تقارير إدارية من الخليج العربي ١٨٨٣/١٨٨٤ – ١٩٠٤/١٩٠٥ [ظ‎‎١‎٠] (٦٠٢/٢٥)

r-
■
18
ADMINISTEATION EEPORT OF THE PEESIAN GULF POLITICAL
I
Shaikh. Saleli wrote a pacific letter to His Highness to the effect that Seyyid Abdul Azeez and
himself, having: summoned the Semail tribes, had made peace between them, and that, their
object being- thus accomplished, they were returning'home. A similar letter from Seyyid Abdul
Azeez was also received. But the rebel leaders were dissimulating and their pretended friendly
action in tranquillizing the tribes and withdrawing their mei3 masked an ulterior design.
Their apparent abandonment of the enterprise, as later events showed, was intended to throw
His Highness off his guard and to mature their plans while watching for a more favourable
opportunity. s
On the "Sth September Seyyid Feysal was despatched to Nakh to settle disputes among
the Shaikhs at that town, and about the same time Seyyid Nasir-bin-Mohammed, Wali of
Mattrah, was employed to adjust misunderstandings among the Beni B&ttash in the Wady
Taeen. Both of these missions were successful. So far from the discord iiV the Semail valley
having been removed by Shaikh Saleh it had, in fact, become greatly embittered and strength-
ened, as he had hoped and intended it should, and the Sultan, being aware of the danger of the
continuance of this quarrel, now sent for the Shaikhs of the Nidabiyeen and Rehbiyeen to
Muscat, and used strenuous efforts to restore harmony between them and the Eeni Jabir.
Seyyid Feysal was subsequently sent to Semail to use his influence with the malcontents there,
but his efforts, like those of His Highness Seyyid Toorkee, met with an entire want of success.
The teaching and machinations of Shaikh Saleh had been too effective j the Nidabiyeen Shaikhs
refused to listen to any terms and remained irreconcileable.
The rebel leaders meanwhile were not idle. On the approach of Seyyid Feysal to Semail,
Shaikh Saleh, with Abdul Azeez, entered the upper end of the valley to counteract his pacific
schemes and to prevent any combination of the Ghaffiree tribes in that quarter. Shaikh Saleh
was also indefatigable at this time in writing letters to the Hinawi tribes, inciting them to rise,.
and Shaikh Jumah-el-Meskeri, who had joined Shaikh Saleh out of a personal grudge he had
against His Highness, wrote to the Shaikhs of the Ghaffiree tribes of Jaalan and "'Oman,
warning them not to join Seyyid Toorkee in his defence againt the coalition. Shaikh Jumah's
letters had in many cases an opposite effect to what he intended, as Arabs are not fond of being
dictated to, and several of the Ghafiiree Shaikhs subsequently supported His Highness out of
pure opposition to Shaikh Jumah.
Rumours of the rising reached Muscat, and some preparations were made to repel attack.
But the rebels^ intentions were not known for certain until the 19th October, when the Political
Agent received a letter from Seyyid Abdul Azeez, announcing his hostile intentions and desir
ing that the British subjects might be removed from danger. On the morning of the 21st the
vanguard of the rebel force, estimated at 1,800 men, arrived at Rui, and the main body came
up during the day. It was fully expected by the garrison that the enemy would rest that,
night in camp and attack Mattrah the next day. But Seyyid Abdul Azeez had devised a more
skilful plan, and, while he was supposed to be encamped at Rui he was marching through the
hills that encircle Muscat to take the town by surprise. The assault was delivered soon after mid
night by the rebels, who were dressed in black to escape observation, and, though the garrison
were taken completely by surprise, they received the assailants with such a heavy and sustained
fire that the latter were repulsed and driven from the walls with great loss. Seyyid Abdul
Azeez behaved with much gallantry, personally leading his men up to the assault, but he was
compelled to withdraw when he found the surprise had failed. The next day it was expected
that an attack on Mattrah would be made, and, as His Highness had formally requested
armed assistance, H. M. S. Fhilomel proceeded thither and threw a couple of shells over
the rebels' position, deterring them from advance. For three days after the rebels main
tained their position outside the town, threatening attack, and H. M. S. Philomel con
tinued an irregular fire at intervals ; but, in the meantime, the friendly tribes summoned by
His Highness to his assistance began to pour into Muscat and soon outnumbered those on the
offensive. Seyyid Abdul Azeez and Shaikh Saleh, who had made certain of victory, then retired
with their discomfited force, which had lost in the attack about 100 killed and 150 wounded,
to Sharkiyeh. His Highness now determined to make use of the large body of Arabs who had
responded to his call for assistance, of whom there were now about 3,000 in the town, and des
patched an expedition into the Semail valley to chastise the two disloyal Ghaffiree tribes who
had been the primary cause of these disorders and who had assisted Shaikh Saleh in his inva
sion. The force was under the command of Seyyid Feysal-bin-Toorkee, and soon brought
the Nidabiyeen and Rehbiyeen to submission, after punishing them by cutting down part of
their date groves. Seyyid Feysal, under instructions from the Sultan, then marched to the
Wady Ma'Awal, where he reduced that tribe, which had long been disaffected, to sub-
■1