أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [ظ‎‎٧] (١٧٦/١٤)

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40. The conditions, however, were peculiar, as Germany or her allies had dnect
access to the Eastern shore of the Canal, across Turkish territory and the
Peninsula until early in 1916, when more extended military defences, co\enng ic
Eastern approaches to the Canal, were organised. . , , , ,
These conditions are not likely to recur so long as Great Britain holds le
mandate for, and is in etfectivevOccupation of, Palestine.
41. At the same time, ingenuity and a free use of money might secure the same
end by different means, and it would be unwise entirely to neglect precautions against
this form of attack.
42. The detection of the actual laying of the mine would be more difficult than
in the case of a mine laid from a merchant ship, but this method ol minelaying would
be equally unreliable in securing the attainment of the object aimed at.
43. The defences against this form of attack partake more of a military than of
a Naval character, but the patrol and the minesweeping of the ( anal by mqtoi
launches and light craft w r hich would be organised as a matter of common precaution,
together with a system of traffic control, would ensure a certain degree of immunity
from the consequences of this and other forms of minelaying.
YIII.—Placing a Considerable Force, including Guns, on the Banks and Sinking
any Vessel attempting to Pass.
44. This was considered a likely form of attack in 1910, when the Committee
of Imperial Defence w 7 as considering the question of the responsibility of the Navy
and Army for the defence of the Suez Canal (C.I.D. Paper 11 ob of the 2nd June,
1910), but it would appear to be too remote in the case of a war with Japan to merit
consideration in this paper.
IX. —Sniping at a Passing Vessel, Killing the Helmsman, and Causing her to
Run Ashore.
45. This form of attack might be secured by a remote enemy if we were not in
effective occupation of the banks of the Canal, but it can be effectually countered, as
it was during the late war, by erecting sand-bag protection on the bridges of all
ships.
X. —By Sinking One of the Large Canal Dredgers.
46. This could not be done without some sort of collusion with the personnel
employed in Suez Canal craft, and is overshadowed by the much greater and more
effective threat of a merchantman sinking herself.
XL—Effect of Blocking the Canal on British Imperial Strategy.
47. The effectiveness with which British Imperial policy is upheld in distant
waters relies in the last resort upon the effectiveness of Naval intervention, wdiich in
turn is dependent on the mobility of the Fleet.
48. The Washington Conference has placed the British Empire in the position
of being the only Power which can counter, with adequate Naval Forces, any
aggressive tendencies on the part of Japan.
49. Should a situation arise which called for our active intervention in the Far
East, it would be necessary to despatch a Fleet of sufficient size to defeat or neutralise
the Japanese Navy.
50. The apparent superiority of the British Fleet over that of Japan is largely
discounted by factors inherent in a campaign conducted at a great distance from our
main sources of supply.
51. These difficulties at present exist in an aggravated form, but will gradually
be eliminated or minimised as the Government policy of building up reserves of oil
fuel on the route to the East, and creating a Naval Repair Establishment, supply and
oil-fuel depot at Singapore matures.
52. Fixed and mobile local armaments are also required at Singapore and
elsewhere to defend the means whereby the Fleet is rendered mobile and maintained
in a state of constant readiness for action.