ملف ٤٧٢٢\١٩١٨ الجزء ١ "بلاد الرافدين: إدارة السياسة والوضع" [و‎‎٣‎٠‎٩] (٦٨٧/٦٣٣)

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^“pr«tirbS ham g ered ^ wpitulationu, and the right to
Which we should obviously do COntm ^y being one
adnhnistratioiido^corJhft^K 4 llave a nominal headpiece to the
thi nsTl 0 , ?? , Ct owu ioneign affairs under British guidance 1
and tire le^t 6 ’- ^ be P os ? il)k ' '<> <iud a local^ndidaie,
family of the Sherif of Mecca'^la^thhTfl? 1 ^ M lntroducm g on e of the
deplore the fnef that thr r • * a v V 11,1 P 10 e * ^ ^ lave always ventured to
one of the Pawns hi " ^scussion ot the future of Iraq with the Sherif, as
also expressetHnv views n^SPtiatJous with him, was ever permitted. 1 have
recoo-nisino-him as Kino-nf A* 11 fb 011 4 1 1 ' l x> btical and practical objections to
States In mv ooinirm ”> ‘ ra ila ancl Sovereign of a group of Confederate
remain Ki,n more reasonable solution would be that he should
Foretn Polers lf . d ^.>ve his own representative with
"V? ° n t ^ Y ! n t ie forei ^ n relations of the Iraq State ami of the
a m 1 p. 01 ] e ^ e p^ e ^ rab Potentates or States, should lie in cur hands. For the
less than Fin f ^ ^ tate a tlt l e nil ght he devised conveying something
vo il nndo he^Pf 1 0i ' Hakm and all the Confecferate Ruler!
tiFllolv Phce- 6 in F ap P r °P na f deference to King Hussein as Sherif of
llol \ i lace-, m the Hejaz. If considered essential in view of their com
irutments to the Sherif, His Majesty’s Government might even decide to
meni’^Tof i^r ^T* ^ v ” ° r T• aDnual subsid y in some form from the
e on ties of liaq, as recognition of his services to the cause of Arab indepen-
tlmHoHPW 6 War; 0r ’ aS “ relig ' 0US contribution towards the upkeep of
Observations on the more Detailed Issues.
. f 0n (I "U rerah authority, dynastic or representative, he discovered that
Lido command the necessary moral sanction in the country as a whole ? What
weight does Ling Hussein or his family carry with the local Arabs ?
In my opinion, wehaye m the Faqib of Baghdad and his family a dynastic
w !icii ' v oiiTu carry the necessary moral sanction, in the Baghdad
Vilayet undoubtedly, and, m my opinion, in Iraq as a whole. I believe they
could be brought to identify themselves with British interests. The present
Aaqib himself possesses a very great prestige and influence not only in
Mesopotamia but among the Mohammedans of India, and I feel sure" his
selection as Head of the State would be regarded as an appropriate solution
and be received with favour throughout India as well as Mesopotamia. The
Aaqifl considers himself superior, in purity of descent and nobility, to the
F 1 *™’ an( * 110 less important, and the introduction of a relative of the Sherif
. Mecca as Head of the State of Iraq would, in my opinion, be greatly
misunderstood and resented by the Naqib and his family, and thus tend to
alienate our most potent element of influence over the Arabs of Iraq. Xing
Hussein and his family carry no weight in Iraq, where only the most distant
mteiest is taken in him. In the early days of the Sherif’s entry into the lists,
when the question of giving him military help was being discussed, the
General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia, was asked by the War Office
whether the failure or collapse of the Sherif would prejudice our military or
political interests in Mesopotamia. We replied after deliberate consideration
that the inhabitants had not been at all moved by his successes, and would, in
our opinion, regard his failure with complete indifference.
12. What materials exist for setting up a Local Administration or
Administrations of a suitable character ?
There is adequate Arab or local material available or in the making for
the subordinate services of the administration. The difficulty we are com
fronted with at present, and must be for some time to come, is to find
individuals suitable for higher posts in the administration, e.g., Mutessarifs,
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