أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [ظ‎‎٣‎٥] (١٧٦/٧٠)

VJ
Administration without tlie machinery oi an Egyptian Ministry. It gave
him, it is true, greater power, notably in the realm of foreign affairs, than that
exercised previously by His Majesty’s agent and consul-general, but previous
experience of interregna of any duration had shown the futility of expecting any
adequate co-operation from Egyptian officials in the absence of Egyptian chiefs.
A Ministry was essential or the entire machinery was threatened with collapse,
('abinets of Affairs, pledged not to touch important questions, had been contrived
in 1919, 1920 and 1921, and the edifice had with difficulty been kept erect, but a
stage had now been reached which was too critical for such makeshift arrangements,
and a Ministry with a programme responding in essentials to the country’s demand
for independence would alone serve the occasion. There appeared to be only three
possible successors to Adly Pasha, namely. Abdel Khalek Sarwat Pasha, his
locum tenens, Mohamed Tewfik Nessim Pasha, the late President of the Council,
and Mohamed Said Pasha, also a former Prime Minister. The last named has a
little deserved reputation for being the “strong man" of Egypt, and is credited
with some ascendancy over the mind of his sovereign, but he is a dangerous intriguer,
his tenure of power has generally been characterised by resort to somewhat reckless
expedients, and his political views, though believed to be reactionary, are obscure.
Some key to them may be discerned in his close association with Prince Omar
Toussoun. In the opinion of those who value the qualities of courage, honesty and
integrity no public man in Egypt stood higher than Tewfik Nessim Pasha, but his
association with the protectorate w r as still too recent in men’s minds to make him
generally acceptable at that juncture, and when the crisis came he himself felt
that there would be no advantage in his assuming office. There remained Sarwat
Pasha, who had carried on the Administration with some success and had succeeded
in gaining the Sultan’s confidence after an inauspicious start. He had for some
time been regarded as the most promising candidate, and up to the moment of rupture
he had not stipulated for any conditions for taking office, probably in the belief
that, even if a full agreement were not attained, liberal concessions in unilateral
form would be made by His Majesty’s Government. The publication on the
3rd December of the draft treaty and more particularly of the accompanying letter
to the Sultan, destroyed the hopes of so easy a solution. Annexation was the only
construction which the Egyptians could read into these documents, and resentment
was general. 1 f another deadlock was to be avoided a bold lead on the part of
His Majesty’s Government appeared to be essential. The draft treaty represented
a definite policy which, while fully safeguarding British interests, accorded to the
Egyptian people a distinct advance in the management of their own affairs, and
in operation would have the marked advantage of placing certain responsibilities
on Egyptian shoulders which they should properly bear. By carrying into effect
the main provisions of the treaty as occasion arose, a Ministerial programme could
be formulated, and a constructive policy set in operation. It was realised that the
adoption of this course would involve the abolition of the protectorate by unilateral
declaration on the part of His Majesty’s Government, and consequently the
relinquishment of the control of Egypt’s foreign affairs and the reinstatement of
an Egyptian Foreign Minister, but this appeared to be the only means of putting
an end to the conditions of uncertainty and recurring disappointment which for
three years had blocked all administrative progress and had kept Egypt in a state
of seething discontent. The declaration of His Majesty’s Government to the Sultan
of the 3rd December amounted to a pronouncement of a British Monroe Doctrine
in respect of Egypt and, so it appeared, sufficiently safeguarded Britain’s special
position vis-a-vis foreign Powers.
10. Sarvjat Pasha s First Programme for Forming a Ministry.
21. His Majesty's Government, however, hesitated to adopt this course. The
Prime Minister had stated in the House of Commons on the 27th October that
no change would be made in the status of Egypt without consulting Parliament,
and, apart from this pledge, the Cabinet had with great reluctance agreed, only
as part of a general settlement including treaty guarantees from Egypt, to relinquish
foreign affairs. It is not perhaps necessary to record in detail the arguments which
were urged from Cairo in favour of the course indicated above and tiie objections
to it seen in London. Adly Pasha resigned on the 8th December, and under some
pressure Sarwat on the 11th December submitted a programme upon wffiich he
believed he could form a Ministry. Briefly summarised, the programme ignored
the draft treaty except in respect of the offer of His Majesty’s Government to