أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [و‎‎٩] (١٧٦/١٧)

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Parenthetically it should be observed that the longer the carry
the less oil fuel will there be available at its termination on account of
consumption by the oilers themselves during the passage, e.g., 1,200,000
tons shipped at Abadan is only equivalent to a million tons available at
Singapore.
(vi.) Reduction of speed due to causes outlined above deprives ships of one of their
best defences against submarine attack during the latter part of the
voyage.
70. regards (c), the whole of our Far Eastern strategy is based on the
existence of a large reserve of fuel at Singapore, i.e., close to the Fleet. The increase
in the “ period before relief ” of Singapore to two and a half or three months would
bring us within measurable distance of having to contemplate the loss of Singapore,
or at least the destruction of its Naval supply and maintenance facilities.
Effect of Loss of Singajgore Oil Reserve.
71. The loss of Singapore oil installation would at once destroy the mobility of
the Fleet, and render effective operations against Japan from Singapore impossible.
We should be dependent on oil brought in tankers along a long and vulnerable line
of communications. In this connection, the Admiralty would again point out that,
apart from the limitations of the world’s oil supplies, the world’s tanker tonnage is
inadequate to supply a Fleet operating in such distant waters, and for this reason
the establishment of the Singapore and other installations in the East has become
part of the Government policy.
Effect of Loss of Oil Reserves on Route to the East.
72. The loss of oil installations at such places as Trincomali, Colombo and Aden
would impose a further strain on our already inadequate tanker tonnage and further
prolong the period before relief at Singapore.
Effect of Loss of Naval Repair Eacilities.
73. The loss of Naval repair facilities at Singapore would be equally disastrous.
74. The strength of a Fleet can only be measured in terms of ships capable of
taking the sea and performing their functions up to the full limit of their fuel
endurance.
Distances in the Pacific are enormous, and the endurances of our ships are even
now barely sufficient. Under the conditions assumed a twofold process will set in :—
{a.) Material will deteriorate, and at- a more rapid rate than in temperate
climates, and there will be little chance of reviving it without detaching
ships to far distant ports such as Bombay, Sydney, Durban and Malta.
{h.) The bottoms of ships will become fouled, and their speed and endurance
thereby decreased.
75. Deterioration of material, or detaching of ships to distant dockyards will
both result in reducing the number of vessels available to meet the enemy and impose
our will on Japan.
The number of ships actually available for service will thus from one cause or
another gradually shrink to a number approximating to the number we can repair
and keep efficient.
We cannot count on having the repair facilities of Hong Kong available, as it is
only reasonable to suppose that, having plenty of time to accomplish her object,
Japan would concentrate on reducing Hong Kong also.
76. The shortage of docks, as revealed by a close examination of requirements
compared with facilities existing within 2,000 miles of Singapore, is as follows :—
Shortage.
Per cent.
100
20
90
100
Bulged Capital Ships
Light Cruisers and Various ...
Destroyers
Submarines
77. The normal repair and refitting requirements are, however, entirely
overshadowed by the situation that would arise after a Fleet action.
A badly damaged ship can often only be saved by putting her into dock.