'الملف 10/3 IV الامتياز النفطي بقطر' [و‎‎١‎٧] (٥٣٤/٥٤)

2,
(i)
(iii) Minor raiding,
4* The Council are fully mindful of the deterrent effect
which would result if it were made generally known that His
Majesty 1 s Govermaent would "be pre ared to support the Sheikh in
the event of his being attacked. They must observe ? however,
that these contingencies all relate to aggression by land from
the hinterland; and that in these circumstances it is
inevitable that the protective measures, apart from the
provision of such detachments as it might "be necessary and
practicable to land from His Majesty's Varships for local
defence of towns and aerodromes, and of such other land
forces as it might be found practicable to send from
elsewhere, must devolve upon the air forces normally located
in Iraq..
These forces, however, are situated a long distance
from Q.atar, to which they would have to proceed by a route
where the possibility of delays due to climatic conditions
cannot be overlooked.. Again, these forces, which are already
below the strength which the Council have long regarded as
necessary in the Middle East, have to meet an ever increasing
number and diversity of calls upon them, including
reinforcement of distant theatres; and the Council certainly
could not undertake that they would be available under all
circumstances to deal with contingencies in Hatar, These
difficulties would for a|il practical purposes be overcome if
a Royal Air Force Squadron were located at Bahrein, but the
Council assume that the importance of the issue involved is
not in itself such as to justify the provision of such an
additional unit, and therefore do not at present propose to
suggest such an increase.
6. Under these conditions the Air Council take the view
that the nature and limits of the protection whicn mig/it be
given if the forces are available, are as follows:-