أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [ظ‎‎١‎١] (١٧٦/٢٢)

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108. During a hypothetical war in the future the following appeal to be the
three conditions that require consideration :—
(a.) France an ally or a sympathetic neutral.
(b.) France an unsympathetic neutral.
(c.) France hostile.
No difficulty is anticipated in case (a).
As regards case (b), it would be within the power of the Canal A minis ra ion
to impede the passage of the Fleet and its attendant auxiliaries in a vane \ o ways.
There are innumerable difficulties than can be raised and exaggera i e
authorities wish to be obstructive, which would disappear if they are sympa e k
The fact of the Canal Zone being under British martial law would not necessarily
make the functioning of the canal organisation easier rather the reverse, as i
might irritate French ammir-propre.
109. As regards (c), it might be necessary for us to take over the imnnmg of the
Canal altogether, making full use of loyal or sympathetic personnel. Ibis won d e
a difficult, but not an impossible task.
It does not, however, arise in connection with the problem under discussion,
which presupposes that Japan is the only enemy.
110. In either case (b) or (c) the more British personnel that can be employed in
the Canal Service the better; and a possible line of action is suggested in the
inflation of numbers of British personnel in the Pilot Service.
111. The British Directors of the Suez Canal Company might be approache
with a view to establishing the principle that the number of pilots of eayh nationality
should bear some definite relation to the tonnage of that nationality using e ana
This would involve the number of British and Dutch pilots being increased con
currently with a corresponding decrease in Greeks and Italians. trenchmen
presumably hold a privileged position, but reference to the Table in paragraph
shows that the number of Greeks and Italians is quite disproportionate Such a
measure, if carried out gradually, should eventually ensure us a substantial majority
and a useful nucleus in war time in the event of our having to take over the running
of the Canal from the French.
112. It would appear from Sir Ian Malcolm’s despatches that the Committee
of Management at Paris are generally able to meet any suggestions put forward by
the British representatives, but as a last resort it would seem from the following
extract from his despatch dated the 3rd July, 1922. that we hold the trump card .
“As regards the British representation on the Board, it would seem to be
“sufficient. °In the event of any grave difference of opinion arising (such as
“has not arisen since 1883), it would always be possible for nominees of His
“Majesty’s Government, holding shares in their name, to produce a majority ol
“votes at a General Meeting.”
XV.— Conclusions and Proposed Action.
113. The effect on British Imperial Strategy of the effectual blocking of the
Suez Canal immediately prior to the outbreak of war with -Japan would be so
disastrous as seriously to imperil our chance of being able to bring the war to a
successful conclusion. . . , ,, _ n
Not only would the safety of our Eastern bases, and with them the means o
maintaining' our Fleet in an efficient and mobile state be seriously imperilled, but
British Imperial trade, communications and territories m the East would be laid
open to heavy attack, and denied protection over an indefinite period.
114. The difficulties of blocking the Canal, in the absence of suitable deterrents,
are such as could be overcome by an enterprising nation.
115. The difficulty of organising suitable deterrents is chiefly due to the
limitations inherent in our relations towards Egypt and our position in the buez
Canal Zone, and vis-a-vis the Suez Canal Company. These* difficulties might,
however, to some extent be overcome by pursuing, so far as possible, the policy based
on the following principles :—
(i.) Make sure that all Treaties we conclude with Egypt, Turkey, or other
Powers do not in any way circumscribe the power of Great Britain
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