"ملخص ثورة الحجاز" [‎١‎٦] (٣٢/١٨)

to both the Sherif and FeisaU but had not received a reply. The Sherif is known to have received these
letters. Maurice then saw the Vali of Damascus, Tahsin Bey, who stated he had been auchorized to
spend up to £T500,()00 in g'old, of which £T200,000 had already arrived, on propag-anda.
Tahsin showed Maurice a letter to Nuri Shaalan {see. Appendix L), who had left the Turks and
gone to Qaf with bis tribe, as his son Nawwaf had been arrested at Damascus in July and confined
at Z»hle. The letter stated that Nuri must return to Damascus with 500 camel men, when he would be
given £T 10,000, food for his bedouins and rilles, as well as the title of Emir of Qaf, and a first-clai
Usmameh. Maurice stated he at once wrote to Nun warning him that the above was a trap and the fact
remains that Nuri Shaalan did not return to Damascus. During all this time Maurice's pose was that of a
Turkish agent working to induce the Arabs lo return to their Turkish allegiance. He stated that Jemal Pasha
refused to allow him to go among the bedouin, but informed him he was to work with the Vali and the
sum of £T-100,000 (?) would be put at his disposal to raise a bedouin army of some 15,000 men. The
Valis of Damascus, Adana, Aleppo and Beirut, with the Governor of the Lebanon appear to have formed a
committee for this purpose. While at Damascus two Sheikhs of the Metawalli tribe asked Maurice why
the support which he'had promised them on his previous visit to Syria in i'J 16 had not been forthcoming,
Maurice stated that he had told the authorities concerned (British ? Arab ?), but nothing had been done,
but it would be different this time. Maurice had no authority for thus pledging the British authorities.
About the 7th December Maurice left Damascus in disguise and went to the Hammad, among the
l)edouins. whom he invited to revolt against the Turkish Government. Towards the end of December
he staled he accompanied a bedouin party with the object of raiding Tadmur, but apparently the raiding
party thought better of it when some 6 hours journey from that place.
At out this time Maurice stated he received a letter from Nuri Shaalan the gist of which was that he
was on the Sherif's side but could not join him as he was too far off and had many enemies, Ibn Rash id, the
Sherarat and the Anazah (?), but if the Sherif's forces came nearer {i.e. further north) he would join him at
once as long as he was given sufficient arms and ammunitioc and with the whole of the Beni Muslim (300,000
—400,000 ? ntt?n) would attack Iloms, llama, or anywhere else. {See Appendix L. The Rualla, Nuri
Shaaian's tribe have now, August, 1918, definitely declared for the Sherif).
He also stated he Imd received a similar message from trie Druse Sheikhs through Selim el A trash, that,
when the Sherif s forces came nearer, they would join him and attaek Deraa. Maurice arrived at Akaba
about the beginning of January, 1918. He is said not to have been received favourably by Feisal.
APPENDIX F.
CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE OF ENEMY POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN ARABIA.
The Turks, probably inspired by the Germans, first showed signs of adopting a more conciliatory
policy towards the Arabs about the end of 1916.
Telegram from Enver to Khalil. —Almost the beginning of this change is seen in end of 1916 a message
from Enver at Constantinople to Khalil Pasha in Mesopotamia dated the 27th December, 1916, in which
Eriver, in suggesting collaboration with Ibn Rasbid, concluded with a summary of Turkish policy, of
which the object was to keep matters going until the end of the universal war, to maintain alliances,
and to prevent new trouble.
Jemal 1. —The armal of Falkenhayn to command in Palestine in place of Jemal Pa^ha No. 1 during
1917 marked a further step in this change of policy. Jemal has lalways been looked on as an enemy
to the Arabs, but even he, before his departure, was reported as " making love to the Druses," and in a
speech which he delivered at Beirut about the end of November, spoke in most kindly terms of Syrians and
Arabs generally. While his name appears as S 'gnatory to an offer of free pardon, dated 14th November,
1917, to all Arabs who had taken up arms for the Kina: of the Hejaz forces, who would give themselves
up within a month. The pardon was a Iso to be extended to the applicants family.
Maurices report. —Maurice's report gives a credible indication of the German awakening to the necessity
of bringing influence to bear on Turkey in this respect, and leaves the impression that the Germans had
hitherto been thoroughly deceived by the Turks. At the foot of page 6. the Germans were reported to have
aaid " All we wanted was that you Arabs should return to your allegiance to the Turks, because that was the
only way we could do anything for you, and we give you our word that the Arabs shall afterwards see the
fulfilment of all their aspirations both in regard to Syria and Irak."
See page 10, last paragraph. —Maurice's interview with Kuhlmann and Ilakki Pasha when after an
akward discussion referring to the massacre in Syria, Ilakki Pasha said, '' let's leave off talking about these
things, let byegones be byegones, let's put off old things and put on new."
Page 11, last paragraph. —"Our Government (German Government) now intends to assist yours (Arab)
very thoroughly.
Page 13, paragraph 2.—-Ilakki Pasha's advice to Maurice to speak to Enver and Talaat about military
goings on, and that the methods of Khalil and Jemal Pasha had done great harm.
Page 17 {centre). —Talaat on letters to Hussein, and later "yes, but we want to gain the friendship of
the Arabs, we have made a mistake before and we want to remedy it now and settle Arab affairs."
Page 20. last paragraph. —Said Bey. " We have already sent 200,000/. in gold to Damascus, and we
shall send some more."
Page 22 {centre). —Jemal—Maurice. "As for the Druses . . . I am quite certain they are against
us and I am forced to treat them as if I believe in them."
Page 24, end of first paragraph —Talaat to Maurice on the question of the Khalifat " since then we
have frequently exchanged messages and letters between the Sultan and the Sherif."
Paragraph 2.—However, if the Sherif wanted to be independent we might consent to it and we might
arrange things in Syria for him . . . His brother Nasir is now in Constantinople, he is very well treated,
and the Sheikh of Islam visits him often. We have negotiated enough with the Sherif. Also the Neo-
Turanian movement . . . Hope you will work hard and show the Arab people the error of their ways
and try to bring them back to their allegiance to us."