ملف ٤٧٢٢\١٩١٨ الجزء ١ "بلاد الرافدين: إدارة السياسة والوضع" [و‎‎٢‎٧‎٢] (٦٨٧/٥٥٩)

rmd crinmial powers granted them by the General Officer Commanding-in-CLief on
Z wedThh ^T I' " nU,tter .°f ^ 0 ' ,tside the towns we have been little
(tumbled n,th uv.l and comniereial suits, incapable of adjustment by compromise
throngli the good offices of the local Political Officer. J P e
o ,| 9 - tl ] e (<iv 1 iI 5 edi( ‘ al 1)l ' anc]| * We are almost ready for the separation
o the Civil Medical work from that of the Army Medical, and' just before I left
raised the question with the Director of Medical Services as to whether the time
it ' T q "rn co,lie for creat111 ^ a ( Wd Medical Department with a separate personnel
lough stdl to I hi under ins general supervision. It is under lively consideration’
• sllullar separation has recently been effected in the Department of Civil Posts hut
del 'mbhT ! ' K "' e | ;l, ' eS0<1 :' Pemlent 011 lhe lllilitar y organisation that we Wo to
ei to then \ lews to a great extent as to when developments are feasible.
(Wb/CTAf Wh J eh Br ‘ tish md Indi ™ T '-oopsunll be required
a)tu Ih, IUt IS a difficult question for me to answer without discussion with the
military authorities, and depends so much on the position in which we are left at the
end ol Hie war- In peace times (he Turks employed about 20,000 regulars of all
arms, ami ,1,000 gendarmerie for the maintenance of security am! orde in the
Baghdad and Hasrah Vilayets. I should say that, for a peace establishment for
miermd security only, we should require for some time after the war to keep a
division m Mesopotamia with one British regiment to a Brigade as at mesent
constituted, and about the same number of gendarmerie, exclusive of 1,000 civil police
foi be towns. In the course of time we should hope to replace the Indian troops bv
Aiabs, organised on the lines of the Egyptian .Army, but it must necessarilv tube
some years. I am not of the opinion that any Indian police will be required except
small leavens to begin with to form a nucleus for the training of the indigent
product, I hope that in this held we shall he able to give employment to the
Aral) ex-officer of the lurkish Army, otherwise this class will be a difficult and
malcontent element to deal witli. - - £imi
' ".I* 'bm-Dons in winch we can most, usefully direct our energies with a view to
popularising our Administration are Irrigation, Education, and Civil Medical In
all_ these departments we are alive to the importance of speedy progress and nrc
disposal 111 * lltra ° St com P at, ble with existing conditions and with the material at our
2 f ele ™ e7 \ t8 f at ^ e most need ^ encourage are: Firstly, tlie Jewish com-
mumty m Baghdad. In this connection 1 recommend that Dr. Weizman be induced
if Possible, to nn.v n. Visit, nv aor»rl O -I..- V! 1 , . .. COO,
•r .,1 . - . . , * ---ixj.u,u isi. \ \ t-LZiinau oe inaucef
j to pay a visit or send a reliable representative to Baghdad to influence the
Jewish community m favour of the British connection. Second! v, the Arab notables
and nobility among the townspeople of Baghdad and Basrah. They are a somewhat
impecunious and backward element, but one which it is very necessary to encourage
and take into our counsels as far as possible. Thirdly, the wealthy landlord element'
both Arab and Jew, and the important Shaikhs of the settled tribes. If it becomes a
question of obtaining public expression of feeling in favour of British control it
can be done ; but I think the subject would have to be handled cautiously. The
intelligent inhabitants of Iraq at the back of their minds are possessed bv the
apprehension that Mesopotamia may conceivably be restored to the Turks at the
1 eace Conference, and as long as this nightmare is present with them we should
merely emphasise it by asking them which Government they would prefer Bv so
doing we shouli I be clearly putting them in a very unfair position because they know
well that if they elect for British control and it nevertheless the Turks were
ultimately to return, all those who had declared for ns would receive short shrift
It will lie understood that the rural population of Iraq as a whole is quite inarticulate
and can hardly be consulted. As regards the elements who do count, e.m, the Jews
and other denominational communities in the large towns, they could ’without doubt
be squared in some forni to give expression to the sentiments that we desire. But
we must consider and decide what is to be regarded as constituting the representative
public opinion which we have to consult.
2d. Steps to he taken to consolidate Commercial Influence in Mesopotamia.
I lie great initial difficulty here is the absence of commercial transport and general
scarcity of tonnage and accommodation, and last, but not least, the uncertainty of the