'تقرير حول مهمة نجد ١٩١٧-١٩١٨ [ظ‎‎١‎٥] (٦٠/٣٠)

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fied tliat Ibn Saud would be tlie first to recognize that H.M.'s Government's
Orders were the inevitable outcome of their victories over the enemy and in no
way connoted any desire on their part for the termination of friendly rela
tions with him.
13. The Sharif and Ihn Saud.
In the previous section I have had occasion to refer briefly to the mutual
incompatibility of the ambitions of the Sharif and Ibn Saud. The subject
M as not only of first-rate importance in relation to the work of the Najd Mis
sion during the period under report, but deserves very serious consideration
in relation to the plans of H.M.'s Government fcr the future of the Arab
world.
When I arrived at Riyadh in December, 1917, it became immediately
evident that Ibn Saud was actuated by consuming jealousy of the Sharif and
genuine apprehension in respect of the latter's unveiled pretension to be con
sidered the overlord, if not the actual ruler, of all Arab countries by virtue
ol his position as de facto supreme spiritual head of Sunni Islam. Concrete
expression had been given to his claims in this direction by the Sharif's
assumption of the title of " King of the Arab countries " (Malik Diyar al
Arab). Ibn Saud made no secret of his suspicion that the assumption of this
title rested cn some secret understanding with H.M.'s Government, of his
unwillingness to accept the position involved in such a claim and of his
anxiety lest H.M.'s Government's commitments towards himself, as expressed
in the treaty signed by Sir P. Cox in 1916, should be prejudicially affected
by their arrangements with the King. I made haste to assure Ibn Saud that
H.M.'s Government had no intention whatever of departing in any way from
their treaty obligations towards himself and that the Sharif's assumption of
the title in question was unauthorised so far as H.M.'s Government was con
cerned. The fact that I was again able to reassure Ibn Saud on these points
cn my return from Egypt, where I had had ample opportunity of discussing
the matter, militated largely in disposing him to accept with resignation the
modification of H.M.'s Government's military proposals regarding which I
had orders to inform him.
During the conversations with the Sharif, which took place at Jidda in
January, 1918, I was impressed by the fact th^t Ibn Saud's jealousy and dis
trust of tlie Sharif was only equalled by the latter's uncompromising attitude
-towards Ibn Saud whom he regarded as the chief obstacle to the realization
of his own ambition of supremacy in all Arabia. This in effect he was and
is and always will be, but it is not without interest to speculate whether it
would not have been possible in the earlier stages of the war for the Sharif
to obtain at any rate a substantial recognition of his Htle by Ibn Saud by
the adoption of a more conciliatory policy,
Ibn Saud was always in need of financifil and material assistance, in
return for which it is not inconceivable that he would have been ready to
place his own resources at the disposal of the Sharif for the prosecution of
Ins operations against the common enemy, as he did or tried to do later with
ns during the period of the Mission's activities; the Sharif, however, pursued
the policy of keeping Ibn Saud bare of resources and undermining his power
by supplying arms and money to tribesmen of Najd as a bribe to induce them
to desert their allegiance to Ibn Saud. By this action he roused the jealousy
and earned the undying hate of Ibn Saud, while at the same time adding
enormously to his strength hy arming people, who, onoe supplied and equip"
ped, would naturally turn to Ibn Saud for further guidance.
Again Ibn Saud, who had spent the whole period of his reign in con
solidating his authority in his own territories and had obtained from H.M.'s
Government recognition of his integrity and absolute independence within
those limits subject to subsequent delimitation of frontiers, was wise enough
to recognize that he was not and could never be strong enough under modern
conditions to extend his frontiers and had set himself to establish his rule
firmly on the basis of the Wahhabi system within limits already sufficiently •
wide. 1 he Sharif affected to find in this policy of consolidation a menace to
the security of his own position—in reality it was no more at the worst than
a safeguard against the menace to Wahhabi integrity involved in his own
pretensions—and, instead of setting to work to kill the Wahhabi revival by
kindness, he proceeded to fan the fanaticism of the people of Najd by the per
secution of ahhabi elements within his reach—cases in point are the Khurma
episode, the exercise of tyranny towards Najdis settled in the Hijaz and the
closing of the Hijaz markets to Najd commerce.
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Sharif, in spite of the great
advantages he has emoyed m virtue of his spiritual position and of the re
sources placed at his disposal by a Power disposed in every way to assist him
m the realisation of the ideal of Arab Unity, has, in the conduct of his rela
tions with his nearest powerful neighbour ", displayed a regrettable ab
sence of that tact and address, which are the first attributes of royalty. In
this connection and in view of the general trend of British policy in relation