"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎١‎٧‎١] (٤٢٤/٣٤٦)

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tliem, nor were we able to stop tlie counter-attack on the 28tli Brigade,,
in spite of the fact that the enemy was seen massing for it and we had
ample warning. It shows the fighting quality of the Turks: and the
difficulties of bringing fire to bear with accuracy when observation is
poor.
That night the III Corps were making their final preparations.
The Tigris was going down, but still running about 6 knots.
During the night the 39th Brigade pushed out to the Nahr-al-Massag
to cover the 14th Divisional Artillery.
The Bridging Train came up and the 37th Brigade with their pontoon
parties moved up in three columns towards the ferries. Just as they
started at dusk a Turkish plane flew over, but apparently saw nothing.
While these moves were going on the 40th Brigade were distracting
the Turks at the Liquorice Factory by another feint, including much
splashing of planks and movement of transport carts.
This feint combined with the raid at Maqasis had the desired effect.
The enemy evidently concluded Maqasis was a hoax and the Liquorice
Factory the real thing, because at dawn a column was seen moving
towards it from the scene of the real crossing.
The night was quiet and all were ready by 0500. At 0530 all three
ferries started launching their pontoons and a quarter of an hour later
the first two moved off.
The Norfoiks at No. 1 got across safely, seized quickly a portion of the
river bank just as the light became sufficient to see a hundred yards or so.
The Turks were now roused and heavy fire was opened. The 2-9th
Gurkhas were crossing at No. 2 Ferry. Here 10 pontoons out of 13
succeeded in reaching the far bank : of these 4 more were knocked out
on the return journey. The six remaining attempted another crossing,,
but every occupant was killed or wounded before they reached mid
stream. The l-2nd Gurkha Rifles at No. 3 suffered the same fate.
The position on the left bank was now for some time precarious, but
the footing gained was maintained and extended, thanks to the magni
ficent performance of the Norfolks and the Gurkha detachment. Out
of the two Gurkha Battalions about one and-a-half companies had got
across before the ferries had to be closed down. The remaining pontoons,
were then brought up to No. 1.
No. 1 Ferry worked well and by 0920 all the Norfolks were across and
the 2-9th Gurkhas started to follow.
The Norfolks with some of the 2-9th Gurkhas now held the toe of the
peninsula whilst a party of the l -2nd Gurkhas was holding on some
700 yards north-east. They were still held up by machine guns parti
cularly from a concealed nullah on the right of the latter. Our artillery
were unable to spot these but by 1300 the l-2nd Gurkhas managed to
advance a little and capture the nullah. Resistance then began to-