ملف ٥٢٥٧\١٩١٩ "بلاد فارس: اللجنة العسكرية" [ظ‎‎٣‎٤] (٥٣٤/٧٣)

uH
The most likely obiective for attack would be (i) the province of Seistan This
Turbatr Haidari and the productive region
surrounding it The capture of the former would exercise considerable moral effect
throughout Pei^ae without difficult , y from Farah or Chakansur, and fooa
in'nlentv for an invading force would be available as soon as the cultivated area is
reaSec? Meshed can be^eached most easily from Herat by the valley past Turbat-
i-Sheikh Jam and supplies can be obtained along this line. Ihe route from Herat
to Turbat-i-Haidari via Rui Khaf could also support an invading force. The
frontier between the Namak Sar Lake and Seistan is hilly and difficult to traverse,
and supplies very scarce, except in the Sunneh Khaneh region. An advance into
this area is unlikely as leading to no direct tangible results.
Raiding by robber bands from Afghan territory has to be guarded, against at ail
times, and such raiding would increase m the event of hostilities between Peisia and
Afghanistan, when such raiding would be encouraged by the Afghan authorities.
In the past the villages around Rui Khaf and Turbat-i-Sheikh J am, in the north,
and those on the borders of Persian Seistan, in the south, have suffered considerably
from Afghan raiders.
4. North-East Frontier .—The future dangers to Persia on this side depend on
what the result of the turmoil into which Russia has been thrown by the revolution
will be. The result will be either that the area adjoining Persia on this side will
be formed into one or more independent States, or that this region will once again
form part of a large Russian State. The dangers to Persia's frontiers will be much
less in the former than in the latter case.
With Transcaspia formed into one or more small independent States, the danger
will be chiefly from bands of brigands which bad or unstable government in
Transcaspia might encourage to raid into Khorasan. The fact that Transcaspia
is chiefly desert, while the province of Khorasan is rich and fertile, will always be a
source of danger if Persia’s troops in this area are weak or unprepared, and might
lead to the inhabitants of Transcaspia endeavouring to seize this rich province for
themselves. Such an attempt, if Transcaspia consisted of one or more independent
States, might be made with a force of 2,000 to 3,000 men, who, unless they were being
encouraged by a larger power behind them, would not be likely to be well provided
with guns or munitions. The most likely line of advance would be by the main road
from Askhabad via Kuchan, but hostile parties could also 1 get over the other passes
from Kakha or Dushak into Khorasan.
Transcaspia, as part of a large Russian State, as formerly, w 7 ould present much
grea er dangers to Persia. The Transcaspian raihvay running parallel to the
Persian frontier and connected with Europe, would facilitate the transmission of
troops and munitions. The rich province of Khorasan would always be a tempting
thl nrnvinn r r g K P °f 6 SS 1 I J§ f he sterile and desert C0untl 7 lying to the north of
weathif d T 8 T a y f 0U d r eCOme ? tron g er as Khorasan’s undoubted mineral
would der.e fi yyl , P 0 . foi'ce that could be brought against Persia on this side
Russian State IfTA 'P Tfk f f °T t J lat th , e Government of the future united
such a State would S a umted f St , at6 h l fo ™ed, will take. It is improbable that
would « its, -P-
but from what has been effected by the ffieJik P ^
appear that a force nf 90 non Qnffine UibIie y ii ^ government of Russia, it would
* the “
case, on whKe^'uturaof Sfterrito™ SjoSiM! utfc® d „ e P en< *. » s in * he >“*
of the former Russian Em d ire will hf a bd b" t e C as P lan Sea that formed part
be much less if this territory’is formed into cmfn agai i n tlle dan g ers to Persia will
becomes, once 1 again, plrt of S f ateS n than p if ^
possesses one of the best harbours on the Caspian shore and! f Bunder . Gaz Persia
would be m a position to thrpaipn cUo ^ snore and a force seizing this port
province of KhLsan mayT^Xd "^ 0118 ° f th f Ca P ita! Wlth the
trade and communications with Enronp pX n P? rt Tehran so far as
objective to a hostile Power in command of thTc^pian^^ ^ f nother P rofitable
01 Ine Caspian. Descents at Lenkoran or
—. 4 '