"تقرير الإدارة عن المقيمية السياسية في الخليج الفارسي للأعوام ١٩١٥-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎٥‎١] (٣٩٦/١٠٩)

2i
PEBSIAN GULF ADMINISTRATION HEPOET
concentrated at Bandar Abbas in April and he bimself marched ^ith his staS
and the Cavalry and Artillery for Kerman, on the 17th of May. J he Infantry
followed some five days later. The march was accomplished without adven-
ture and General Sykes was received by his old friend, the Sardar INusrat,
and the population with open arms. The official reception concluded with all
due formalities, work was begun. The main tasks that fell to b e undertaken were
the raising of the South Persia Eifles, then known as the South Persia Military
Police, and the inyestigation of the recent conduct of the inhabitants so far as it
had affected British interests or might in the future affect the security of the
Biitish and the peace of the province.
The enlistment and organisation of the Police force was at once taken in
hand by Major Farran, Captain Powle and Captain Merrill who had been
appointed to Kerman for the purpose. British claims were received and were
investigated at the Karguzari in the presence of Captain Thorburn,
and referred to General Sykes for final orders. In some 16 cases ^ sentences of
fine, imprisonment, or expulsion from the town were passed and the majority of
these were carried into effect without difficulty. A few of the more important
cases in which execution was delayed will be referred to later on. The offences
were either having taken some active part in the disturbances on the Democrat
and German side or having illegally acquired the property of British subjects.
General Sykes was further occupied by work entailed by the command of the
Column which it was intended should proceed under his command to
Shiraz with a ^iew to restoring order in that quarter, and to organising a
British police force on the Bushire-Ispahan road. In this work General Sykes
was assisted by his Staff Officer, Major Eraser Hunter.
When the force arrived at Kerman a number of Austrians, Afghans and
others, members of Seller's party, who had been attacked, robbed and in some
eases wounded at Saadatabad were under the surveillance of the Persian
authorities at Saidabad, the capital of Sirjan. Bruggmann, a Swiss subject
and Agent of the German Persian Carpet Company, who had been an active ally
of the Germans and had been appointed by them " Vice-Consul " at Kerman,
was recovering from enteric fever in Kerman. He was arrested and, after an
investigation, General Sykes decided to send him and one or two others who had
also been caught in Kerman(?), to join those in Sirjan, whence the whole party
was to be sent down to Bandar Abbas for deportation to India. Arrangements
were made for an escort to be supplied by the Local Government and a certain
Shahzada Husain of Kerman town, who had a personal following of 20 armed
men, was appointed to take charge of the prisoners and escort and commissioned
to convey them to Bandar Abbas. The force and prisoners were duly assem
bled under his command, in Saidabad, but their departure was in the first
instance delayed by the fact that some of the wounded prisoners were not yet
in a fit state to travel.
Matters were in this position when Major D. L. R. Lorimer, who had been
appointed His Majesty's Consul, and arrived on the 2ith July in Kerman, took
over charge of the Consular and Political work from General Sykes. The
column started for Yezd en-route to Shiraz on the 26th, and were followed by
General Sykes on the 28th July. The force reached Yezd safely on 14th
August.
The situation in Kerman was highly favourable to the British. The real
governing power had remained in the hands of the Sardar Nusrat, of whose
loyalty to the British, as lonp as they are obviously dominant, there can be no
question. He had been, as we have seen above, an object of saspicion to the
Germans and to the late Governor-General, the Sardar Zafar, and of animosity
to the Democrats. He had certainly no reason to love the latter, but takings
loug view and contemplating the possibility of being thrown a^ain at some
future time on his own resources, he seems to have shown a very unvindictivc
spirit and to have counselled a policy of oblivion or of mild moderation in the
case of the more influer tial of the local leaders by whom he might at some
future date be oalled to account. There is no doubt that the driving energy
had come from the Germans, and the non-Kerman Democrat leaders who had
disappeared en masse, some to Shiraz and others to Tehran,