أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [و‎‎٨‎٠] (١٧٦/١٥٩)

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“ If Sarwat does not feel strong enough to alter or remove Soudan articles
of Constitution, it is not easy to see how to help him, and it seems to me that
nothino’ is to be gained by trying to induce him to remain in office.
“ It seems probable that King may nominate Tewfik Pasha Nessim in
Sarwat’s place, and as things stand at present I am not disposed to endeavour to
influence His Majesty’s choice.
“ i propose, however, to speak sharply to King, pointing out to him—
“ (1.) That he has allowed to become widespread belief that he regards with
favour a group who are our declared enemies;
“ (2.) That fact that he has used every means in his power to bring about
fall of a Government that enjoyed my support implies hostility to policy that
commanded sympathy of His Majesty’s Government;
“ (3.) That I consider particularly unfortunate that his attitude should
have forced Government out of office at a moment immediately after assassina
tion of two members of a political party friendly to Sarwat; and
“ (4 \ That in these circumstances it will be with considerable misgiving
that I shall watch development of policy for which His Majesty is responsible.
“ i n a subsequent telegram I shall endeavour to explore believed implica
tions of Sarwat’s resignation.
60. The Sarwat Government, though supported by Lord Allenby, did not feel
.able to stand up against the combined forces of the Palace and the Opposition, anc.
resigned office on the 29th November.
Nessim Pasha becomes Prime Minister.
61 Kina' Fouad had undoubtedly scored a signal success, which was made more
complete when Tewfik Nessim Pasha, who early in 1922 had become the King s chef
du cabinet,” formed a Government whose chief characteristic was that individual
Ministers were acceptable to their Sovereign if not otherwise specially qualified tor
then^posUion. AHenb^ whose SU pp 0rt had not availed to prevent the fall of the late
Government, had no part in the formation of that which is pow m office, though he
has a high opinion of the present Prime Minister personally and is on good terms
with his colleagues. ’ ,, , , ,v
63 In the meantime His Majesty’s Government were able to prevent the
despatch to the Egyptian Government of the invitation to the Lausanne Conference
until it was ascertained whether the Ministry of Nessim Pasha would be prepared
to accept the Egyptian articles in the form agreed upon with Sarwat. Lord Allenby
immediately opened negotiations with the new Government, but up to the present
their fear of exposing themselves to hostile criticism by accepting anything less than
formulae likely to find favour with extreme Nationalist opinion has rendered any
agreement on this subject impossible of attainment. In consequence, the issue of the
invitation to Egypt remains suspended.
Part III—The Soudan.
Reconquest and Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1899.
64. When in 1898 the Soudan was rescued by an Anglo-Egyptian military
expedition from the barbarism into which the conquest of the Mahdi had plungei
the entire countrv, its status was determined by the convention concluded between
Great Britain and Egypt in 1899, establishing an Anglo-Egyptian condominium.
The terms of that instrument, which is reproduced as Appendix (C ), show that the
British title was based on the right of conquest, and they are so drawn as to make
Great Britain the predominant partner in the Administraiion of the Soudan. 1 he
Egyptian title is based partly upon the fact that the Soudan was an Egyptian
province which had successfully rebelled, and partly upon the military and financial
share taken by Egypt in its reconquest.
Why Egypt wants the Soudan.
65. There is no ethnical affinity between Egypt and the Soudan and, though the
northern half of the latter country is populated by Mahommedan Arabs their aversion
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