نسخ مطبوعة من رسائل السير هنري ويلوك لوزراء الخارجية البريطانية المتعاقبين تناقش الوضع في بلاد فارس. [و‎‎٤] (١٤/٧)

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Indly. —The commercial relations between the two countries, which from their mngnitude
are very important, will be entirely deranged. The Persians deprived of their usual supplies
from England will once more return to the manufactured goods of Russia ; and our own
merchants, alarmed by such repeated interruptions to the trade, will be weary of speculating
at a market which is found subject to so many contingencies.
Zrdly. —Persia will very soon discover that we have not the power to injure her; and so
long as she is coaxed and cherished by Russia, she has no immediate occasion for our alliance.
We shall therefore be more anxious to rtsume our lost footing at Tehran, than the Shah will
be to invite our return.
If force is to supply the place of conciliation, I should next wish to consider in what
manner England has the power of compelling Persia to more social feelings. I have elsewhere
observed that compulsion cannot with safety be resorted to; because the first consequence of
weakening the Shah is more completely to render him a tool of Russia—if this view is sound,
further enquiry is unnecessary, but as it may not generally be conceded, I will touch on the
two points by which Persia may be supposed to be accessible and vulnerable.
Is it by invasion ? All who have been in the country know the impracticability of the
passes which separate Dashtestan from the interior Provinces; and if these difficulties did not
exist, the poverty of the country, and the paucity of supply, for an invading army, would
discourage such an enterprise.
Is it by the unprofitable policy of setting up another Prince?—of creating a revolution?
—of disturbing a Government which is not oppressive, and which is not more unpopular than
would be any other we could raise in its place? Such projects might possibly be hazarded if
Persia were unprotected—backed as she is by Russia, they cannot for a moment be entertained.
Situated as we are at the present moment in Asia, encompassed by so many dangers,
warnings, and threatenings, it is impossible to act on all points with vigor, nor is it politic
to threaten where we have not the power of execution.
With the Shah of Persia it may be expedient to temporize. He has been mortified,—-he
has also strong ground for irritation in the occupation of Karrack,—that he has displayed
energy no person can question; that his obstinacy and pertinacity of purpose have disturbed
the peace of Asia, and involved us in great embarrassment, is undeniable. But circumstances
have developed in his character qualities which may render him formidable as an enemy, useful
as an ally, and he has redeeming virtues which, if properly directed, may lead him to the
steadfast upholding of the independence of the Persian Empire; and such an instrument,
at such an epoch, should be handled and moulded to our purpose.
We shall not lose in dignity by now conciliating Mahomed Shah, nor is it desirable to
try him too much by demanding that which his pride may have difficulty in conceding, nor in
resisting any concession which he may have a right to demand.
We cannot injure the Shah of Persia ; he may do us incalculable mischief by disturbing
our contemplated operations in Afghanistan, which I pray may still be cancelled, for I confess
that I cannot contemplate without awe and dread the labyrinth of political intricacies, and
military difficulties into which we are immersing; the calling into action the hostile feelings
of myriads of brave warriors west of the Indus; whilst we leave in India elements of disor
ganization which are strongly developing, even before the departure of our Army, which is our
only safeguard; and I do not regard as the least evil of the growing system, the annihilation
in the breast of the Shah of Persia of all expectation in the alliance of Great Britain.
(Signed) HENRY WILLOCK.
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