'ملخص الأحداث التاريخية في مشيخات الخليج العربي وسلطنة مسقط وعمان، ١٩٢٨-١٩٥٣' [و‎‎٩‎٣] (٢٢٢/١٩٠)

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fr^nHh . im P ort an c e toHer Majesty's Government of maintaining the present
friendly relations with the Sultan is difficult to assess. Muscat is at present of no
commercial and of little strategic value to them. Should, however, oil be found
at a place m the Sultan s territories whence it could be piped to the coast of the
Indian Ucean the position in this respect would be completely changed. As things
are the most thcit can be said is that any abandonment by Her Majesty's
oovernment ol their long-standing friendship with Muscat would be a break in
tradition that could not fail to have a disturbing effect on their relations with the
Persian Gulf Rulers generally.
. 7* ^ instructions issued in 1953 to the new incumbent of the post of
Political Resioent the objectives ot Her Majesty's Government in Muscat are
defined as follows: —
(i) to retain as iar as possible the relationship based on existing agreements
between the United Kingdom and the Sultan of Muscat and to
harmonise the Sultan's internal and external policies with the interests
of Her Majesty's Government;
(ii) to retain the facilities in the Sultanate at present granted to Her Majesty's
forces;
(hi) to secure recognition of the frontier between Saudi Arabia and the
Sultanate as near as possible to the line defined by the Sultan in 1937;
(iv) to enable Petroleum Development (Oman) (Limited) to take full advantage
(at the earliest moment) of their concession, which in Her Majesty's
Government's view covers the Sultan's territory up to the line defined
at (hi) above.
With reference to (iv) the hope is expressed that the Sultan will be able to
extend his authority peacefully and effectively over Central Oman and that Saudi
influence will be excluded from that area, and it is stated that Her Majesty's
Government are ready to assist the Sultan in this task but wish, if possible, to
avoid direct involvement.( 11 )
II.—Internal Affairs
8. The main problem at the beginning of this period was the absenteeism
of the Sultan, Saiyid Taimur, and his desire to abdicate. From the beginning of
1928 until his abdication at the end of 1931 he only spent between eight and nine
months in Muscat. He disliked the place and probably resented the close control
exercised over his affairs by the Government of India and its officers. He spent
much of his time in India, but also visited Europe, the United States of America
and Japan. In 1928 he visited the United Kingdom where he spent a month as
the guest of The King, by whom he was received in audience, and underwent an
operation for appendicitis. In March 1930 he sailed for India and informed the
Political Resident that he did not intend to return. The Political Resident or
Political Agent, Muscat, interviewed him on several occasions in India but failed
to shake his resolve. After a final interview with him in November 1931 the
Political Resident wrote to him saying that if he abdicated it would be necessary
to reduce his monthly personal allowance from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 2,000, and that
the arms subsidy of Rs. 1,00,000 which was personal to him would cease to be
payable, and appealing to him to reconsider his decision.( 12 ) He replied that owing
to his ailments he must persist in his refusal to return to Muscat, that he accepted
his reduced allowance and that the Government of India could do what they
wished about the arms subsidy. He accordingly announced his abdication from
the date of the letter (November 13, 1931) and appointed his son Sa'id as his
successor. In the circumstances it became necessary to accept the situation and
proceed with the recognition of Sa'id as Sultan.
9. Sa'id had returned to Muscat from his school in Iraq in 1928, and had at
once started training in administrative work. In 1929 he had been appointed
President of the Council of Ministers, and in view of his father's prolonged absences
quicklv became the virtual ruler of the country. He was Taimur's eldest son,
had reached the age of 21, and had already shown promise of considerable ability.
R LatoRa pS'/M ofoeSn. mUE 6230/267/91 of 1931).