أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [ظ‎‎١‎٧] (١٧٦/٣٤)

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10. In dealing 1 with this question, however, it is necessary to consider not only our
military requirements in Egypt but on our Imperial chain of communications. The
pre-war garrison of the Mediterranean consisted of :—
Gibraltar 2 battalions.
Malta ... ... ... ••• •.* o battalions.
Eoypt (including detachment at Cyprus)... 5 battalions (including 1 at Khartoum).
1 Cavalry regiment.
1 Royal Horse Artillery battery.
1 Mountain battery.
11. The Garrison which we propose should be retained on our Imperial chain of
communications is not so much an increase over the pre-war garrison as a redistribution
rendered advisable by the developments of the last nine years. It is still essential that
our garrison in the Mediterranean should be of the approximate aggregate strength of a
division at normal Colonial peace establishment. The only increases shown in the
present position are in the direction of Cavalry, Artillery and Royal Air Force, which are
required in order to complete the organization and to adapt it to the shifting of the centre
of gravity further east.
12. The strategic reasons for this orientation are sufficiently obvious to require but
little elaboration, and can be briefly tabulated as follows :—
(a) Our post-war position vis-d-vis Turkey and the obligations imposed upon us by
our mandate for Palestine.
(I>) The enhanced importance of the Suez Canal for the passage of our fleet to eastern
waters.
(r) The need for safeguarding the Canal against the additional dangers inherent in
the change in the status of Egypt.
(d) The liability to support Iraq so long as we remain responsible for that country
as the mandatory power.
13. To these essential strategic reasons for the maintenance ol our garrison in Egypt
can be added the incidental advantages which that country offers as a training ground for
our troops, facilities for which are peculiarly lacking in Gibraltar and Malta.
14. The permanent retention of the present garrison in Egypt would entail
additional expenditure on accommodation to that foreshadowed in C.P. 89 (2o), which
was based on the assumption that conditions would ultimately admit of some reduction of
the garrison.
It was proposed in that paper to provide temporary hutments only at Moascar, as it
was anticipated that this camp might ultimately be abandoned. To provide hutted camps
of a semi-permanent type for the whole of the garrison which cannot be accommodated in
existing barracks would involve the provision of accommodation for :—
1 Cavalry regiment.
1 brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
1 brigade, Pack Artillery.
3 Infantry battalions.
Some ancillary units.
The cost of this would be approximately £510,000.
This represents an increase of £200,000 over and above the estimate of £310,000
given in CJb 89 (23), but it should be noted that in that paper it was stated that no
provision had been made for replacing the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, which we aie undei an
honourable obligation to surrender to the Egyptian Government. ^
The cost of accommodation elsewhere of the troops now in the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks
is estimated to be £100,000 (included in the £510,000). _ .
Should a new depot for Ordnance stores or any considerable increase of hospital
accommodation become necessary, these would be in addition. Nor is any allowance
made for land purchase, the cost of which cannot be estimated till the final distribution of
the garrison has been determined and the site of the camps fixed.
D.
30/A July, 1923.