أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [و‎‎٧] (١٧٦/١٣)

(a.) For a Japanese merchantman to sink herself in the T anal at a selected time
and place.
{b.) For a neutral merchantman to sink herself in the Canal at a selected time
and place.
(c.) For a specially fitted ship to sow mines in the Canal at selected points in the
hope that either a merchant ship or one of our larger men-of-war would
strike the mine and thus block tne Canal.
{d.) For the surreptitious laying of mines from the banks of the Canal with the
same object as (c).
The object might also be achieved—
(e.) By placing a considerable force, including guns, on the banks, and sinking
' any vessel attempting to pass.
(/.) By “ sniping ” at amassing vessel, killing the helmsman, and causing her to
* run ashore.
(g.) By sinking one of the large Canal dredgers.
Y.—Blocking of the Canal by the Sinking of a Merchant Ship.
32. The list of requirements in paragraph 10 looks, at first sight, somewhat
formidable; it is not, however, thought that it would be difficult for the Japanese
to secure its fulfilment, bearing in mind their natural secretiveness and patriotism,
their capacity for minute detailed organisation, and the policy which found such
striking expression in the attempts to block Port Arthur before the official declara
tion of war.
The various factors which make for the success of this operation were examined
in detail in Section III.
33. Although it might be possible to arrange for a neutral to sink herself, the
operation, from the point of view of the Japanese Naval Staff, would lack the element
of reliability which is so essential to ensure its successful execution, and although the
possibility of neutral action in this respect should not be ignored, it is considered
that the chief danger lies in attempted blocking by a Japanese merchant ship, two
of which on the average pass through the Canal each way per week.
¥1.—Laying of Mines from a Merchant Ship.
34. As regards (c), the sowing of mines from a specially equipped merchantman
would be an indirect, and far less reliable method of securing the same result as that
aimed at by (a) or (6)—the blocking of the Canal.
35. Referring to Section III, it will be seen that nearly all the factors required
to ensure a successful block are lacking, and that this form of attack possesses, in a
marked degree, the element of unreliability.
36. Moreover, considerations over which the enemy has no control, would decide
the selection of the pilot for and nationality and type of ship which strikes the
mine, assuming, for a moment, that the presence of the latter has not already been
discovered and suitable precautions taken.
37. Certain visible above-water fittings would be necessary in a ship adapted
for laying mines, and the actual laying of the mine would entail some unusual
activity on the part of the crew which would be bound to arouse the suspicions of the
pilot, especially if the latter were warned what to look out for. The actual dropping
of a heavy object into the water could hardly escape the notice of the pilot, whose
collusion would be required in order to ensure suppression of the fact that the
dropping of the mine had been detected.
38. In the above connection it can probably be assumed that the Canal
Authorities will take all precautions that are within their power on the strength of
representations made by the British Government.
YU. —Surreptitious Laying of Mines Transported to the Canal by Land.
39. During the late war, five mines were laid in the Canal after being trans
ported to the Asiatic side across the Sinai Peninsula by camel or other means. Of
these, only one was struck by a ship—the steamship “ Teiresias "—with the result
that the Canal was blocked for several days.
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