أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [و‎‎١‎٨] (١٧٦/٣٥)

| This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.
(S>
No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.
I
EGYPT AND SOUDAN.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 8178/1761/16]
No. 1.
O
The Committee of Imperial Defence.
Foreign uffice Memorandum respecting Military Policy in Egypt.
A MEMORANDUM (No. 439-B) by the Secretary of Stnte for War has been
circulated to the members of the Committee of Imperial Defence describing the military
policy which the War Office consider that His Majesty’s Government should follow in
Egypt. Before the committee take any decision in the matter, it is desirable that
careful consideration should be given to the difficulties of a political character to which
the adoption of that policy must inevitably give rise.
2. From paragraph i4 of the memorandum it is clear that the War Office look to
“the permanent retention of the present garrison in Egypt” and propose to spend
rather over half a million sterling on providing additional accommodation. It is,
primd facie, difficult to reconcile such intentions with the general proposition laid
down by His Majesty’s Government on the 12th July, in the parliamentary statement
on the Ruhr, “that the indefinite occupation by one country of the territory of another
“ in time of peace is a phenomenon, rare and regrettable in itself, to which an
“ honourable end should as soon as possible be found/’
3. The declaration of the 28th February, 1922 (“Egypt, No. 1, 1922.” Cmd. 1)92),
laid down that “ Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.” Even,
therefore, if allowance is made for the reservation for eventual settlement by Anglo
Egyptian agreement of questions relating to (a) the security of British communications
in Egypt, (b) the defence of Egypt, (c) the protection of foreign interests in Egypt,
and (d) the Soudan, it is clear that when Egypt applies for admission to the League of
Nations there can be no ground for British opposition to her candidature, and in the
absence of such opposition the application is likely to be granted.
4. When the Egyptian Parliament meets in a few months’ time it is only to be
expected that the question of the British garrison will be raised, either by the Govern
ment of the day in an attempt to silence Opposition criticism or by the Opposition in
order to embarrass the Government. When, as a result of these manoeuvres, the
Government is called upon to attempt an early settlement of those of the reserved
subjects which are connected with the maintenance of British troops in Egypt, it will
be impossible for His Majesty’s Government to refuse to open negotiations. It is,
however, altogether beyond the bounds of probability that an Egyptian Government
dependent upon a parliamentary majority could be induced to agree to the maintenance
for an indehnite period of British garrisons in Cairo or Alexandria or their immediate
neighbourhood.
a. During the negotiations which took place in 1921 with the then Egyptian
Prime Minister for the conclusion of a treaty between Great Britain and Egypt,
Adly Pasha would have been prepared to accept the following clause :—
“ The sole object for the maintenance of a British military force on Egyptian
territory in time of peace being the protection of British Imperial communica-
“ tions, all British troops shall be stationed in the zone of the Suez Canal outside
“ the neutral zone ; aerodromes and other auxiliarv services shall be established in
the same district, and the presence of these troops shall not constitute a military
“ occupation of Egypt nor in any way infringe her sovereign rights.
“ The rights of passage across Egyptian territory and the use of Egyptian
harbours and aerodromes shall only be open to British forces in time of war,
though facilities for military transport between the Canal zone and the nearest
“ port will at all times be accorded,”
future Egyptian Governments, who will have to render an account of their
proceedings to a popularly elected Parliament, cannot be expected to prove more
accommodating, from the British point of view, than did Adly Pasha. In these
circumstances the most that can be hoped for is some temporary arrangement liable to
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