Gwadar. Abdul Aziz was
now in Bahu and Salim in Kaij, and. their presence was disturbing to the
country at large and even threatened to cause trouble with 1 eisia. Ac
cordingly, at the end of August, the Commissioner in Sind was informed
that, in case of the Saiyids approaching Gwadar to molest it, the\
might be called on to withdraw and to disperse their men, and that, i i< v
refused, they might be arrested. A few days later the Commissionei was
further authorised to inform the Saiyids that an allowance o vy" ^
month would be paid to each of them by Saiyid lurki, on con ition o
their residing in British territory and abstaining for the tutuie inm in
terference in the affairs of 'Oman,—an offer for the consideration of
which ten days were allowed them,—and to warn t hem that, i ey or
cibly threatened Gwadar or attempted to make their way to Oman oi o
the Persian Gulf, they w r ould be liable to arrest.
The terms offered were not accepted by either of the Saiyids , but in
September 1873, as we have seen in the history of the C, nian u ana e,
'Abdul 'Aziz was captured at sea and removed to India. a im iowe
remained at large in Makran, chiefly in the district of Das i van, an
definitely declined a renewed offer of the same terms as etoie.
The course adopted seems to have driven Salim to despeiation. In
the early morning of the 8th of December 187.^, ha\ing n ^ a . ea . .i
march from the interior of 100 miles in two days, he aunei 111
with only 15 followers and captured the fort by escalac K 1 >
Rn^i i • and the acting: Wall was
Losses of
British sub
jects.
Terms offered
by Saiyid
Turki to
'Abdul 'Aziz
and Salim,
and ultima
tum of the
Britisb Gov
ernment.
Sa'id-bin -Khamis, was absent at the time; and t ie ac 1 in l? ,
a weak man, incapable of action, but not, it was believe* , is y ^
Sultan. On the 11th of December H.M.S.
Columbine " and the
Capture and
deportation
of 'Abdul
'A iii , Sep
tember 1873.
Seizure of
Gwadar by
Salim and
failure of an
attempt to
arrest him,
1 )ecember
1873.