"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎٤‎٢] (٤٢٤/٨٩)

64
The British, force marched all day till 1800 to a place 20 miles
from Kut. The 6th Division had marched 30 miles : the 30th Brigade
-34 miles. On the 2nd December, the force marched to within 3 miles
of Kut, which was entered early on the 3rd December. The Turks had
been entirely out-distanced : the only trouble met with was from Arabs,
who, as usual, turned against the retreating side.
The plan of the battle of Ctesiphon was very similar to that of the
battle of Es-Sinn, that is to say, that the force at General Townshend's
disposal was split up into columns, leaving no
reserve in the hands of the commander of the whole.
Complete envelopment of the Turkish forces was planned, as at
Es-Sinn. This sort of plan, aiming at envelopment on a wide front, and
i^ith the whole force given to subordinate commanders, with no
Teserve in the commander's hands, depends, one may say, for its
.success on success. If anything unexpected throws the machinery out
of gear, failure is likely to result: for there is no body of troops at the
commander's disposal, with which he can cause the wheels to revolve
■again. Accurate information and superior numbers are essentials for
.success. In this particular case, neither of these essentials was present.
It was regrettable that our information regarding the enemy's numbers
was inaccurate. The enemy's strength was under-estimated by 50 per
cent.; moreover the presence of an Anatolian Turk division was unknown.
So certain was the Intelligence Staff at G. H. Q. of the accuracy of their
estimate, that when General Townshend in his report gave the Turkish
figures as 20,000 (a figure which we now know to be accurate) this state
ment was challenged by the G. H. Q. Staff. Information about the
ground and the enemy's position, gained from personal reconnaissance
on the part of commanders or staff, was entirely lacking. Proper maps
•of Mesopotamia were not in existence : all detailed sketching had to be
done by eye from an aeroplane. Considering all things, the sketches
produced were remarkably accurate. But accurate eye sketches cannot
xeplace personal reconnaissance. Had this latter been carried out from
the air or ground, the great tactical importance of High Wall must have
been observed.
As we have alread} 7 ' noted, the splitting of the whole command into 4
•columns left nothing in hand to meet unforeseen contingencies. There
was another serious objection to this plan : it resulted in the small force
•of mobile land artillery being divided among the four columns. Thus
iihere could not be any really adequate artillery support at any one spot.
It was due to this that the infantry casualties were so heavy.
An interesting point arises in connection with the Flying Column.
The eventual task of this column was to press on and occupy Baghdad
after the battle General Townshend did not trust the G. 0. C. Cavalry
Brigade : accordingly he placed an infantry brigadier, noted for his