"ملخص لمراسلات تتعلق بشؤون الخليج الفارسي، ١٨٠١-١٨٥٣" [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٨] (٣٤٤/٢٣٦)

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[Part VI—Chap. XLIV.
of these despatches as his esp rience might su^^est, and His Lordship would have been happy
to avail himself of them in forming his own judgment. But as I have not heard from you
again on the subject, and as these papers relate to matters of importance on which it is
desirable that some resolution should be formed without delay, I am directed to communicate
to yon, for the information of His Honour in Council, the following remarks of the Governor-
General on Captain HennelPs despatches.
3. His Lordship hiirhly applauds the zeal and energy which induced Captain Hennell to
Captain Henuell's letter A, dated 4th July 1839, undertake his late vojage along the coast, in
with enclosures. order to ascertain fully the motives which had
induced the Chief of Bahrein and others to submit, without apparent necessity, to Khoorsia
Pacha, the Egyptian General, and to endeavour by his presence and personal influence and
exhortation to stop the progress of submission on the part of the Maritime Chiefs which might
otherwise, he had reason to apprehend, extend over the province of Oman.
4. The explanation afforded by Sheik Abdoola bin Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein, either
in his letter to Captain Hennell, or in his conversation with that officer, of the motives which
had induced him so unexpectedly and apparently so unnecessarily to place his territories in a
position of dependence on Egypt, and to become himself tributary to Muhammad Ally,
appeal's to the Governor-General most unsatisfactory. The facility of erossin<r from the main
land to Bahrein in boats, which he alleges as the cause of his weakne-s and inability to
oppose the Egyptian General, might have been a valid reason for submission to an army
assembled on the coa^t, and furnished with boats to effect the passage. But no such
imminent danger threatened him, and much time must have been occupied in preparations
for the invasion of Bahrein. Jar from waiting for these, the Sheik appears, on the arrival
of an Agent of Khoorshed Pasha, to have surrendered his independence at the first summons,
and even now to discuss «ith complacency the propriety of his conduct. From the date of
the enga gemenr, entered into with Khoorshed Pasha, it appears that it was negotiated
subsequently to the visit of Admiral Maitland and Mr. Edmunds to Bahrein, and the Sheik's
assertion that the engagement was concluded before the arrival of the IFellesley at Bahrein
can deserve little credit, as such a transaction could hardly have escaped the knowledge of
Mr. Edmunds, if in reality the island of Bahrein had become a dependency of Egypt before
his visit. It must therefore be assumed that Sheik Abdoolah consented to become tributary
to the ruler of Egypt, not only before he was (compelled by any military demonstration to
adopt that course, but after all the encouragement to resistance and promise of support which
he had received from the British Government, and it would thence appear manifest that, by
whatever motives he may have been influenced, he has deliberately preferred his present
connexion with Egypt to his former independence in alliance with the British Government.
5. Sheik Abdoola's conduct is unfortunately not a solitary instance of too ready
submission to the demands of Khoorshid Pasha and his Agent Syud bin Mootluk. There is
reason to believe that Sheik Kuleefa bin IShakboot and Sooltan bin Sugfiur had rather
encouraged than otherwise the pretensions of Syud bin Mootluk and but for the app-arance of
the Resddent on the coast of Oman, it is to be apprehended that the other Chieftains in that
quarter would ere long have been induced or compelled to submit to the authority of the
Officer appointed by Khoorshid Pasha to rule over them.
6. Under such circumstances it could have only been by energetic measures such as
those adoptei by Captain Hennell, that the continued influence of the British Government
over these petty States could have been longer maintained.
7. Tfie Governor-General it therefore prepared to approve and confirm the engagements
entered info hy that officer for the supply of munition* of war to certain of the Chieftains^
and His Lordship hopes that the engagements concluded hy several of the chiefs 10 adhere to
their former connexion, and not to permit Syud bin MootluJc to obtain a footing among them,
will he faithfudy performed,
8. Of this there might not have been much prospect if Khoorshid Pasha and his Agent,
Syud bin Mootluk, were to persist in prosecuting their designs against the independence
of the Chiefs of Oman, for it has been seen with how little regard to honor and good faith
several of these Chieftains who had engaged to Lieutenant Edmunds to oppose with one
accord the encroachment? of Syud bin Mootlnk were almost immediately afterwards in
friendly communication with that officer, and were preparing the way for the general
subjugation of their own, and of all the surrounding territories.
9. Any dependence on the steadiness of these Chieftains to the engagempnts they have
subscribed being therefore limited to the inducements which they may have to keep them,
and as Captain Hennell had so little reason to rely on their good faith after he had left the
coast, he appears to have acted with a sound discretion in resorting to other means of
deterring Syud bin Mootluk from his projected subjugation of Oman. The Governor-General
approves the tenor of the Resident's letter to that officer, and trusts that the remonstrance
may not only produce an effect upon his proceedings, but may tmd as much as their engage
ments to Captain Hennell to unite the Arab Chief'ain in the defencee of their independence.
10. Captain Hennell's previous remonstrance to Khoorshid Pasha appears not to have
been without effect, and his protest against the encroachments of the Egyptian forces
in the direction of Oman, will, it is to be hoped, lead to the immediate recall of Syud bin
Mootluk from that province,
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