أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [و‎‎١‎٣] (١٧٦/٢٥)

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the western bank, Egypt would undoubtedly do all in her power to repel the attack
by force when the Turkish troops were attempting to cross the Canal. The result
would obviously be a violation of the neutrality of the Canal by Turkey, and this
violation we, in common with all the other signatory Powers, are bound to stop. Our
ground of interference, however, would not be the protection of Egypt against attack,
but the protection of the Canal against violation. So far as we claim to intervene
under the Convention, our intervention should be strictly confined to such measures as
are necessary to prevent the violation of the neutrality of the Canal.
The question of whether we are also bound or entitled to protect Egypt herself
against attack by Turkey is an entirely different question, which must be kept apart
from that of the preservation of the neutrality of the Canal, an international
obligation practically shared by the concert of Europe.
Our interference with force sufficient to protect and preserve this neutrality for
the benefit of the world at large does not, however, entail interference to preserve
Egypt so long as the neutrality of the Canal is assured.
Turkey, by violating the neutrality of the Canal, would, of course, violate the
Treaty to w T hich she is a party, and this would be an outrageous proceeding on her
part, but it would not release the other parties to the Treaty from their obligations
thereunder to see that the neutrality of the Canal is maintained.
It is possible that Turkey might argue that she cannot violate the neutrality of
the Canal if her object be merely to punish her rebellious or contumacious vassal, who
has no belligerent rights and no separate international status apart from Turkey.
The neutrality guaranteed, however, is really in the nature of a passage without let
or hindrance through the Canal for shipping of all nations, and this would obviously
meet with interference from bodies of armed men forcing a way across the Canal and
fighting on its banks, to the danger of the passing shipping.
APPENDIX III.
Foreign Office Memorandum on the Suez Canal Convention of 1888,
dated July 1, 1922.
There have been clear indications ever since our declaration to Egypt of the
15th March that the French intend to accuse us of a breach of our international
engagements in the matter of the maintenance of troops on the Suez Canal.
The Embassy at Paris are anxious for some indication of the lines on which we
will deal with such charges when they are made, and, though it is difficult to prepare
a detailed defence of our position without knowing the form which the attack will
take, it may not be inopportune to examine the whole situation in order to discover
whether that position is as vulnerable as the French seem to believe.
The “ neutrality ” of the Suez Canal first attracted attention in 1882, when Lord
Wolseley used Lake Timsah as a base for his advance on Tel-el-Kebir. His right to
do so was violently opposed by M. de Lesseps and the Administration of the Company,
but their pretensions were described, in a written opinion of the Lord Chancellor
(Lord Selbourne), dated the 14th September, 1882. as preposterous, being based on
Article 14 of the Company’s concession of the 15th January, 1856, which merely
declares that the Canal and its dependent ports shall “ always be open, as neutral
“ passages, to all merchant-vessels passing from one sea to the other, without
“ distinction, exclusion or preference of persons or nations.'' Lord Selbourne
observes, with reference to the above passage, that “ a stipulation more irrelevant to
“ warlike measures, taken by the Khedive or his allies for the defence of the Govern-
“ ment of Egypt against foreign or domestic enemies cannot well be conceived.'
Some three months after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, Lord Granville addressed a
circular to the Powers on the Egyptian situation, and, inter alia, alluded to the
arrangements which should for the future be adopted in connection with the “ free
“navigation” (an expression which he preferred to “neutrality") of the Suez
Canal.
Nothing further happened till 1885, when, at the instance of the French Govern
ment, it was decided to assemble at Paris a Commission composed of representatives
of the Great Powers, as well as of Spain and Holland, “ to establish by a conventional
“ act a dehnite system for guaranteeing at all times and to all Powers the free use of
“ the Suez Canal.”