ملف ٤٧٢٢\١٩١٨ الجزء ١ "بلاد الرافدين: إدارة السياسة والوضع" [و‎‎٢‎٧‎١] (٦٨٧/٥٥٧)

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play this role. I have always ventured fo dt- loiv 'd th f S,lerif of M«cea to
iutm-e of Iraq with the Sherif. as one of the ivirns in tf Ct dlsc ' ,lss '™ of the
ever permitted. I have also expressed my vieus ,'h nlv Im’tl 8 ' '"r 0118 ,'''’* 1 ' him ’ ™ s
objections to recognising him as Kiimof Vriii ' r J’ 1 d| o Po'dica! and practical
federate States. Tn my opinion a n ofe ii K, a " d , Soverel g n oJ ' a group of Con
tain King.of 1 lejaz, and de ’iied have"]! sohlfl011 that he should
I’owers while the foreign relations'of die Kao ^ f 018 ^
Aral) I otentates or States, sliould lie in onr h-inrl^ t/ li a ^i 0 r ler C01lf ederate
State a title mielit bo deviser! ; T- ^o r the-Arab Ruler of the Iraq
Hakim (Ruler), and all the Confederate 0 *!rulers \ U 1 ess Sidtan or
deference to King Hussein as Sherif of the Holy Pikes ddhe "nob pa L a PP ro .P riate
essential m view of their commitments to the Sherif His Vaiesh-’s C f '' on f d ? l 'f 1
even decide to guarantee the payment to him of an m, ual s fb 1 ^ 0vwnw f en ‘ ro *« b ‘
the revenues of Iraq,-as recognition of his sen iik “Unt ^Card ° nn Z'' 0111
dunug the war; or, as a religious contribution towards of 6 dTe Holy
II.
Observations on the more Detailed Issues.
romvHnul the Jccslmj m^Z^tfoTin^TeZr^TaZiwhflna^ % 'f l
A mg Hussein or his family carry with the local Arabs ? 9 dnr *
In my opinion, we have in the Naqib of Baohdad and his r., lll a,., • ,
which would carry the necessarv moral sanction in (he P ol i u-i ,,ynast ' C eIe,nellt
and, in my opinion, in Iraq ns a whole! I bkeve ^v
themselves with British interests The nresenl ir J10,1§ 11 to ld entily
prestige and influence not only in 2 ,t mT” “ V6ly ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية *“
India, and I feel sure his selection as Head of the StatC 8 i ’fi ^ ollam ™ edans of
appropriate solution, and he recH^ R , P- ! "'i ‘ ^ « ««
Mesopotamia. The Naqib con^himSf' up io Crpurh/'k 3 / 8 "? U “?
:? t tefc 1 ^
misnnderstood and resented by the Xaoib Tnd V-- f ’-i 1 ^ ]1! 'd 0 k JH10I b Ce greatly
onr most potent element of influence over, the Arabs of" r-uk' kifklk 1 " 1 ' 0
& It ^ ' Jmlant inferek ^
our military or ^
consideration that the inhabitants had not hecn at all mover hkl ; > d<1,berat ®
would, in our opinion, regard his failure with complete h,difference. ’ md
of a^uZuIZZtr^ f0r SeU,n0 UP a L ° Cal ^"rtaion or Ac,ministrations
There is adequate Arab or local material available or in the rnakino- r,„. H,,. ,
ordinate services of the administration. The difficulty we are con from, rl (yi ' Sub "
ami must be for some time to come, is to find individuals suitable for highei poskfnThe
administration, e.q., Mutessanfs, Qaimaqams, such as would be filled in th, T 1 f
Tkrkok- 01 C^ ga k tt d 0 tTU D T” fyC o“-i-io«ers,As4;akcZmL^
T , V 18 t iat ' aldel tdle } lll ' k ' s 1 fegime almost all these posts were filled bv mire
Imrlis ; these have been eliminated, and there is at present no one to fill thei • pLe
Wherever we have tried ex-officers of the late Administration they l.ave ahnost'
invariably proved unsatisfactory ; they are in fact saturated with the evil traditions of
t o ugime m .vlnch they have been brought up and trained. Until we can create
this element, enlisting as far as we are able the assistance of the Egyptian ami
Soudan Administrations, we must rely mainly on young British office,s ' J
rnen ion here hat whereas I have done my utmost to employ experimentally anv
inhabitants of the country at all likely to be suitable, this laudable ekleavour finds no
favour with the loca mhabiiants concerned. I am continually appealed to by Lk
not to place the conduct of their affairs in the hands of ex-officials of the late rea nt
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