ملف ٤٧٢٢\١٩١٨ الجزء ١ "بلاد الرافدين: إدارة السياسة والوضع" [ظ‎‎٣‎٠‎٨] (٦٨٧/٦٣٢)

■i
5. In any case we must set our faces against the admission of the slightest
Turkish element or participation in the administration. In this connection, I
should mention that when I was in Cairo it was suggested that,, as events were
shaping, we might be obliged to decide to come to some compromise with
Turkey at any moment; I also learnt there of Sherif Faisal’s secret overtures
to the Turks; and when asked my opinion I expressed the view that if in the
last resort we were compelled to come to some compromise with Turkey I did
not consider that the retention of nominal Turkish suzerainty need be considered
altogether incompatible with the realisation of our practical aims, always
provided that the country were safeguarded against the leasr control or
interference by Turkey in the administration. As cases in point we have the
precedent of Egypt and the more pertinent one of Koweit. The fact is that
the bulk of the people of the country are not concerned with abstract theories
or niceties of international principle; for example, as long as the Shaikh of
Koweit feels assured that his interests are under our practical protection, and
are safe in our hands, he does not trouble his head as to whether in the distance
Turkish suzerainty exists or not. I think the position would be the same in
the case of the inhabitants of Iraq, where nine-tenths of them are altogether
inarticulate, and all they are concerned with is the manner of their treatment
by the Government actually in control of Baghdad. As regards the remaining
tenth, who are capable of understanding the real issues, they 'would, of course,
not be completely reassured (supposing that the fiction of Turkish suzerainty
were being maintained) unless they were absolutely safeguarded against the
participation of Turkey in the administration. I assume, therefore, that we are on
common ground in considering that if the Turks were to be allowed to retain
the suzerainty of Mesopotamia (minus Basrah) they must, at any rate, be
completely eliminated from the administration, and that it must be our mission
to ensure that Iraq obtains the administration which the country needs and
which her future demands. There must be no Turkish Commissioner and no
Turkish flag. A special flag must be devised.
fl. Alluding for a moment to the question of relative status, as between
the Basrah and Baghdad Vilayets respectively, it is my very definite opinion
that a homogeneous administration in all practical aspects is not in any way
incompatible with a technical difference of political status, and that it is
essential in the interests of the country that the administration of both
v ilayets should be uniform, that of the Basrah Vilayet being brought into line
with Baghdad in due course.
i. In considering the precise form of the administration there are several
altei natives to be weighed in the balance, and attached to each alternative are
suosidiai} difficulties which need consideration. For the moment we wull
consider the Baghdad Vilayet only, on the hypothesis that Basrah Vilayet can
be made to conform to it at a convenient juncture.
o. j ug question ol me ^ Arab laqade ’ offers no insurmountable difficulties
0 fiV 1 . mn( ; Ihe essential problem is the determination of status to be
assigned to the province of Iraq. It is agreed that the administration should
be under British guidance, and the more complete the British control can be,
the better for the country. In fact, unless it is assured the country has no
fuiuie, for it would be impossible to get money for its development unless
investors are sat.sfied that their interests are fully safeguarded, a condition
” cannot > assured except under protective British supervision. How is
cat supeivision to be achieved ? The most satisfactory solution would seem
„ If g f™ en b I f Hlgh Commissioner assisted by a Council, formed
]u clt . y ot , t , 1 . e Heads most im P orta ut Departments of State, and partly of
pmsentative non-olficial members from among the inhabitants. But the
Joieign relations o such a government must obviously lie in British hands,
and it would thus be practically a British protectorate.
p r! lca B 11 " ailaa gement could be achieved and recognised by the
’pj 8 ,' e an( ^ 00( ’ j)U t if not, then the existence of a titular native ruler
won d become a necessity I do not think it would be impossible to find one,
nm the difficulty is that il the administration were given such a form it might