"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎١‎٨‎٨] (٤٢٤/٣٨٠)

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At 1400 on the 19th Gee. Keary was informed that some 2,000 Turks
were advancing from Qasr-i-Shirin on Shahraban. He was instructed
to conceal his strength, draw them on and destroy them. He moved
out a portion of his force on the 20th but it was not till the 21st that
the enemy were encountered holdiug Shahraban, the bridge over the
Mahrut Canal being destroyed. Gen. Keary was delayed here till
the 23rd when the Turks evacuated and the pursuit was taken up to the
foot of Jabal Hamrin. Here the 8th Infantry Brigade was held up
by a strong position behind two big canals whose existence had previ
ously been unknown. The first of these, the Nahrunia, was crossed by
this Brigade that night but further progress was stopped by the Balad
Euz. It now became evident that the Turks were holding in consi
derable strength the historic position of the Jabal Hamrin, a broad ridge
of rock rising some 800 feet from the plain. He had, as was known,
in this area, the 6th ^nd part of the 14th Divisions, with 3 Muratteb
Battalions—a total strength of 5,600 rifles, 240 sabres and 40 guns. The
position was one of great strength and actually occupied by 4,500 rifles
and 20 guns. Gen. Keary determined to hold the enemy in front
with two battalions whilst the bulk of the column were to cross the
Balad Ruz well to the south and attack the enemy's left flank at dawn
on the 25th. Premature commencement of bridging, however, disclosed
the plan to the enemy. Moreover after crossing this stream instead
of keeping well to the right the attack inclined somewhat to the left.
Nor was it pushed on with sufficient vigour. As a result instead of
gaining the ridge beyond the Turkish left, it struck this ridge just where
it had been reinforced, and was severely handled. In fact the 9th Bri
gade was only extricated with considerable difficulty by using.every
available man in the 8th Brigade to cover its withdrawal. Our casual
ties were just under 1,200. This action is an interesting example of hill
warfare with modern weapons in country very similar to the North-
West Frontier.
On the 26th March the Turks withdrew followed 4ip by the 8th Bri
gade which reached Qizil Robat on 1st April 1917 just after the last of
the Turks had crossed to the right bank of the Diyala. At this place
contact was gained with the Cossacks on the 1st April.
These operations afford an excellent example of successful rear
guard work in two directions by Ali Ihsan. He had held off the Rus
sians on the Pai Tak Pass with two battalions only, whilst he withdrew
the remainder of the 2nd Division through Qizil Robat. Meanwhile
he held the strong Jabal Hamrin position with the 6th Division and as
soon as he had inflicted a reverse on the British and had cleared the
remainder of his Corps successfully, withdrew this rearguard also.
To assist the XIII Corps, Khalil had meanwhile transferred the XVIII
Corps across the Tigris to the Adhaim, and was now advancing at a